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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
South Africa has had a free mandate theory of representation up to 1994.  From 1994 
to 2002 an imperative theory applied and in 2003 a limited hybrid free mandate was 
introduced. The origin of parliament, the development of representation as a concept 
in Public Law and the birth of political parties are studied.  It is shown that parliament 
and representation were natural developments that occurred at the same time, not by 
grand design, but by chance.  
It is also shown that political parties appeared first as informal intra-parliamentary 
groupings that developed into extra-parliamentary organisations, organised to achieve 
and exercise power in the political system as the franchise became more liberal. 
The factors that influence a member’s mandate and floor-crossing as such are 
discussed. 
Finally it is concluded that from a legal historical perspective, a free mandate of 
representation is the preferred theory of representation in public law. 
 
 
 
 
KEY TERMS 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“For the roots of the present lie deep in the past, and nothing in the past is dead to 
the man who would learn how the present comes to be what it is” 
William Stubbs The Constitutional History of England vol 1(1870) v. 
 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
It is common knowledge that prominent political leaders such as Sir Winston 
Churchill,2 General JBM Hertzog3 and Mrs Helen Suzman4 all crossed the political 
floor in their long public careers more than once.  That an anti-defection clause was 
deemed to be necessary for political stability in 1993 is understandable, but the outcry 
with which the return to a semi-free mandate system of representation was met in 
2002 was surprising in the light of South Africa’s constitutional history. 
Since the first attempt to reintroduce the free mandate in 2002, the issue of floor-
crossing became a very heated debate, but no or very little reference was made to the 
fact that South Africa had always had a free mandate system of representation and 
that floor-crossing was a regular feature in the pre-1994 Constitutional regime.5  In 
both the certification judgments6 and in the United Democratic Movement v  
                                                 
2 Churchill was elected as a member for Oldham in 1900 as a Tory but jointed the Liberal Party in 
1904.  In 1924 he returned to the Conservative Party where he remained, becoming Prime Minister 
twice. 
3 Hertzog left the South African Party in 1913 and founded the National Party shortly thereafter.  In 
1934 he, together with Smuts, formed the United Party and in 1940 he joined the Herenigde 
Nasionale Party. 
4 Suzman was elected to Parliament in 1953 as a member for Houghton for the United Party but 
crossed to the Progressive Party in 1959 and became a member of the Progressive Federal Party and 
the Democratic Party in due course. 
5 It appears that since candidates’particulars no longer appear on the ballot paper and that because the 
ballot paper contains the particulars of political parties only, it is seen as inherently contradictory for 
individuals to cross the floor with retention of their seats. See NW du Plessis Alternative Electoral 
Systems for South Africa (2001) 19.  
6 Ex parte Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC) and In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC). 
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President of the Republic of South Africa and Others7 the Constitutional Court did not 
refer to the position before 1994 and the matter seems to have been approached purely 
from the view of the Constitutional Principles and the Constitution itself.  Reference 
was made to the constitutions of other countries,8 but the Court did not refer to the 
development of the concept of representation or floor-crossing as it appeared in the 
past. 
 
In Executive Council Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South 
Africa9, the Constitutional Court stated that the 1993 Constitution showed a clear 
intention to break away from the past.10  This notion was reiterated by the outgoing 
Chief Justice in a farewell address to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development, when he said that although South Africa was 
spared a revolution in the political sense of the word, the country did experience a 
constitutional revolution.11  That the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa 
did herald the beginning of a new chapter in South Africa’s constitutional history can 
not be overstated, but to say that it was a constitutional revolution implies that a line 
has to be drawn through the pre-1994 Constitutional regime, negating the fact that 
many aspects of the old system were in reality used as the building blocks for the new 
system.  Notwithstanding the fundamental changes introduced by the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions, the changes were introduced through the existing constitutional process 
                                                 
7 Please see Chapter 6.3. 
8 Please see Chapters 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. 
9 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) . 
10 A more acceptable approach was taken by Mahomed J in S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) at 487 where he stated that that part of the past which is defensible is retained but that there is 
a decisive break from “that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and 
repressive.”  
11 Address by Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson in Good Hope Chamber, Parliament, Cape Town, 7 
June 2005. 
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of the time, therefore perpetuating the nexus between the old and new.12  It is 
consequently writer’s submission that the democratisation of South Africa was not a 
revolutionary process but an evolutionary process and that the golden thread that runs 
through our constitutional history from the earliest times was not severed by the new 
Constitution.13  The new Constitution is silent on aspects such as the responsibility of 
political representatives, their mandates, how candidates should be appointed by 
political parties etc. and it is submitted that the common law remains relevant in such 
cases as long as it is brought into conformity with the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution.14  On the question of floor-crossing the Constitution has been changed 
two times and the Constitutional Court has considered the matter twice, giving 
slightly divergent views in the two judgments.  In none of these cases was an 
historical approach adopted. Although the Constitutional history of British public law 
is very well documented and authoritative research has been done in South Africa on 
representation in public law,15 very little research has been done on the development 
of the mandate of political representatives and the matter of floor-crossing. 
Furthermore, since South African politics became more and more dominated by the 
ruling party from 1960 to 1994 and post-1994 by the new ruling party with even a 
stronger position in Parliament, the mandate of a Member of Parliament appears to 
have become less defined. This situation was aggravated by the strong hold that 
                                                 
12 Please see Section 229 of the interim Constitution that stated that “Subject to this Constitution, all 
laws which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were in force…shall continue 
in force…subject to any repeal or amendment of such laws by a competent authority”. Schedule 6 
clause 2 of the 1996 Constitution similarly provides for the continuation of existing law subject to 
repeal or amendment.  
13 The evolutionary development of our Constitutional Law is illustrated by the judgment of 
Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa & Another: In re Ex parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) where he dealt with the 
development of the power of the Courts to review administrative decisions under the different 
constitutions since the South Africa Act, 1909 at 692 to 698. 
14Commissioner of Customs & Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of  Customs  & 
Excise v Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight 1999 (3) SA 271 (SCA) at 786 F G.  
15 Basson DA Verteenwoordiging in the Staatsreg unpublished LLD thesis University of South Africa 
(1981). 
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political parties started to get over individual members, which hold was 
constitutionalised by the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions.16 
 
In the light of the above, the focus in this study is on the historical development of 
Parliament, the development of the concept of representation, the development of 
political parties and matters that influence a Member’s mandate.  Against this 
backdrop floor-crossing is studied as it occurred in South Africa from 1910 to the 
present.  Finally, a conclusion is reached as to whether floor-crossing should be 
permitted or not in South African public law. 
 
 
1.2 DELIMITATION OF STUDY 
 
Our Constitutional heritage includes the history of the development of Parliament in 
England over more than 700 years. Although that history has been well documented, 
it was considered necessary to recapitulate the salient aspects of its development to 
indicate how our present day Parliament can be traced back to the original Parliament 
at Westminster.  Parliament and representation go hand in hand but had different 
origins.  A study of the development of representation as it eventually manifested in 
South African constitutional law is made. The emphasis is historical and theories of 
representation are referred to only where relevant. 
 
To get the full picture of the development of Parliament and representation as a public 
law concept it is also necessary to understand the development of political parties and 
                                                 
16 Section 43(b) of the interim Constitution and item 13 of Annexure A of Schedule 6 of the 1996 
Constitution. 
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the interaction of these three phenomena.  However, as the development of political 
parties is a vast study on its own, this work will focus only on the foundation of 
political parties and the development of their control over Members of Parliament.  
Both intra and extra-parliamentary factors that influence a representative’s mandate 
are looked at, and in the final analysis floor-crossing as such is addressed. 
 
Developments of a temporary nature that had no effect on the final outcome of the 
present situation in South Africa, such as the Homeland Policy and Tricameral 
Parliament are referred to but not discussed in detail.  Since the subject matter is vast 
and the scope of the study limited, it is not intended to fully explore the subject but 
rather to tickle the appetite for more study of a very interesting and topical subject. 
 
Representatives in this study are limited to Members of Parliament17 and more 
specifically Members of the National Assembly, unless the context clearly indicates 
the contrary. 
 
An historical approach was followed in this study and the emphasis therefore is on 
historical fact and not on theory. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Presently both members of the National Assembly and members of the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) are referred to as Members of Parliament but as there is a clear distinction between 
the functions and election of the members of these two Houses of Parliament, it is suggested that 
another name be found for referring to members of the NCOP. In Doctors for Life International v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others CCT 12/05 (not yet reported at time of submission) 
Ngcobo J pointed out that the two institutions represents different interests in the law-making process. 
The National Assembly represents the people while the NCOP represents the provinces. See par 29.    
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1.3 CLASSIFICATION OF STUDY 
 
The approach to the subject matter and the system that is followed will be determined 
to a great extent by the intention of the research.  Since the aim of this study was to 
show that the roots of the present lie deep in the past and that to understand the 
present one has to know the past, an historical approach was followed.  It was 
therefore a premise that the study should commence with the origin of parliament and 
its development to the present.  The concept of representation in public law developed 
by chance at the same time as parliament and it flowed from this that a study of the 
origin of representation in public law should follow the chapter on the origin of 
parliament.  Since representation in public law cannot be imagined without political 
parties, the birth of political parties had to be studied to fully understand the position 
of a representative, hence Chapter 4. 
 
In all three these Chapters the research commenced with the position in Britain where 
these concepts originated and their development as it manifested in South Africa was 
followed to the present.  Since these concepts developed without a grand plan and 
purely by chance, there are no clear dividing lines between the development of the 
concepts studied, with the result that there is a certain degree of overlap between the 
chapters.  In Chapter 5 the factors that influence a representative’s mandate are 
studied and in view of the fact that political parties play such a dominant role in this 
regard, much attention was given to their control over members, especially in the 
compilation of candidate lists. 
 
  7
In Chapter 6, floor-crossing as it occurred since 1910 is discussed in detail.  A 
conclusion is made at the end of each chapter and a final conclusion is reached in 
Chapter 7.  Finally four recommendations are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTION OF ITS 
MEMBERS 
 
“It was a lucky thing indeed for Great Britain that her people had the good sense to 
choose the path of peaceful, if slow, constitutional evolution.  Any other course, which 
tended unduly to hasten changes, would have been dangerous, considering the 
extremely backward state of the political education of the great mass of the 
population.” 
GE Hall   A Brief Survey of English Constitutional History (1925) 219 – 220. 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The origin of the South African Parliament lies far back in British Parliamentary history 
and the development of the Westminster Parliamentary system over a period of more 
than seven hundred years.18 
 
Constitutional development in England was a slow process and the growth of 
constitutional institutions was so gradual that when their significance came to be 
realised they had already been in existence for some time.19  Consequently it cannot be 
stated with any degree of certainty exactly how and when the concept of representation, 
as found in all modern democratic systems, took root in England, but the oldest writ of 
summons to the Royal court dates back to between 27 May 1204 and 27 May 1205.20  It 
can therefore safely be accepted that the origins of Parliamentary representation date 
back to the beginning of the thirteenth century.  Nevertheless, general regular 
Parliamentary elections in which every adult man and woman secured the right to vote, 
                                                 
 18 Carpenter Gretchen Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (1987) 26. 
19 Lovell CR English Constitutional and Legal History: A survey (1962) X1. 
20 Pasquet D An Essay on the Origins of the House of Commons (1925) 1964 reissue 1. 
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only date back to 1928 in Britain21 and to 1994 in South Africa.22   The idea of regular 
general elections once every five years is therefore in historical terms, a recent 
development even in the United Kingdom where the system developed.23 
 
It is generally accepted that the word Parliament is derived from the French verb 
“parlar”, (to speak), and originally simply meant speech or dialogue.24  However, 
Ilbert25 traces its Latin form as applied by Monistique Statutes of the 13th Century to the 
talk held by monks in their cloisters after dinner.  The term was later used to describe 
solemn conferences such as that held between Louis IX of France and Pope Innocent IV 
in 1245.  In England the word was first used when Henry III (1216-1272) summoned a 
council or conference of great men to discuss grievances.  This event was described by 
a contemporary chronicler as holding a Parliament.26  The word took root in England 
and was soon applied regularly to the national assemblies summoned by Edward I 
(1272-1307). 
 
Parliament as a lawmaking body has its roots in the Germanic concept that the law was 
supreme and immutable.  The law could therefore not be changed, but had to be found 
and it was found by the council of the King’s wise men27 or by an assembly of the 
people.28  These findings or judgments took place in the form of dooms and were 
regarded as declaratory.  The concept of statal government authority was vague and the 
only legal order as such existed within the family group where the pater familias 
                                                 
21 Keir DL The Constitutional History of Modern Britain 1485 – 1937 3rd ed (1947) 472. 
22 See paragraph 4.3 post of this study. 
23 It is interesting to note that the tenure of Parliament was seven years as from the Septennial Act of 
1716 until 1911 when it was reduced to five years. Carpenter op cit 46 footnote 124. 
24 Carpenter op cit 29. 
25 Ilbert C Parliament: It’s History, Constitution and Practice (1948) 1. 
26 Ilbert op cit. 
27 Witenagemot. 
28 Folkmoot. 
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exercised wide, practically unrestricted powers.  The individual was expected to take 
the law in his own hands to correct any wrongs he may have suffered but the peace of 
the household precluded members of the family from making war on one another.  This 
led to families grouping together in clans which in turn grouped together to form 
tribes.29 
 
Certain customs and usages developed over time to regulate the legal relationships 
between members, the most important from a public law point of view being the 
allegiance relationship and the community relationship which led to the creation of a 
legal order based on the concept of state authority.30  The absolute power wielded by 
the pater familias within the family, in time led to outsiders being drawn to stronger 
families which they could join by swearing an oath of allegiance to the pater familias, 
which brought them under his authority.  A reciprocal relationship developed between 
the pater familias (liege lord) and the new member (liegeman) in terms whereof the 
liegeman undertook to support the liege lord in time of war and to perform certain 
duties in peacetime.  For his part, the liege lord had to protect his liegemen and to treat 
them as members of his family.31 
 
Although the allegiance relationship could initially be terminated at any time except 
when the liege lord was in danger and entitled to rely on the support of his liegemen, it 
eventually became a permanent relationship in terms whereof the liegeman, or vassal, 
owed the liege lord allegiance for life.  This developed into the feudal system which 
was based on the relationship between vassal and the feudal lord, which was in turn 
                                                 
29 Carpenter op cit 27. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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based on the feudal lord’s holding of land. This was also the foundation of the 
relationship between the king and the people.32 
 
When Eadmund acceded to the English throne in 941, all his subjects swore an oath of 
allegiance to him, not individually but by proxy to the members of the witenagemot 
who swore allegiance on behalf of the entire nation.33  Because of the concept that the 
law could not be changed but only “found by the wise men and declared, in their 
dooms” the king could not make new laws but had to rely on the dooms of the 
witenagemot or Council of Wise Men.  The King could also not impose taxes and this 
too was a function of the witenagemot or Council of Wise Men.34  It is not clear how the 
witenagemot was constituted but according to Plucknett35 
“(Its) members were the king, the ealdormen or governors of shires, the king’s  thegns, the bishops, 
abbots, and generally the principes and sapientes of the kingdom. Sapientes, called ‘witan’ and meaning 
wise men in modern English, was the common description of those who attended it.  The lesser thegns, if 
entitled to be present, probably did not attend in any numbers, so that the assembly can never have been 
very large.” 
 
Plucknett concludes that “although the witenagemot was not a representative body in 
the modern sense, it was unquestionably looked upon as representing in some sort the 
whole people, and consequently the national will”.36 In the sense that the Norman 
Conquest was seen by William the Conqueror as asserting by force what was legally 
his, his ascension to the throne was constitutional in theory, with the result that the 
continuity of the English Public Law was not broken. However, the conquest itself was 
illegal from a constitutional law point of view.37 
                                                 
32 Carpenter op cit 28. 
33 Carpenter op cit 29. 
34 Carpenter op cit 30. 
35 Plucknett TFT Taswell – Langmeade’s English Constitutional History 11th ed (1960) 18. 
36 Ibid. 
37 According to Plucknett, op cit 32-33, William “professed to be asserting his legal right and further 
alleged that Harold (who had been elected by the witan to succeed Edward) himself had once sworn 
to recognise his claim to the throne.”  
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During the Norman period, which started with the reign of William the Conqueror in 
1066, the witenagemot was gradually replaced by the Great Council of the King and 
later became known as the Magnum Consillium or the Commune Consilium Regni 
Nostri.38  The Norman kings therefore recognised the rule that the king could not levy 
taxes “save by the common council of our realm” as well as the principle that the king 
could only make laws through his Curia Regis which was his permanently appointed 
councillors.39  At that point in time the king and his subjects had an indirect relationship 
and the king was more concerned with the barons with whom he was in constant 
conflict.40  In an effort to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the barons, King John in 1213 
summoned four men from each County to attend the Great Council as well as the feudal 
lords and the lords temporal and spiritual.41  From these beginnings Parliament then 
gradually developed from an advising council to a sovereign body representing the 
people. 
 
2.2  BRITAIN 1215 TO 192842 
It is an interesting constitutional fact that the Parliament at Westminster, which is 
considered the mother of all Parliaments, is not regulated by a written constitution, 
                                                 
38 Carpenter op cit 31. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Carpenter op cit  36. 
41 Carpenter op cit  2. 
42 It falls outside the scope of this study to give a detailed account of the development of Parliamentary 
government in Britain, but to understand the development of representative government in South 
Africa, a very brief summary of the history of Parliamentary government in Britain will be given.  
For a detailed account please see the following works: 
    Anson WR The Law and Custom History (1922), Chrimes SB English Constitutional History (1965), 
Erskine May Constitutional History of England (1889), Von Gneist R The History of the English 
Constitution (1886), Holdsworth WA  A History of English Law (1936),  Joliffe JEA The 
Constitutional History of Medieval England (1961) Keir DL The Constitutional History of Modern 
Britain (1937), Maitland FW The Constitutional History of England (1955), Plucknett TFT Taswell-
Langmead’s English Constitutional History (1960), Stubbs W The Constitutional History of England 
(1880), Pasquet D An Essay on the Origins of the House of Commons (1925), Pike LO Constitutional 
History of the House of Lords (1894), Pollard AF The Evolution of Parliament (1920) and Porritt 
Edward The Unreformed House of Commons:Parliamentary Representation Before 1882 (1903). 
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but by conventions that developed over time.  However, certain guarantees for basic 
liberties were from time to time enacted of which the Magna Carta of 1215 is the 
most famous English constitutional document.  Carpenter43 points out that although 
the Magna Carta contained no new legal rules or principles but was actually a 
confirmation of existing rules which the king had been disregarding, the signing of the 
document was of major importance as future kings would be faced with a 
constitutional document and not merely unwritten rules of constitutional law. 
 
Initially members were called to Parliament by writ “de veniendo ad 
Parliamentum”.44Different writs were issued to the lords, the clergy, the knights and the 
commoners.45  Hallam46 describes the government of England as having been, in all 
times recorded by history, one of those of mixed or limited monarchies which the Celtic 
and Gothic tribes established in preference to despotism, tyranny or the various models 
of republican polity which prevailed on the Continent and in the East.  In its 
constitutional development England was more fortunate than the rest. By the fifteenth 
century it had acquired a just reputation for the goodness and the security of her citizens 
from oppression.47  The relative liberty that English subjects enjoyed in the fifteenth 
century had been “the slow fruit of ages still waiting a happier season for its perfect 
                                                 
43 Op cit 31. 
44 Churchill Winston S A History of the English-Speaking People vol 1(1956) 220. 
45 The lords were summoned “ad tractaturi vestrumque consillium impensuri” i.e. to negotiate with the 
king and give council.  The knights and commoners were summoned to represent their constituencies 
and to consent on behalf of their constituents and to await further instructions – “ad faciendum et 
consentiendum hiis quae tunc ibidem de communi consilio regni nostri favente domino ordinari 
contigerit super negotiis antedictis.” The only difference between the knights and commoners being 
that the knights were summoned individually whereas the commoners were to be selected.  In the 
case of the clergy the verb faciendum was later left out as only their consent was required.  Their 
actual presence was therefore not required as their absence was considered consent enough.  (See 
Maitland FW The Constitutional History of England (1955) 176-177).  It is interesting to note that 
even today, when a general election is announced, the Lord Chancellor still issues a writ under the 
seal of the Sovereign calling for candidates to be nominated. (Writ issued on 5 April 2005). 
46 Hallam H The Constitutional History of England vol 1(1867) 1. 
47 Hallam op cit  2. 
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ripeness, but already giving proof of the vigour and industry which had been employed 
in its culture”.48 
 
Churchill49 calls the latter years of Henry III’s reign (1216 – 1272) “the seed time of the 
Westminster Parliamentary system.”  In particular, the Provisions of Oxford of 1258, 
supplemented and extended in 1259 by the Provisions of Westminster, served as a 
catalyst for further development. These Provisions consisted of baronial proposals, the 
paramount one being a demand that the “King in future should govern by a Council of 
Fifteen to be elected by four persons, two from the baronial and two from the Royal 
Party”.50  The King issued a proclamation accepting the arrangement, but in 1261 the 
Pope freed Henry from his oath to accept the provisions of Oxford and Westminster, 
which led to civil war.51  Simon de Montfort defeated the Royal Army, took the King 
captive and made a treaty with the captive King whereby the rights of the crown were to 
be strictly controlled.52  De Montfort called the famous Parliament of 1265 to which he 
summoned representatives from both the shires and towns, making it the first 
representative parliament.53 
 
During the next 200 years the progress made toward government by consent was 
“extraordinarily rapid”54 and the power of the House of Commons increased 
gradually.55  Although legislation still emanated chiefly from the King, the principle 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Op cit 215. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Churchill op cit 217 -218. 
52 Churchill op cit 219. 
53 Churchill op cit 220.  Churchill, however, also points out that the fact that de Montfort probably 
summoned the strong popular element to weight the Parliament with his own supporters detracts 
from the constitutional significance attached to the first representative Parliament.  Nevertheless, “de 
Montfort had lighted a fire never to be quenched in English History”   Churchill op cit 220-223. 
54Marriott, Sir John This Realm of England Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy (1938) 137. 
55 Hall DGE A Brief History of English Constitutional History (1925) 90. 
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was established that all legislation had to be enacted by the King in Parliament so that 
no legislation was valid “unless it was done in the presence of, and received at least the 
formal assent of Parliament.”56  According to Hallam no laws were ever enacted by 
English kings without the assent and advice of their Great Council.57  He then quotes a 
statute of Edward II (1307 – 1327) which declared that: 
 
“…the matters to be established for the estate of the king and of his heirs, and for the estate of 
the realm and of the people, should be treated, accorded and established in Parliament, by the 
king and by the assent of the prelates, earls and barons, and the commonality of the realm, 
according as had been before accustomed.”58 
 
He concludes that there was: 
 
“not a single instance from the first dawn of our constitutional history, where a proclamation or 
order of council has dictated any change, however trifling in the code of private rights, or in 
the banalities of criminal offences.”59 
 
However, as the Commons began to assert itself in Parliament towards the end of the 
fourteenth century, the barons realised that Parliament was the best way to curb the 
king’s power and interest in Parliament started to increase.60  In 1430 a Franchise Act 
was passed which would regulate the franchise in counties for more than 400 years.61  
According to this Act electors had to be persons resident in the county, having freehold 
to the value of 40 shillings per annum.62 
 
Although it has been pointed out that there are no sharp dividing lines in medieval 
English history, the succession of the House of Tudor to the English throne in 1485 
                                                 
56 Hall op cit 91. 
57 Op cit  3. 
58 Op cit 3 to 4 my underlining. 
59 Hallam op cit 4. 
60 Hall op cit. 
61 Hall op cit 93. 
62 Maitland FW The Constitutional History of England (1955) 173. 
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heralded a period of 200 years of Tudor dictatorship under which very little 
constitutional development occurred.63  Tudor monarchs and Elizabeth I gained control 
over the House of Commons by creating the so-called “rotten” and “pocket” boroughs, 
which were urban constituencies with very few voters in which the elections could be 
manipulated.64  It is therefore not surprising that it appears as if parliament during the 
period of Tudor monarchs was used to legalise the King’s appetite for wealth and power 
as taxes were exorbitant.65  When Parliament did attempt to make a stand against the 
inroads upon the public purse, as in 1523 when a request for £800 000.0066 to be raised 
by a tax of one fifth upon lands and goods was not approved, no Parliament was 
assembled for nearly seven years.67 
 
Hallam68 identifies five essential checks upon the authority of the king at the time of 
Henry VII (1485-1509) of which two are relevant to this study, namely: 
 
• the king could not levy new taxes upon his people except by the grant of his 
Parliament; 
• the assent and authority of Parliament were necessary to every new law. 
 
A subsequent statute passed by Parliament granting the king all monies borrowed by 
him including such debts that have been repaid is proof that Parliament at that time 
served the king’s interest.69  Hallam70 writes that Henry VIII (1509 – 1547) had almost 
                                                 
63 Churchill op cit 394. 
64 Carpenter op cit 42 footnote 100. 
65 Hallam op cit 15. 
66 Said to have exceeded all current coin in the kingdom at that time. 
67 Hallam op cit  18. 
68 Op cit. 
69 Hallam op cit 23.  Apparently most of this House of Commons held office under the crown which 
underlines the important principal of separation of powers and independence of representatives. 
  17
absolute dominium over Parliament and only one instance is known where Parliament 
refused to pass a bill recommended by the crown.  However, during the reign of Edward 
VI (1547 – 1553) there were several instances when the Commons rejected Bills sent 
down from the Upper House.  There were still more rejections in the reign of Mary 
(1553 – 1558) and it appears that Parliament started to assert itself:  notwithstanding the 
fact that she dissolved her two first Parliaments for not being submissive, the third 
Parliament rejected several of her favourite bills.71  How the crown attempted to 
influence the election of members to the Commons is clear from the following circular 
letter of Edward VI to all the sheriffs commanding them to give notice to the 
freeholders, citizens, and bourgeoisies within their respective counties: 
 
“…that our pleasure and commandment is, that they shall choose and appoint, as nigh as they 
possibly may, men of knowledge and experience within the counties, cities and boroughs.” 
 
Recommendations of several persons then followed.  Those so elected either belonged 
to the court or were in the king’s trust.72 Hallam comes to the conclusion that it 
appears probable that persons in office formed a very considerable portion of the 
House of Commons at all times.73  The execution of noblemen such as the Earl of 
Warwick,74 the Earl of Suffolk,75 Sir Thomas Moore76 and the Duke of Buckingham77 
is proof that the Tudor governments intimidated the great families of England of that 
time.  In an effort to strengthen their influence over the Commons, Edward VI created 
twenty-two new boroughs and Mary added fourteen to the number.78  Matters did not 
                                                                                                                                            
70 Op cit 43. 
71 Hallam op cit  44. 
72 Hallam op cit  45. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hallam op cit  26. 
75 Hallam op cit  27. 
76 Hallam op cit  32. 
77 Hallam op cit  27. 
78 Hallam op cit  45. 
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improve under the House of Stuart and when James (1603-1625) succeeded Elizabeth 
in 1603, an entire year lapsed before he summoned his first parliament.  He also ruled 
for long periods without calling a Parliament.79  The proclamation that called his first 
Parliament: 
“charges all persons interested in the choice of knights for the shire to select them out of the principal 
knights or gentlemen within the counties; and for the bourgeoisies, that the choice be made of men of 
sufficiency and discretion, without desire to please parents and friends, that often speak for their 
children or kindred; avoiding persons noted in religion for their superstitions, blindness one way, or 
for their turbulent humour otherwise.  We do command he says, that no bankrupt or outlaws be 
chosen, but men of known good behaviour and sufficient livelihood.  The sheriffs are charged not to 
direct a writ to any ancient town being so ruined that there are not residents sufficient to make such 
choice, and of whom such lawful election may be made.  All returns are to be filed in chancery, and 
if any be found contrary to this proclamation, the same to be rejected as unlawful and insufficient, 
and the place to be fined for making it; and anyone elected contrary to the purport, effect and true 
meaning of this proclamation, to be fined and imprisoned.”80 
 
Parliament saw such an assumption of control over the election of its members as a 
glaring infringement of the privileges that had become the prerogative of the House of 
Commons.81 However, during the ensuing elections the county of Buckingham returned 
Sir Frances Goodwin in preference to Sir John Fortesque, a privy councillor.  Sir 
Frances had been outlawed some years before and the writ was therefore returned to the 
sheriff as it was in contradiction to the king’s proclamation.  A second election was held 
and Sir John was elected.  This matter was discussed in the House of Commons a few 
days after the opening of the session and it was resolved that Goodwin was lawfully 
elected and returned.  The House of Lords thereupon requested a conference between 
the two houses which was refused by the Commons stating: 
“… that they conceived it not according to the honour of the house to give account of any of their 
proceedings…”82 
 
                                                 
79 Wiechers M Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg 3rd ed (1981) 87. 
80 Hallam op cit 299 to 300. 
81 Hallam op cit 300. 
82 Hallam op cit 300 to 301. 
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The king then became involved, but the House of Commons stood its ground and in 
the end the matter was resolved by a compromise in terms whereof both members 
were set aside and a new writ issued.83 
 
During the reign of Charles I (1625-1649) the tension between the king and the 
Commons increased.  The king appears to have been solely intent on entrenching the 
excesses of prerogative84 while the Commons was intent on rendering the existence of 
the monarchy compatible with that of freedom.85 It thus became inevitable that the King 
would clash with Parliament.86  When he acceded to the throne he immediately tried to 
rule as an absolute monarch.87  The first Parliament of Charles’ reign was assembled in 
1625 and possibly because none of the main grievances of the previous reign were yet 
redressed and in an effort to force the king to reform, the customary grant of tonnage 
and poundage was not made for the king’s lifetime as had been the practise for two 
centuries, but only for one year.88  The king reacted by dissolving Parliament.89 90 
 
The King then resorted to exacting money under the guise of loans and those who did 
not comply were pressed to serve in the navy if commoners, while the gentry were 
committed to prison.91  This led to the Petition of Right presented by the Commons at 
the next Parliament in the shape of a declaratory statute92  which inter alia stated: 
                                                 
83 Hallam op cit  301to 302. 
84 Hallam op cit 374. 
85 Hallam op cit 419. 
86 Wiechers op cit 87. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Hallam op cit  376. 
89 Ibid. 
90 The reason for not making the grant for the king’s life was most probably an effort to force the king 
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requiring parliaments to be held every year, Edward IV during his reign of 22 years held but 6 
parliaments (Maitland op cit 178). 
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“…that no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax or such like 
charge, without common consent by Act of Parliament.”93 
 
Eventually civil war broke out and Charles was beheaded in 1649 whereupon Oliver 
Cromwell took over as Lord Protector.  Eleven years of “republican rule” followed but 
the constitutional changes that Cromwell attempted to introduce was of little 
consequence to public law.94  An interesting insight into Charles I’s belief in his divine 
right to rule appears from his last words before execution quoted by Fraser:95 
“For the people truly I desire their liberty and freedom as much as anybody whatsoever; but I must 
tell you that their liberty and freedom consists in having government, those laws by which their lives 
and goods may be most their own.  It is not their having a share in the government; that is nothing 
appertaining to them; a subject and sovereign are clear different things...” 
 
The monarchy was reinstated in 1660 and Charles II (1660 – 1685) succeeded in 
avoiding open confrontation with Parliament.96  Of significance from a public law 
point of view during this period was the principle that was laid down in the 
impeachment case of Danby in which Danby’s defence of having acted on the express 
instructions of the King was rejected as: 
“No Minister can shelter himself behind the throne by pleading obedience to the orders of his 
sovereign.”97 
 
James II (1685 – 1688) succeeded Charles II.  He was the second son of Charles I and 
like his father started his reign on a collision course by proclaiming absolute power 
and also acting accordingly.98  Within three years of his succession, the so-called 
glorious revolution broke out in 1688 and James II was deposed. 
 
                                                 
93 Hallam op cit 392. 
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The throne was offered to William of Orange (1689-1702) and his wife Mary.99  
When it became apparent that William III would leave no heir, Parliament passed the 
Act of Settlement (1701) which was primarily aimed at governing succession to the 
throne but also had important public law provisions such as: 
 
• The principle that no member of the House of Commons is permitted to 
hold a remunerative office under the Crown.100 
• The appointment of judges at a fixed salary that could not be reduced 
quamdin se bene gesserint.101 
• The King’s pardon would not be a defence in the case of an impeachment 
by the Commons. 
• The Kings were to rule in accordance with the law and the law guaranteeing 
the religious rights and freedom of the people were reinstated.102 
 
After the Act of Settlement the struggle between the King and Parliament came to an 
end.103  Parliament started to assume absolute power and the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty became established.104  A catalyst occurred in 1714 when the Hanoverian 
monarchs acceded to the throne.  Probably because George 1 (1714-1722) did not 
have a good understanding of English, the King gradually withdrew from attending 
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Cabinet meetings.105  This led to one of the Members of Cabinet having to chair 
Cabinet meetings, which eventually gave rise to the position of Prime Minister.106 
 
Cabinet government developed during this period from what was originally an 
advisory body (Curia Regis) to the executive arm of government that we know 
today.107  Whereas the King dominated policies up to the end of the Seventeenth 
Century, the Eighteenth Century heralded the era of great parliamentarians, such as 
William Pitt the Elder, William Pitt the Younger, Lord Chatham, Lord North, John 
Wilkes and Edmund Burke.108  Although Parliament had by then been accepted as 
sovereign,109 Parliament was by no means representative of the people.  Apart from 
the fact that the franchise was still limited, there existed glaring inequalities of 
constituencies. 
 
Hall110 is of the opinion that very few people initially exercised their vote and that 
voting was considered a burden.  It was not considered a right but a liability, which the 
majority would have preferred to escape.111  In the case of the boroughs, the franchise 
varied from borough to borough,112 but it appears that the general rule was that a voter 
had to be a freeman of the borough, although there was no uniform definition of 
freeman.113  As far as the composition of the Commons was concerned, the majority of 
the members were knights of the shire although there were only 37 counties compared 
                                                 
105 Carpenter op cit 45 and Mackintosh JP The British Cabinet (1977) 51 and May op cit 7. 
106 Carpenter op cit 46. 
107 See Mackintosh  op cit; Wiechers op cit 95 to 101 and Carpenter op cit 43 to 48 for detail. 
108 Howat GMD From Chatham to Churchill (1966) 12 to 19. 
109 Carpenter op cit  138. 
110 Op cit  91. 
111 Hall op cit 174 quotes the example of the borough of Torrington who successfully petitioned the 
king to be excused from sending members to parliament. 
112 Maitland op cit 174. 
113 Hall op cit  93. 
  23
to 166 boroughs.114  It is therefore clear that up until that point, Parliament was seen as 
representative of, but by no means as being responsible to the people.115  Significant 
development towards responsible government only started after the Industrial 
Revolution,116 although the excesses of the French Revolution initially had a negative 
effect on political advancement.117 
 
During the reign of George III (1760 to 1820), the House of Commons had over 550 
members of which more than 400 represented boroughs and less than 100 the 
counties.118  Cornwall with its 21 boroughs returned 42 members, which was totally out 
of proportion to its population size.119  Making matters worse was the fact that almost 
half the boroughs in the country were in the “pockets” of influential families and it 
often happened that the same family held a seat in Parliament for generations. In 
Somerset, for example, the Whitemore family represented Bridgenorth in Parliament for 
more than 200 years.120 
 
Reform was slow as both the Tory Government and the Whig opposition were adamant 
that Parliament should remain in the hands of men with land and property.121  However, 
the Industrial Revolution created a new propertied class that was unrepresented in 
Parliament. Although the Whig leader, Lord Grey (1764 to 1845), was sympathetic to 
extending the franchise to include the new class, the gulf between Whig concessions 
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and radical ambitions was bridged by Lord Durham (1792 to 1840), a rich aristocrat 
who appreciated that reform was necessary.122 
 
The revolutions in France and Germany in 1830 brought matters to a head as it was 
realised just what a dissatisfied people might do.123  When George IV (1820 to 1830) 
died, the Tory majority of Wellington was seriously reduced in the general election that 
followed the King’s death.  The new King, William IV (1830 to 1837) invited the 
Whigs under Lord Grey to take office and Grey’s ministry introduced three reform bills.  
The House of Lords rejected the first two Bills and the country responded by rioting.  
England came very near to revolution and Grey persuaded William IV to create a 
sufficient number of Whig peers to pass the third reform Bill through the House of 
Lords.124 
 
Before the reforms of 1832 there were glaring inequalities in the relation of 
representatives to population, especially in the boroughs.125  The changes in population 
which followed the Industrial Revolution greatly increased the inequality and Adams 
describes the situation as follows:126 
“Larger new towns arose which had no representation.  Old boroughs lost populations heavily.  Old 
Sarum had no electorate, Galton had seven voters and Tavistock had ten, yet they each returned two 
members to Parliament, while Manchester and Birmingham returned none.  Forty-six constituencies, 
each with less than fifty electors returned a total of Ninety members.  Moreover, the decline in 
population combined with a limited suffrage delivered many boroughs completely into the hands of 
neighbouring great landowners. These landowners either controlled the election through their 
ownership (the so-called pocket boroughs), or found it easy to buy the required number of votes (the 
rotten boroughs).  The Duke of Newcastle nominated eleven Members of the House of Commons, 
Lord Lonsdale nine, and Lord Fitzwilliam eight.  Six peers together sent forty-five members to 
Parliament.  In this way, nearly half the Membership of the House represented private interest rather 
than a public constituency.” 
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The Reform Act of 1832 removed the “rotten” and “pocket” boroughs that were 
created by the Tudor monarchs and Elizabeth I.127  At that stage, the population of 
Britain was 15 million of which less than half a million could vote.  The reform bill 
extended the vote to just over three-quarters of a million people, which was still a far 
cry from real representative democracy.128  However, that this was considered a great 
achievement is clear from Lord Macaulay’s (1800 to 1859) description of the event to 
a friend: 129 
“Such a scene as the division of last Tuesday I never saw, and never expect to see again.  If I should 
live fifty years, the impression of it will be as fresh and sharp in my mind as if it had just taken place.  
It was like seeing Caesar stabbed in the Senate-house, or seeing Oliver Cromwell taking the mace 
from the table; a sight to be seen only once, and never to be forgotten.  And so ended a scene which 
will probably never be equalled till the reformed Parliament wants reforming; and that I hope will 
not be till the days of our grandchildren.” 
 
Nevertheless, Parliament still consisted mainly of aristocrats and landowners. The 
middle classes, let alone the working classes, did not gain much.130  The Reform Act of 
1867 further enlarged the electorate and rearranged constituencies in such a way that 
they were more representative than before, which stimulated greater public interest in 
politics.131  Many of the working classes in towns could now vote, but agricultural 
labourers numbering approximately 2.5 million were still excluded.132  Further reform, 
however, followed rapidly.  The secret vote was introduced in 1872, agricultural 
labourers received a vote in 1885 and by 1900 six million men had the vote based on 
household or parental qualifications.133  Women over 30 received the vote in 1918 and 
in 1928 all adult subjects received the vote.134 
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This may sound strange to the present day voter, but the continuity of Parliament was 
an historic achievement by which erratic monarchy was replaced with a self-regulating 
body and it was the most critical link in the democratic process that distinguished 
Britain from other countries at that point in history.  This may have prompted Jean 
Jacques Rousseau to make the following statement: 
“The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the 
election of members of Parliament; as soon as the members are elected, the people are enslaved; it is 
nothing.  In the brief moments of its freedom, the English people make such a use of that freedom 
that it deserves to lose it.”135 
 
The Westminster system therefore developed from a system where members were 
called (summoned) to sit in Parliament, to a system where members were elected by 
popular vote.  In-between various election practices developed, none of which could be 
said to achieve representation of the population as a whole until general suffrage 
without qualifications prevailed in 1928.  However, irrespective of how members of 
Parliament were elected, it appears that the House of Commons was always seen to 
represent the people as a whole and that laws passed by Parliament were accepted as the 
law of the land by the whole population.136 
 
2.3 SOUTH AFRICA PRE-UNION 
Before 1853 elected representatives of the people played no part in the government of 
South Africa, although directly elected municipal councils existed after 1834.137  Prior 
to the settlement of the Dutch East Indian Company at the Cape in 1652, the inhabitants 
of the territory that later formed South Africa were not organised in a constitutional 
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framework comparable to that of a representative state and representation in its modern 
sense was not known.138 
 
Under Dutch rule, legislative and executive powers were entrusted to a political council 
that consisted of four nominated members with the governor as chairperson.139  The 
earlier form of local government in South Africa was the system of Landdros and 
Heemrade which was instituted in 1658.  However, the members were appointed and 
not elected.140  The first constitution in South Africa was adopted on 6 June 1837 by a 
general assembly of Voortrekkers at Winburg when a provisional constitution 
consisting of nine articles was adopted and in terms whereof the supreme legislative 
powers were vested in a chamber named the Volksraad (National Assembly).141  The 
Voortrekkers had a form of direct democracy in that every matter of importance after 
adoption by the Volksraad, had to be referred to the burghers in primary assembly for 
approval.  This resulted in a very weak government as the burghers refused to pay any 
but the most trifling taxes.142  This system ended when the British annexed Natal in 
1840 and it can therefore be stated that before 1853 elected representatives of people 
played no part in the government of South Africa.143 
 
2.3.1 CAPE COLONY 1853 TO 1910 
 
Representative government was instituted for the first time in South Africa in 1853 in 
the then Cape Colony by ordinance number 2 of 1852 which took effect on 1 July 
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1853.144 The Westminster model was followed and Parliament consisted of the 
Governor (representing the head of state), a Legislative Assembly (upper house) and a 
House of Assembly (lower house).145 
 
The Legislative Assembly consisted of the Chief Justice and fifteen elective members. 
146  Eight of the fifteen members were elected by the Western districts and seven by the 
Eastern districts.147  The House of Assembly consisted of forty six members elected in 
twenty two electoral divisions each returning two members except Cape Town which 
returned four members.148  It is interesting that the upper house (Legislative Assembly) 
was also an elected chamber (with the exception of the Chief Justice) and not a 
nominated body, as one would have expected a second chamber would have been 
introduced to safeguard the interests of the crown.  In this respect the Cape Legislature 
was ahead of the “mother of Parliaments”.149 
 
Franchise qualifications were liberal compared to the position in Britain at that time and 
no distinction was made on grounds of race or colour.  All adult male British subjects 
resident in the Colony, who occupied land and premises of £25.00 value or earned a 
salary or wages of £50.00 per year, or £25.00 with free board and lodge, could vote.150  
The qualifications were later altered to exclude commercial land tenure.151  The 
property occupation test was raised from £25.00 to £75.00 and the £25.00 salary and 
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board and lodge qualifications were eliminated by the Franchise and Ballot Act Number 
9 of 1892.  At the same time, the secret ballot was introduced.  Although political 
parties started to rise towards the end of the nineteenth century,152 they seem to have 
had very little control over individual members of Parliament who enjoyed a free 
mandate of representation, at least in theory.  However, Eybers,153 without quoting any 
authority, was of the opinion that the principle of a free mandate as enunciated by 
Edmund Burke154 may still have been the guiding principle of most members in Britain, 
but that it was denied at the Cape from the very start.  He put it as follows:155 
“…in 1775 Edmund Burke made it clear to his electors at Bristol, that in every question brought 
before Parliament, it was he as member who was to decide, and not they as constituents.  This 
principle, it has been said by a distinguished author who ought to know, is still the guiding principle 
of most members in Great Britain today.  At the Cape this principle was denied from the very start.  
Members, when elected, were instructed – there is no other word to use – to act on broad issues in a 
certain way.  Had they not signified their intention to act in such a way they would not have been 
elected; and having signified such an intention, and having been consequently elected, they were 
bound to adhere to their undertakings or to resign their seats.  If it were not so, democracy would not 
be anything real, and party government would be an oligarchic rule. So many thousand men selected 
one man to represent their views on certain matters and to do his utmost to get those views enforced.  
If at any time he found that he could not at any time support those views, it was his duty to make 
place for someone who could, though nowhere in the Empire has a law yet been passed compelling 
him to do so.  Occasionally a member would be sent to Parliament on the understanding that he 
would act at his own discretion; then the case was different.  And there were always numberless 
matters on which a constituency could not, or at any rate did not make up its mind.  In every such 
case the member would act as seeing best to him.” 
 
In contradiction to Eybers’ imperative theory of representation, an example of the free 
mandate enjoyed by members of the Cape legislature is manifested by the motion of no 
confidence in Sir Gordon Sprigs’ Government, passed in 1899.  Sir Gordon had a 
majority of seven in the house, but the motion of no confidence was carried by four 
votes which means that eleven members changed their allegiance.156  However, it 
should be borne in mind that political parties at this stage still did not have full control 
over their members.  The Cape Parliament was a model of a representative government 
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towards the end of the nineteenth century and it served as a mould for the Parliaments 
later introduced to the other colonies as well as the later Union Parliament.157 
 
2.3.2 ORANGE FREE STATE   1837 – 1910 
 
As indicated above, the first constitution adopted by the Voortrekkers was at Winburg 
in 1837.  This constitution was, however, never ratified and it was only after the Orange 
Free State formally came into existence as a republic on the conclusion of the 
Bloemfontein Convention, on 23 February 1854, between Sir George Clark as British 
Envoy and representatives of the White population between the Orange and Vaal rivers, 
that the first formal constitution was adopted by an elective assembly of twenty nine 
representatives.158 159 
 
A Volksraad specifically elected for that purpose adopted the first constitution in 
1854.160  The franchise was limited to citizens resident for six months but as it was not 
clearly stipulated who was entitled to vote the matter was revised in 1866.  The vote 
was extended to White males born in the Orange Free State161  or resident in the state 
for more than one year and the registered owner of immovable property to the value of 
at least 2000 Rix Dollars (article 1.II) or White persons who had been living in the state 
for at least three consecutive years (article 1.III).  Citizens were defined as Whites born 
in the state, Whites resident for three years or Whites resident for one year owning 
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registered immovables to the value of 2000 Rix Dollars 162,163 who produced a 
certificate of good conduct from the Government of the last country of residence and 
who made a written promise of loyalty.164  Civil and judicial officials could 
immediately acquire citizenship through taking the oath of allegiance which meant that 
they immediately qualified to vote. 
 
The National Assembly consisted of one member for each ward (veldkornetskhap) of a 
district and one member for each town.165  The first assembly consisted of 29 members 
who represented approximately 15,000 voters.166  As the population increased more 
districts and towns were proclaimed which resulted in a disproportional increase in the 
size of the Assembly. In 1874 the town of Bethlehem, for example, with only 10 voters 
and the town of Bethulie, with 24 voters, each sent a member to the National Assembly.  
Efforts to change the formula were not successful.167  Further constitutional changes 
were adopted in 1879 and 1898.  In 1879, after the discovery of diamonds and the 
influx of foreigners, citizenship and the franchise were more concisely determined and 
in 1898 after the discovery of gold, further amendments were made to the attainment of 
citizenship and the franchise as a precaution against foreign domination.168 
 
These measures were not unreasonable under the circumstances and judged against 
prevailing conditions met with acceptable public law norms of the time.  It appears that 
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the Orange Free State demonstrated itself to be a stable and well-governed state.  
Bryce169 was prompted to observe that: 
“In the Orange Free State, I discovered in 1895 the kind of commonwealth which the fond fantasy of 
the philosophers of the last century painted.  It is an ideal commonwealth…” 
 
He described the constitution as: 
“…well suited to the community which lives happily under it…”170 
and from a constitutional law point of view it is worth noting his observation that: 
“…it is a simple constitution, and embodied in a very short, terse, and straightforward instrument of 
sixty-two articles, most of them only a few lines in length…”,171 
 
This idyllic situation came to an end with the outbreak of the Anglo Boer War in 
October 1899.  The Orange Free State was formally annexed by Britain on 24 May 
1900 by a proclamation by Lord Roberts proclaiming it part of Britain’s dominions to 
be administered by himself until further notice.172 
 
In terms of the peace treaty whereby hostilities were ended173…  “military rule would at 
the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil government and as soon as 
circumstances permit, representative institutions leading up to self-government will be 
introduced.”174 But self-rule was only restored in 1907 when responsible government 
was introduced according to the Cape model.175 
 
No records exist of any floor crossing during this period, but as political parties did not 
exist in the Free State prior to the Anglo Boer War and were still in their infancy during 
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the short period of representative government before union, it can be accepted that 
members had a free mandate as this was the accepted theory of representation at the 
time.176 
 
The peace of Vereeniging177 contained an agreement in terms whereof the question of 
granting the franchise to Natives would not be decided until after178 self-government 
was introduced.179  According to Sir Charles Bruce180 this precluded the British from 
extending the votes to non-Whites as was the case in the Cape colony, although strictly 
speaking the term ‘Native’ did not include Coloureds or Indians.  Accordingly the vote 
was granted to White male British subjects with a qualification which practically only 
excluded paupers and loafers.181 
 
2.3.3 SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC (TRANSVAAL) 1852 - 1910 
 
Bryce182 was not so complimentary towards the South African Republic, the Orange 
Free State’s neighbouring Republic across the Vaal River, also known as the Transvaal.  
The independence of the South African Republic was recognised by Britain by the Sand 
River Convention signed on 17 January 1852.183  However, a rudimentary constitution 
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had already been drawn up in 1844 which was adopted on 23 May 1849.184  Provision 
was made for annual elections of members of the House of Assembly (Volksraad).185 
A formal constitution was adopted by the House of Assembly on 13 February 1858.186 
As in the case of the Orange Free State, the vote was limited to White males only, but 
the following clauses of the 1858 constitution are relevant to this study. 
 
• Article 12 stated that the people delegated the function of legislation to a House of 
Assembly (Volksraad) which would be the highest authority in the country, but 
provision was made for a period of three months within which the people could 
convey their opinion (oordeel) to the assembly concerning a law passed except in 
the case of laws which were urgent.     This can be seen as a form of veto power 
by the electorate which would have had an influence on the manner in which 
members exercised their mandates. 
 
• Article 31 of the Constitution created a mechanism by which any person could 
object to the President of the Executive Council about a member, and such a 
member could be removed before the commencement of a session. 
 
• Article 40 contained the prescribed oath which members had to take prior to 
taking their seats.  Translated into English, it read as follows: 
 
“As elected member of assembly of this Republic I declare, promise and swear solemnly that I 
have not given or promised any gift to anyone in order to obtain this position; that I will be 
faithful to the people in the discharge of my office; that I will conduct myself in accordance with 
the constitution of this republic to the best of my knowledge and according to the dictates of my 
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conscience and that I will aim at nothing else than to promote the happiness and the welfare of 
the inhabitants in general.”187 
 
It is therefore clear, especially from the reference to the dictates of a member’s 
conscience, that a member enjoyed a free mandate, although he was subject to a recall 
and the veto rights of the electorate. 
 
On 12 April 1877 the independence of the South African Republic came to an end with 
its annexation by Sir Theophilus Shepstone to the British Crown.188  Two deputations 
were sent to London to protest against the annexation, but they were not successful.189  
When Shepstone proclaimed the annexation he announced that local autonomy would 
be instituted, but by 1880 the constitution under which they were to enjoy self-
government had not been promulgated.190  When it was realised that their independence 
was not going to be restored, the National Assembly of the Old Republic was convened 
for a special meeting at Paardekraal in December 1880.191  Gladstone who had criticised 
the annexation while in opposition had now become Prime Minister in Britain but 
indicated that Britain would not withdraw from the territory.  On 16 December 1880 the 
Republican flag was hoisted at Heidelberg and fighting ensued at Bronkhorstspruit, 
Potchefstroom, Laingsnek, Ngogo and finally at Majuba where the British force was 
defeated.192  An armistice was concluded on 5 March 1881 in terms whereof the 
Transvaal state (as it was called in the Treaty) was again recognised as an independent 
political community to enjoy complete self-government but under the sovereignty of the 
British Crown.193 
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As in the case of the Orange Free State the Republican constitution of the South African 
Republic ended with the Anglo Boer War and was replaced by Crown Colony 
government until 1906 when responsible government was introduced following the 
Cape model.194  Letters patent conferring full responsible government to Transvaal were 
issued on 6 December 1906 and published in the Transvaal Government Gazette on 12 
January 1907.195  As in the case of the Cape Colony, two chambers were instituted: a 
Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly.  However, unlike the Cape Colony, the 
members of the Legislative Council (15) were to be nominated by the Governor, while 
the members of the 69-member Legislative Assembly  were elected by White male 
British subjects possessing certain qualifications.196The first political party, Het Volk, 
was formed by General Louis Botha. 
 
 
2.3.4 NATAL 1856 - 1910 
 
Eybers197 divided the early constitutional history of Natal into five periods, namely: 
 
• 1835 – 1838 British Settlers in Natal 
• 1838-1844 Boer occupation 
• 1844-1856 Annexation to Cape Colony 
• 1856-1893 separate colony and Legislative Assembly 
• 1893-1910 responsible government 
                                                 
194 May op cit 2. 
195 Eybers op cit XXIV. 
196 Eybers op cit XXV. 
197  X__xxx. 
  37
 
However, for the purpose of this study the periods up to 1856 are not relevant, except 
for a reference to the manifest signed by Piet Retief on 7 May 1838 when he left the 
Cape Colony to settle in the hinterland:198 
 
“We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just principles of liberty”199 
 
There is no record of a constitution of the Republic of Natal but by the end of 1838 
there was a Legislative Assembly chosen by the people consisting of 24 members, one 
of whom was appointed president.200  The British took military possession of Natal in 
1841 and in 1844 it was annexed to the Cape Colony.  In 1856 Natal was proclaimed a 
colony by Charter number 113 and representative government was introduced creating a 
single chamber of sixteen members of which twelve were to be elected and four 
nominated. 
 
Membership of the Legislative Assembly was gradually increased and by 1883 it 
numbered thirty, of which twenty three were elected, five were appointed officials and 
two were appointed non-officials.  The franchise, as in the Cape colony, was open to all 
adult male British subjects and the qualification was ownership of immovable property 
of £50.00 or rental of it to the annual value of £10.00.201  The qualification excluded 
almost all non-Whites at that time, but by 1865 there was a distinct danger that Black 
voters could swamp the polls as the Blacks outnumbered the Whites twelve to one, 
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excluding the territory of Zululand.202  Consequently, Act number 11 of 1865 was 
passed, disenfranchising Black voters, other than those especially given the vote by the 
Lieutenant Governor, in his free discretion on the grounds of twelve years residence, 
exemption from Native law for seven years, the recommendation by three White voters 
and possession of the ordinary property qualifications.  However, prior to this a Native 
trust was created by Letters Patent of 27 April 1864 to hold and administer land 
occupied communally by Blacks.  Further measures to curtail the vote of non-Whites 
were introduced in 1883203 and again by the Constitution Act of 1893.204 
 
The lower house had thirty seven elected members (later 43) from thirteen electoral 
districts (later seventeen) with two, three or four representatives each.  The ratio of seats 
to registered voters of the colony as a whole was one to five hundred and fifty one, but a 
Durban borough, for example, averaged 1500 voters per seat, while Alfred County with 
only 389 voters had two seats,205 resulting in very unequal representation.  In 1896 the 
Franchise Amendment Act No.8 of 1896 was adopted in terms whereof non-Whites 
were excluded from future rolls, while respecting existing rights. 
 
It is interesting to note that by the turn of the nineteenth century, 99% of the names of 
those on the roll were those of Europeans, although even two thirds of adult White 
males were not registered.  According to the 1904 census, Natal had 97,109 Europeans, 
100,918 Asiatics and 910,727 Blacks.206 
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Towards the close of Natal’s colonial life, the mismanagement of the administration of 
Native affairs led to an uprising and the proclamation of martial law. It can be safely 
stated that if it was not for the formation of the Union of South Africa 1910, Natal 
would have had to introduce serious political reforms.207  By the time Union was 
formed in 1910 no political party activity of note existed in Natal and most members of 
the Union Parliament were elected as Independents, which is the ultimate free mandate. 
 
2.4   UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1910 TO 1961 
 
When Union was proclaimed on 2 December 1909, to take effect on 31 May 1910, the 
four colonies that were to form the Union of South Africa, all enjoyed equal status as 
responsible government colonies.208  The colonies had similar constitutions based on 
the Cape model and the constitution of the Union was, “except for the Provincial 
Council system”, a replica on a larger scale of the pre-existing constitutions of the four 
colonies.209  As shown above, there existed different qualifications for the franchise in 
the four colonies that became the Union of South Africa in 1910.210 
 
At the National Convention (1908-1909) where the constitution of the Union of South 
Africa was deliberated, the major objection of the Cape Colony was the political colour 
bar.211  Although the British Government indicated that the further the convention went 
in the direction of a colour-blind general civilisation test for the franchise, the better the 
prospects for transfer of power to a union Parliament would be, Transvaal and Orange 
Free State delegates insisted that there would be no Union at all should the non-White 
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vote be extended to the northern provinces.212  In the end a compromise was reached in 
terms whereof the position in the Cape was safeguarded by requiring a two-third 
majority of all members of both houses at a third reading for a repeal or amendment of 
Section 35 that regulated the qualification of voters.213 
 
WP Schreiner (1837-1919), a former Cape premier, was a strong supporter of the 
retention of the traditional colour blind Cape voting policy and proposed that the non-
White franchise should not only be entrenched by a two-third majority of both houses 
as was laid down in the Draft Bill, but also by a two-third majority of Cape members.214 
Schreiner was of the opinion that the so-called entrenched clauses did not provide 
sufficient safeguards, and he led a deputation to Britain to plead the case with the 
British Government.  However, Britain approved the Draft Bill and on 20 September 
1909 it was enacted by the British Parliament as the South Africa Act of 1909.  The 
only concession to the colour-blind advocates was that non-Whites could sit in the 
Provincial Council of the Cape and Natal but not in the National Parliament.  The South 
Africa Act did therefore not change the position that existed prior to the formation of 
Union as far as the franchise was concerned. The position immediately after 31 May 
1910 was that every subject who had the right to vote immediately before 31 May 1910, 
had the right to vote under the constitution of the Union of South Africa. 
 
The South Africa Act made provision for a Senate and a House of Assembly.  The first 
Senate was to consist of forty members appointed for ten years.  Each of the four 
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provinces could nominate eight Senators elected by the Members of Parliament of a 
Province sitting together with the Members of the Provincial Council of such a 
Province.215  The Governor General in Council could also nominate eight Senators, four 
of whom were to be selected on the ground of their thorough acquaintance, by reason of 
their official experience or otherwise, with the reasonable wants and wishes of the 
Coloured people of South Africa.216  The smaller Provinces were clearly advantaged by 
this system as they received many more seats than they would have received if seats 
were to be allocated proportionally. The House of Assembly was initially composed of 
121 seats which were also allocated to favour the smaller Provinces.  The Cape 
Province received 51 seats, the Transvaal 36 seats and the Orange Free State and Natal 
17 seats each.217 
The population of the four provinces at that stage was approximately as follows: 
 
Table 1218 
PROVINCE WHITES NON-
WHITES 
TOTAL 
Cape 579,741 1,830,063 2,409,804 
Natal 97,109 1,011,645 1,087,054 
OFS 142,679 244,636 387,315 
Transvaal 297,674 927,674 1,270,348 
Totals 1,117,203 4,059,018 5,176,221 
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At the outset it therefore appears that approximately 70% of the male population had no 
voting rights and that all females were disenfranchised.219  In 1930, the Women 
Enfranchisement Act 18 of 1930 granted the vote to all adult White women without 
qualification which lead to the anomaly that in the Cape and Natal White men still had 
to meet the income or resident’s qualifications, while no such qualifications existed for 
White women. The Franchise Laws Amendment Act 26 of 1931 abolished all 
qualification requirements for White males and resulted in general suffrage for all adult 
White citizens in the Union. 
 
Over time various other amendments to the South African Constitution followed, of 
which the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 and the Amendment Act 9 of 1956 
were the most notable.  The first mentioned Act which was adopted with a majority of 
169 against 11 votes in a combined sitting of both Houses of Parliament, removed the 
Black voters in the Cape from the common voters roll to a separate voters roll. 
 
2.4.1.   REMOVAL OF BLACKS FROM THE COMMON VOTERS ROLL 
 
As indicated above, the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 removed the Blacks 
in the Cape from the common voters roll and at the same time divided the Cape into 
three constituencies with one seat each in the House of Assembly.  However, only 
Whites were eligible for election in these constituencies.  The legality of the removal of 
the Black voters from the common voters roll was challenged in court but the Appeal 
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Court dismissed the Action.220  To compensate in part for the Cape Blacks’ loss of their 
vote on the common voters roll, Act 12 of 1936 introduced four additional seats in the 
Senate, whereby the Blacks of the Union could indirectly, through electoral colleges, 
elect four Senators. 
 
2.4.2 REMOVAL OF COLOUREDS FROM THE COMMON VOTERS 
ROLL221 
 
The most controversial amendment to the South African constitution was the removal 
of the Coloureds from the common voters roll.  The National Party came into power in 
May 1948 winning 70 of the 150 seats in Parliament and obtaining the support of the 
Afrikaner Party who had 9 seats.  Hancock222 points out that the 1948 election was 
South Africa’s most momentous election since Union and that it was decided by a 
minority vote.  Hancock223 analysed the 1948 election results and came to the 
conclusion that on a one-vote one-value basis the United Party would have received 
more than 50% of the seats (80 seats) and that the NP/AP alliance combined, less than 
40% (60 seats).224 According to Carpenter,225 General Smuts of the Transvaal 
delegation at the National Convention was in favour of a proportional electoral system 
but in the end a constituency based winner-take-all system was adopted.  If the election 
results of 1948 and 1953 were recalculated proportionally, the history of South Africa 
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would have been totally different, which demonstrates just how important the electoral 
system that applies at a given point in time is. 
 
After the 1948 election the new government knew that it did not have the support of the 
Coloured voters who rejected the apartheid policy of the National Party. As a step 
towards implementing its policy of separate development it introduced the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act,226 which attempted to remove the Coloureds from the 
common voters roll and to provide for the election of four White members of 
Parliament on a separate voters roll for Coloureds.  This Act was passed by a simple 
majority in both houses of Parliament and not by a two-thirds majority as required by 
section 35 of the South African Act. 
 
A number of Coloured voters challenged the legality of the Act and the Appellate 
Division had no hesitation in finding that the provision of section 35 had not been 
complied with. The Statute was declared invalid.227  In response, the government 
embarked on a series of actions to achieve its goal, but it was eventually unable to 
achieve a two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
 
The first attempt was to introduce the High Court of Parliament Bill228 which provided 
for a review by Parliament of an Appeal Court judgment invalidating an Act of 
Parliament.  A Minister could bring the review and the members of the Court would be 
the Members of Parliament sitting as a court of appeal.  Harris et al also challenged the 
legality of the High Court Act and the Act was eventually declared invalid by the 
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Appellate Division in the Minister of the Interior and Another v Harris and Others.229  
A general election followed in 1953 and although the National Party slightly increased 
its majority, it still lacked a two-thirds majority in Parliament and indeed did not receive 
a majority of the popular vote either.230 
 
Undeterred, the Government again strove to remove the Coloureds from the common 
voters roll by introducing the Appellate Division Quorum Act,231 requiring eleven 
judges to sit in final appeal when the validity of an Act of Parliament was in question.  
At the same time the Senate Act232 was passed, enlarging the Senate substantially and 
changing the method of electing its members.  Under the new Act, the Senate was to 
have 60 nominated and elected members.  The number of seats for each province was 
one fifth of its electoral college (Members of Parliament and Members of Provincial 
Councils combined), with a minimum of eight per province, who would now be elected 
jointly and not by proportional representation. This resulted in the majority party 
returning all the elected members.  In the enlarged Senate, the government was able to 
obtain a two-thirds majority in a combined session of both houses of Parliament and 
consequently secured the passage of the South Africa Amendment Act233 employing the 
entrenched procedure.  Aggrieved Coloured voters again took the government to court, 
but in Collins v Minister of the Interior 234 the enlarged appeal court upheld the new 
legislation with a majority of ten to one.235 
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2.4.3 INDIANS 
 
In 1945 an Act was passed to allow for separate representation of Indians in the 
Transvaal and Natal by three White Members in Parliament.236  The Indians, however, 
were not satisfied and boycotted the new dispensation.  With the change of government 
in 1948 the chapter giving representation to Indians was repealed, 237 without having 
been implemented. The position of the Indians was only again addressed twenty years 
later in 1968, and thereafter in 1983.238 
 
2.4.4    FURTHER LAWS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE  
 
Further laws of constitutional significance adopted by Parliament were the Bantu 
Authorities Act, 239 which laid the basis for a system of self-rule by rural Black 
communities according to their traditional public law, and the Promotion of Black Self-
Government Act,240 which removed the so-called Native representatives from 
Parliament.  It also enacted the ethnic diversity of the Black people of South Africa and 
divided them into eight ethnic groups.  Each of these ethnic groups was granted a 
specific geographic area in which a degree of self-government could be exercised 
within the framework of the Bantu Authorities Act.241 
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241 Basson DA and Viljoen HP South African Constitutional Law (1988) 310. 
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Basson and Viljoen 242 quote Verloren van Themaat/Wiechers as follows in this regard: 
 
“By 1959 the government’s policy regarding self-governing Black areas had attained new 
perspectives.  In the light of developments in Africa and the growing process of decolonization it 
was accepted for the first time that these areas could even develop to full independence.” 
 
South Africa went to the polls on 5 October 1960 to decide whether to become a 
Republic and in the first plebiscite of White voters held in the country: 850,458 votes 
were brought out in favour of a Republic, against 775,878 opposing a Republic.  
Percentage-wise the split was 52.29 to 47.71 which was a close shave considering that 
approximately a hundred and sixty thousand (plus minus 10%) abstained from voting. 
White voters in South West Africa were also allowed to vote notwithstanding the fact 
that the territory was never de jure a part of the Union of South Africa. 
 
This was the only case of direct democracy applied in the Union of South Africa, albeit 
only amongst the Whites. 
 
 
2.5       REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1961 TO 1984 
 
A new constitution was adopted by Parliament in 1961 243 constituting the Republic of 
South Africa.  The change from Union to a Republic brought no drastic constitutional 
changes, except for a change in the formal name of the state and the replacement of the 
British Queen by a State President as head of State with the consequent redundancy of 
                                                 
242 Op cit 311. 
243 Act 32 of 1961. 
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the position of Governor General.244  The composition of the House of Assembly 
remained the same and no changes were made to the franchise. 
 
A further phase in the Government’s separate development policy for Blacks was 
introduced in 1963 with the adoption of the Transkei Constitution Act245 which granted 
self-government to the Bantu resident in the Transkei. A concurrent Transkei 
citizenship was created and this citizenship granted Transkei citizens the right to vote in 
the Transkei.  The Executive Authority was vested in a Chief Minister and six other 
Ministers who were responsible for Finance, Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, 
Agriculture and Forestry, Roads and Works.246  The Legislative Authority was vested in 
the legislative assembly which consisted of five Paramount Chiefs, sixty Chiefs and 45 
elected members.247 
 
In 1968 the South African Indian Council was established,248 consisting of 45 members 
of whom 40 were elected and five nominated.  However, the Council had no legislative 
powers, acted only in an advisory capacity and was therefore unsuccessful as a means 
of exercising political rights.249  The South African Indian Council was abolished by the 
Constitution Act of 1983.250 
 
In 1969 Parliament created the Coloured Persons Representative Council251 which was 
an attempt to establish a type of Parliament where the Coloureds could exercise their 
                                                 
244 Basson and Viljoen op cit 37 to 38. 
245 Act 48 of 1963. 
246 Part 4 iv of the Act. 
247 Section 37.  Changes to the composition of the legislative assembly were made from time to time. 
248 Act 31 of 1968. 
249 Basson and Viljoen op cit 323. 
250 Act 110 of 1983. 
251 Act 49 of 1964. 
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political rights.  The Council had Legislative powers on matters such as finance, 
education, local government and community welfare subject to extensive restrictions.  
The Council consisted of 60 members of whom 40 were elected by the Coloured voters 
and 20 nominated by the State President.  However, the Council was not a political 
success and it was dissolved in 1980252 at which stage it had passed only a few Acts.253 
 
In 1971 the National States Constitution Act 254 was passed to make provision for the 
development of Black nations to self-government and independence.  Chapter II of the 
Act provided for self-government for other ethnic groups to the same extent as the 
Transkei had after 1963 and self-government was subsequently introduced in all the so-
called homelands.255 
 
In 1974 the National Assembly passed the Status of Transkei Act256 to provide for the 
Transkei to become independent where after the Transkei Legislature passed the 
Transkei Constitution Act.  Basson and Viljoen257 described the Transkei Constitution 
as follows: 
“The Transkei Constitution Act has been modelled on the South African constitutional tradition and 
is, therefore, in the Westminster mould of the Constitution Act of the RSA.  For this reason, then, the 
Transkei Constitution Act, is called a borrowed constitution.  It incorporated to a large extent the 
most important features of the 1963 Constitution Act.  The British doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty is very evident in this Constitution Act.” 
 
Legislative power was vested in a one chamber Parliament comprising the President 
and the National Assembly.  The National Assembly consisted of 150 members of 
                                                 
252 Act 24 of 1980. 
253 Basson and Viljoen op cit 322. 
254 Act 71 of 1971. 
255 Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KaNgwane and Kwa 
Ndebele. 
256 Act 100 of 1976. 
257 Op cit 313. 
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which 75 were elected and 75 non-elected, being five Paramount Chiefs and 70 
Chiefs.258 
 
Of the other self-governing Black territories only three opted for independence after the 
Transkei, namely Bophuthatswana,259 Venda260 and Ciskei.261  Each of these states 
passed its own Constitutional Act, but it falls outside the scope of this study to discuss 
these constitutions, suffice to say that they deviated more from the Westminster mould 
than the Transkei.262 
 
An important constitutional amendment was enacted in 1980 when the Senate was 
abolished and the President’s Council263 established, at the same time instituting the 
office of Deputy State President.  The main purpose of instituting the President’s 
Council was to create a multiracial body to advise the government regarding a new 
constitutional dispensation for South Africa.264 
 
The Council originally consisted of 60 members of all population groups except the 
Black Group and they were all appointed by the State President.  The Council made 
recommendations that led to the adoption of a new constitution in 1983,265 which 
constitution deviated from the Westminster mould in many ways.  Apart from the fact 
                                                 
258 The Transkei Parliament therefore deviated in two important aspects from the Westminster tradition, 
namely one chamber and half the members being non-elected.  In fact the non-elected Members were 
later increased to 77 putting them in the majority which is contrary to democratic principles. 
259 7 December 1977. 
260 13 September 1979. 
261 4 December 1981. 
262 Basson and Viljoen op cit 317. 
263 In view of the short lifespan of the President’s Council only a very brief overview is given in this 
study. 
264 Basson and Viljoen op cit 76. 
265 Act 110 of 1983. 
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that the President’s Council excluded the largest part of the population it was, as an 
appointed body, not representative and therefore had no mandate from the electorate. 
 
 
2.6  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1984 TO 1994:  THE TRICAMERAL 
PERIOD 
 
The 1983 Constitution came into effect on 2 September 1984 and had introduced 
major constitutional changes of which the following are relevant to this study: 
 
• Three lower houses of Parliament were created:266 the House of Assembly for 
Whites, the House of Representatives for Coloureds and the House of Delegates 
for Indians 
• The vote was extended to Coloureds and Indians, albeit for their own houses 
(Blacks were however, still excluded) 
• An Executive President replaced the position of Prime Minister267 
• A new concept, foreign to South African constitutional law namely appointed 
Members of Parliament was introduced268 
• The system of indirectly elected Members of Parliament introduced in 1980 was 
extended269 
• The functions of the President’s Council were extended so that it became a 
unique body  which had both an advisory role in executive authority as well as 
an arbitrator’s role in legislative authority270 
                                                 
266 Section 37(1). 
267 Section 6. 
268 Sections 41B, 42B, and 43B. 
269 Sections 41C, 42C and 43C. 
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• The President’s Council consisted partly of indirectly elected members and 
partly of nominated members271 
• The Executive Authority was divided into the own affairs of the three 
population groups concerned and general affairs.272 
 
In the case of own affairs the State President acted on the advice of the Ministers’ 
Council concerned and in the case of general affairs he acted on the advice of the 
Cabinet.  The Cabinet consisted of the State President,273 Ministers appointed to 
administer departments of state for general affairs,274 any Minister designated by the 
State President as a member of the Cabinet,275 and any member of a ministers’ council 
designated by the State President as a member of Cabinet.276 
 
The Ministers’ Councils consisted of Ministers appointed to administer Departments of 
State for own affairs of one and the same population group.277  For the directly elected 
members the one-member constituency electoral system was maintained and the three 
Houses of Parliament were composed as follows: 
 
• The House of Assembly278 consisted of 166 elected members, 4 members, one 
from each province, appointed by the State President, and 8 members elected 
indirectly by the 166 elected members by means of a proportional system of 
representation. 
                                                                                                                                            
270 Section 78. 
271 Section 70(1). 
272 Part IV of the constitution. 
273 Section 20(a). 
274 Section 20 (b). 
275 Section 20 (c). 
276 Section 20(d). 
277 Section 21(i). 
278 Section 41. 
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• The House of Representatives279 comprised 80 elected members, 2 members 
appointed by the State President and 3 members elected indirectly by the 80 
members as in paragraph 1 above. 
• The House of Delegates280 consisted of 40 elected members, 2 members 
appointed by the State President, and 3 members elected indirectly by the 40 
members as in 1 and 2 above. 
 
Although the 1983 Constitution broadened the basis of representation by extending 
representation to other population groups apart from the Whites (i.e. the Coloureds and 
Indians) the largest population group, the Blacks were excluded (as indicated above) 
with the result that it did not meet the ideal of a truly representative system of 
government.281 
 
The 1983 Constitution also brought an interesting change to the government versus 
opposition style of politics as the majority parties in the various Houses of Parliament 
now needed to agree to pass Acts concerning general affairs.282 
 
The Provincial Councils that existed in the four provinces since Union were abolished 
in 1986,283 but provision was made at the same time for the appointment of members of 
all population groups to provincial executive committees.  The Act also made provision 
for executive cooperation between the provinces, and the self-governing territories on 
                                                 
279 Section 42. 
280 Section 43. 
281 For crittcism of the 1983 Constitution see Basson and Viljoen op cit 80. 
282 Basson and Viljoen op cit 96. 
283 By the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986. 
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matters of mutual interest.284  The rights of Black citizens domiciled in the Republic of 
South Africa who became strangers through the independence of the Black homelands 
were restored by the Restoration of South Africa Citizenship Act,285 but this was still a 
far cry from the demands of the disenfranchised majority of the population.  However, 
the most important development during this period was the unbanning of prohibited 
political organisations in 1990 which was followed by multi--party negotiations. These 
negotiations in turn led to a declaration of intent, signed by the majority of South 
African political parties and organisations in December 1991, in which they committed 
themselves to draw up a new democratic constitution for South Africa.  Agreement was 
reached on the particulars of an interim constitution in 1993 and the interim 
Constitution was promulgated on 28 January 1994.286 
 
 
2.7 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  1994 – 2005 
 
The interim Constitution took effect on 27 April 1994 and the extent to which it changed 
the South African constitutional order is evident from the fact that it repealed no fewer 
than 59 Acts of Parliament.287  The interim Constitution288 brought an end to the 
constitutional discrimination that existed at that point in time and the first fully 
democratic elections in South Africa were held on 27 and 28 April 1994.289  Apart from 
giving the active right to vote to all South African citizens, the interim Constitution 
                                                 
284 The Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal Act 80 of 1986 was a direct outcome of this 
provision. 
285 Act 73 of 1996. 
286 Act 200 of 1993. Please see Thompson Leonard A History of South Africa 3rd ed (2006) 249-257. 
287 See Schedule 7. 
288 Although called as such, it was indeed a complete constitution and its transitional nature stemmed 
from the fact that Chapter 5 made provision for a constitutional body to pass a new constitutional text 
within 2 years from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under the interim Constitution. 
289 Rautenbach IM and Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law, revised 2nd ed (1996) 16. 
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produced four important new constitutional concepts as far as this study is concerned, 
namely: 
• proportional representation 
• supremacy of the constitution 
• fundamental human rights for all and 
• an imperative mandate 
 
Proportional Representation 
 
A two-chamber Parliament, comprising the National Assembly and the Senate was 
reintroduced.290  The National Assembly was to consist of 400 members elected in 
accordance with a system of proportional representation of voters. 291  A system of 
election of Members for the National Assembly was provided for in Schedule 2. It 
made provision for 200 seats to be filled from Regional lists submitted by the 
respective political parties, with a fixed number of seats reserved for the nine new 
provinces292created by the constitution as follows: 
 
• Western Cape      - 21 seats 
• Eastern Cape      - 26 seat 
• Northern Cape      - 4 seats 
• KwaZulu-Natal      - 40 seats 
• Orange Free State293     - 15 seats 
• Northwest       - 17 seats 
                                                 
290 Section 36. 
291 Section 40. 
292 See Section 1-4. 
293 Presently Free State. 
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• Northern Transvaal294     - 20 seats 
• Eastern Transvaal295     - 14 seats 
• Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging296  - 43 seats 
 
The remaining 200 seats were to be filled from National lists submitted by the 
respective political parties or from regional lists where national lists were not submitted.  
Seats were to be allocated in terms of a quota established by dividing the total number 
of votes casts in a region/nationally by the relevant number of seats plus 1.  The interim 
Constitution was silent on how political parties had to compile their candidate lists.297  
The proportional list system brought an end to the era of the constituency based 
Member of Parliament. As such it removed Members of Parliament from their 
constituents, thereby terminating the mandate that a Member needed to have from the 
constituency he/she represented.298 
 
The new senate was composed of 10 senators from each province nominated by parties 
represented in a provincial legislature according to a proportional representation 
formula.299 
 
Nineteen political parties participated in the first election under the interim Constitution 
and seven parties gained seats in the National Assembly.  The results were as follows: 
300 
                                                 
294 Presently Limpopo. 
295 Presently Mpumalanga. 
296 Presently Gauteng. 
297 See Chapter 5.2.5 of this study. 
298 See Chapter 6.1 and 6.2 of this study. 
299 Section 48. 
300 Reynolds, Andrew (Editor) Election 1994 South Africa: The campaigns, results and future 
prospects (1994) 183. 
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Table 2: 
 
African National Congress   -  252 seats 
National Party    -  82 seats 
Inkatha Freedom Party   -  43 seats 
Freedom Front   -  9 seats 
Democratic Party    -     7 seats 
Pan African Congress   -  5 seats 
African Christian Democratic Party  -  2 seats 
 
Supremacy of Constitution 
Section 4 (i) of the interim Constitution determined that the constitution shall be the 
supreme law of the Republic and that any other law or Act inconsistent with its 
provisions would be of no force and effect.  Section 4 (ii) made the constitution 
binding on the Legislative, Executive and Judicial organs of state at all levels of 
government.  This brought an end to the sovereignty of Parliament and therefore 
limited the mandate of Members of Parliament to at most what they are permitted to 
do in terms of the Constitution.  This fundamental change was summed up as follows 
by the President of the Constitutional Court in Executive Council Western Cape 
Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa:301 
“Our history, also the history of commonwealth countries such as Australia, India and Canada, was a 
history of Parliamentary supremacy.  But our constitution of 1993 shows a clear intention to break 
away from that history.  The Preamble to the Constitution begins by stating the ‘need to create a new 
order’. That order is established in s 4 of the Constitution, which lays down that: 
 
‘This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or Act inconsistent with its 
provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution, 
be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency.’…Parliament can no longer claim supreme 
power….it is subject in all respects to the provisions of the Constitution…”302 
 
                                                 
301 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) at 904. 
302 See also De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998(3) SA 430 (CPD) at 451 
and Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille MP and Another SA 1999(4) All SA 241 (CPD) at 
245.  Please also see Chapter 5.7. 
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Fundamental Rights 
The inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, especially such rights as freedom 
of expression,303 freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition,304 freedom of 
association,305 and political rights306 have a bearing on a political representative’s 
mandate as will be more fully discussed later in this study.307 
 
An imperative mandate308 
Section 43 (b) constitutionalised an imperative mandate in South African 
constitutional law in as much as it in effect stated that a member who changes 
political allegiance had to vacate his or her seat. 
 
This appears to infringe fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and political rights such as the right to form, participate in the activities of 
and to recruit members for a political party, to campaign for a political party or cause 
and freely to make political choices.  However, this matter is more fully discussed in 
Chapter 6 of this study. 
 
As mentioned above, the interim Constitution, according to its own dictates,309 was of 
a transitional nature and as determined by Section 68(2) the Constitutional Assembly 
had to adopt a constitution which had to be referred to the Constitutional Court for 
certification in terms of Section 71 of the interim Constitution. 
 
                                                 
303 Section 15. 
304 Section 16. 
305 Section 17. 
306 Section 21. 
307 Chapter 4. 
308 Section 43 (b). 
309 Chapter 5, Sections 68-74. 
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The certification process as far as it concerns this study is dealt with in Chapter 6.3.1. 
At this stage it only needs to be pointed out that the final constitution was approved 
by the Constitutional Court after certain amendments and that the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 1996 came into force on 4 February 1997.   As far as 
this study is concerned, the 1996 Constitution did not, in material terms, change much 
of the new constitutional order introduced by the interim Constitution, except to 
replace the Senate by a National Council of Provinces which was also an indirectly 
elected body and therefore outside the true scope of this study. 
 
However, the 1996 Constitution did deviate from the interim Constitution in one 
important aspect as far as the mandate of political representatives is concerned: the 
imperative mandate introduced by the interim Constitution was repealed, although in 
terms of item 13 of Annexure A, schedule 6, the imperative mandate still applied to 
members elected in the first election in terms of the 1996 Constitution, i.e. the 1999 
election.310 311 
 
The 1996 Constitution is more fully discussed in Chapter 6.3.2. 
 
The first elections under the 1996 Constitution were held in June 1999 and 26 
political parties participated in the election, of which thirteen obtained seats in the 
National Assembly. 
The results were as follows: 312 
 
 
                                                 
310 Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit 113. 
311 The 1966 Constitution is more fully discussed in Chapter 6.3.2. 
312 National and Provincial Election Results South African Election June 1999. 
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Table 3 
 
 
African National Congress   -  266 seats 
Democratic Party    -  38 seats 
Inkatha Freedom Party   -  34 seats 
New National Party    - 28 seats 
United Democratic Movement  - 14 seats 
African Christian Democratic Party   -  6 seats 
Pan African Congress of Azania  -  3 seats 
United Christian Democratic Party - 3 seats 
Freedom Front     - 3 seats 
Federal Alliance   - 2 seats 
Azanian People’s Organisation  - 1 seat 
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging  - 1 seat 
Minority Front    - 1 seat 
 
 
The most notable aspect of the results was the poor performance of the New National 
Party (NNP) whose support dropped from 82 members in 1994 to 28 members.  The 
Democratic Party on the other hand increased its representation substantially from 
seven members to 38, becoming the official opposition. 
 
With the first municipal elections to be held under the 1996 Constitution, the New 
National Party, Democratic Party and Federal Alliance formed an alliance to fight the 
2000 municipal elections under the banner of a new political party: the Democratic 
Alliance (DA).  The new party did extremely well at the municipal elections of 
December 2000.313  At national and provincial level the three alliance partners had to 
                                                 
313 It captured 22.12% of the vote and won 1306 seats. 
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retain their separate identities because of the anti-defection clause in Schedule 6 of the 
1996 Constitution which was still effective for the duration of the lifespan of the 1999 
Parliament and legislatures.  However, effectively the alliance partners functioned as 
one and joint caucuses were held.314 The relationship between the Democratic Party 
and the New National Party did not flourish and came to a break when the New 
National Party broke away from the DA towards the end of 2001 to form a new 
alliance with the ANC.315 
 
As indicated above, the position of NNP members of Parliament and the provincial 
Legislatures was not affected by the alliance between the Democratic Party, New 
National Party and the Federal Alliance because of the anti-defection clause.  
However, NNP councillors who were elected under the DA banner were now caught 
up in the DA and had to toe the DA line on peril of being expelled and thus losing 
their seats in terms of the anti-defection clause. The NNP’s new alliance partner, the 
ANC, had the necessary majority in Parliament to make the required amendments to 
the constitution to enable NNP members of municipal councils who were trapped 
under the DA banner, to cross the floor without losing their seats.  The enactments 
that followed and the subsequent constitutional court cases are dealt with in detail in 
chapter 6.3.2.  Suffice to say at this stage that during the first window period a total of 
23 members of the National Assembly changed their allegiance.316 The second 
election under the 1996 Constitution was held on 14 April 2004 and eleven parties 
participated in the election. The results were as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
314 As informed by Dr EA Conroy MP, NNP. 
315Statement by Tony Leon MP Leader of the Official Opposition Cape Town 26 October 2001. 
316 Please see chapter 6.4 for detail. 
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Table 4 
 
African National Congress  - 279 members 
Democratic Alliance   -  50 members 
Inkatha Freedom Party   - 28 members 
United Democratic Movement   -  8 members 
New National Party   -  7 members 
African Christian Democratic Party -  7 members 
Independent Democrats  -  7 members 
Freedom Front Plus   -  4 members 
United Christian Democratic Party - 4 members 
Pan African Congress  -  3 members 
Minority Front     -  2 members 
Azanian Peoples’ Organisation -  1 member317 
 
 
 
2.8   CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that at least up to 1928 in Great Britain and up to 1994 in South Africa, a 
minority of the adult population elected Parliament.  If it is taken into account that 
even those who had the vote abstained from using it, and that the elected members 
only represented a percentage of the votes cast, members were elected by a small 
percentage of the population.   In a winner takes all system such as applied in South 
Africa before 1994, the result was even more unrepresentative of the people’s wishes.  
Looking back at the biased systems by which members of Parliament were elected till 
the last reforms were introduced in the beginning of the 20th century in Great Britain 
and at the end of the 20th century in South Africa, it is close to a miracle that both 
countries escaped the revolutions that changed the political scene in Europe during the 
                                                 
317 Report on the National and Provincial Elections 2004 published by the Independent Electoral 
Commission 60. 
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last three centuries and in Africa during the last half of the twentieth century.As far as 
Great Britain is concerned, Howat318 explains as follows: 
“Although we might wonder at the way in which our ancestors of 200 years ago chose their Parliament, 
the system was not entirely bad.  People on the Continent admired our form of Government and few 
British people found cause for complaint.  Nearly everyone believed that it was right that Parliament 
should consist of the men of property and landed wealth, since they would have the country’s 
prosperity at heart…in the eighteenth century, those who lacked the vote were not necessarily disturbed 
by the fact nor by the type of members in Parliament.  Some members were able men who found in 
politics a chance to be of service to their country.  Others we have to admit were more concerned with 
preserving their own interests and were ready to oppose any sort of reforms.  The hardships of daily 
living and the savagery of the law both needed the attention of a reformist.  When things became very 
bad, men rose in revolt, as did silk weavers in 1765, or looked to their heroes for summary prayers.  
These included Pitt the Elder, Lord Chatham (1708-1778) who declared himself not unmindful to the 
sufferings of the poorer sort, Pitt the younger and John Wilkes”. 
 
 
Maybe Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), who had little interest or sympathy for 
Parliamentary reform, summed the attitude of the ruling classes up best with the view 
that “a vote was a trust and not a right”.319 
 
In the case of South Africa the Cape Colony started off in 1853 with a more liberal 
franchise than what existed in Britain at that time, and which was further remarkable 
for its lack of reference to race.  In the Boer republics the franchise was, as far as 
Whites were concerned, democratic even to the point where it had traces of direct 
representation.  However, the influx of immigrants after the discovery of gold in the 
Witwatersrand led to the first attempts at constitutional engineering in South Africa 
when a second chamber was introduced to accommodate the immigrants.  A 
seemingly innocent clause in the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging at the time of 
signature320  namely that the franchise would not be extended to Natives until after 
self-government, in the end had the result that for nearly a century the majority of the 
                                                 
318 Op cit 12. 
319 Howat op cit 76. 
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population in South Africa had no direct access to Parliament and could therefore not 
mandate political representatives through the Parliamentary process.321 
 
The Parliaments of the four colonies that formed the Union of South Africa in 1910 as 
well as the subsequent Union Parliament were cast in the Westminster mould and as 
in Britain the South African Members of Parliament were seen to be the 
representatives of the people even though, de facto, they did not represent all the 
people. 
 
Race issues dominated constitutional development in South Africa especially after 
1948.  Although the government that came to power in 1948 did not enjoy the support 
of the majority of the electorate, it gradually instituted constitutional changes that did 
not meet the approval of the population as a whole and for which they did not have a 
de facto mandate.  The way in which the Coloureds were removed from the common 
voters roll caused indignation which hailed a period of rule by law rather than rule of 
law.  The democratisation of the South African constitutional system became a vexing 
matter and a new constitution was adopted in 1983, extending voting rights to 
Coloureds and Indians but keeping de facto control in the hands of the White 
population.  Ten years later the first completely democratic constitution was adopted 
which culminated in the 1996 Constitution, the fifth since the Union. 
 
The 1996 Constitution may no longer be recognisable as the offspring of the Mother 
of all Parliaments, but as in the case of heredity, the family features of the 
Westminster mould are still visible and the present can only be fully appreciated if 
                                                 
321 In a way it is tragic that the democratic ideals with which the Boer republics were formed in the end 
fell by the wayside and that they in reality became oppressors. 
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seen in its historic context.  However, it should be borne in mind that behind the 
formal legal text that now constitutes the Constitution of South Africa, lies a 
remarkable story of social and political conflict of three and a half centuries that need 
to be known in order to fully understand the present.  That story unfortunately falls 
outside the scope of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REPRESENTATION:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE IN 
PUBLIC LAW 
“Our notion of representative government thus seems to incorporate both a very 
general, abstract, almost metaphorical idea -- that the people of a nation are present 
in the actions of its government in complex ways  --  and some fairly concrete, 
practical, and historically traditional institutions intended to secure such an 
outcome.” 
HF Pitkin The Concept of Representation (1972) 235. 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hearnshaw322 points out that the characteristic feature that distinguishes the modern 
democracy from the Greek, Roman, Medieval, Civic and Cantonal democracies is that 
the modern democracy is representative and not direct.  The principle that a large 
number of people may be represented in the process of government by a single person 
or persons is firmly entrenched in contemporary public law and is common to all 
modern legal systems.323   However, representation as a public law concept is 
essentially a modern one and was unknown in ancient Greece and Rome.324 
 
Although the ancient Greeks had a number of institutions that involved representation 
they had no corresponding word for the concept.325   The word representation derives 
from the Latin representare but for the Romans it meant “the literal bringing into 
presence of something previously absent, or the embodiment of an abstraction in an 
                                                 
322 Hearnshaw FJC Democracy at the Crossways (1918) 101. 
323 Carpenter op cit 162 and Pitkin HF The Concept of Representation (1972) 2. 
324 All Roman citizens were members of the comitia centuriata during the republican period and 
although the national assembly was seen as representative of the entire population, the concept of any 
one member representing or voting for another had not yet developed.  See Carpenter op cit 162. 
325 Pitkin op cit 241. 
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object.”326 The modern concept of representation as employed in public law, 
developed in England “only by the purest chance”327 to become one of the underlying 
principles, not only of the Westminster Parliamentary system but of all modern 
democracies. 
 
3.2 REPRESENTATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
Maine328 calls government by representation a virtually English discovery which 
caused Parliamentary institutions to be preserved in Britain from the destruction 
which overtook them everywhere else.  He describes it as follows: 
“under this system, when it was in its prime, an electoral body, never…extraordinarily large, chose 
a number of persons to represent it in Parliament, leaving them unfettered by express instructions, 
but having with them at most a general understanding, that they would strive to give a particular 
direction to public policy.” 
 
Representation has its origins in the feudal system wherein the feudal lord represented 
his vassal vis-à-vis the king. It developed together with the rise of the parliamentary 
system329 - although from different origins, the two systems eventually developed to 
fit together as hand in glove.  The principle of representation developed from the 
principle of consent in that the representatives received plena potestas to agree to the 
payment of taxes on behalf of their communities.330 It arose from practical 
considerations, as constant warfare made it dangerous for all the men of the tribe to 
leave their homes to attend meetings of the moot.331 
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Taswell-Longmead332 put it as follows: 
“The theoretical right of the individual to attend the assembly in person was exchanged for the 
practical right of electing representatives.” 
 
However, feudal law did not recognize the principle that one man could represent 
another in the giving of his consent and it was through the king’s claiming the Roman 
private law principle of consent quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur that forced 
subjects to be present with plena potestas, which resulted in the link between 
representation and consent.333  Basson334 put it as follows: 
“It is therefore clear that the principle of representation, namely that representatives be elected by 
communities to consent on their behalf to taxes, developed from the doctrine of consent.”335 
 
Once the principle of representation is established the question arises as to who or 
what is being represented.  Cam argued that it is the “living communities”336that are 
being represented, i.e. a village, borough, legal corporation, shire etc (not individual 
subjects). From this developed the idea of the community of the realm which gave rise 
to the notion that the whole community was represented in one institution namely the 
House of Commons.337  Representatives no longer represent the interests of their local 
communities who elected them, but have to act in the common good or general 
welfare of the community of the realm.  In other words, representatives act in the 
national interest and not in the interests of a particular group.338  This was made clear 
by the English Court of Appeal in the judgment of Farwell LJ.339  The facts of the 
case in short were that the Plaintiffs sought an order against the defendant, a Labour 
Party Member of Parliament, to toe the Party line in Parliament in terms of a contract 
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between the parties.  The court quoted the following from a speech by Edmund 
Burke:340 
“but authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the Member is bound blindly and implicitly to 
obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and 
conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land….you choose a member indeed; 
but when you have chosen him, he is not a Member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament.”341 
 
Pitkin342 quotes the following exposition of representation as expressed by Lord 
Brougham in his judgment: 
“the essence of representation is that the power of the people should be parted with, and given over, for 
limited period, to the deputy chosen by the people, and that he should perform that part in the 
government, which, but for this transfer, would have been performed by the people themselves.  It is 
not representation if the constituents so far retain control as to act for themselves.  They may 
communicate with their delegate…..but he is to act – not they; he is to act for them – not they for 
themselves.” 
 
However, the most pronounced exponent of the free mandate was Edmund Burke343 
who was quoted as follows by Sir Courtney Illbert:344 
“Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the 
strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his 
constituents.  Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; 
their business unremitted attention.  It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his 
satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own.  
But, his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to 
sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.  These he does not derive from your 
pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution.  They are a trust from Providence, for the 
abuse of which he is deeply answerable.  Your representative owes you, not his industry only, 
but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. 
 
My worthy colleague says his will ought to be subservient to yours.  If that be all, the thing is 
innocent: if government were a matter of will upon my side, yours, without question, ought to 
be superior.  But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgement, and not of 
inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the 
discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form 
the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments? 
 
To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable 
opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear, and which he ought always 
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most seriously to consider.  But authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the member 
is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and to argue for, though contrary to the 
clearest conviction of his judgement and conscience – these are things utterly unknown to the 
laws of the land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of 
our constitution. 
 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which 
interests each must maintain, as an agent, and advocate, against other agents and advocates; 
but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; 
where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting 
from the general reason of the whole.  You choose a member indeed: but when you have 
chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.” 
 
Illbert345 points out that the principles laid down by Burke were not new and 
previously pronounced by Blackstone and others, but: 
“…they had never been so eloquently or forcible expressed.” 
However, it should be mentioned that Burke was not an exponent of universal 
suffrage but rather of virtual representation.346  Burke had a lack of faith in the 
capacity of the ordinary person to think things out for himself as is evident from the 
preface to his book A Vindication of Natural Society published in 1756 in which he 
poses the question: 
“What would become of the world if the practice of all moral duties, and the foundation of society, 
rested upon having their reasons made clear and demonstrative to every individual?” 347 
 
Nevertheless, the principles so eloquently enunciated by Burke, were still 
considered as sound in the twentieth century.348 Illbert put it as follows: 
“A Member of Parliament is elected by a local constituency, he has special duties towards it; but he 
is not a mere delegate or mouthpiece; he is a member of a body which is responsible for the interests 
of the country at large, and though he is influenced by the wishes and views of his constituents and 
by the action of his party, he does not surrender his right of independent judgement.”349 
 
However, in the earliest days of Parliament, Members were more in the position of 
agents or delegates as is evident from the fact that in 1339 when the Commons were 
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asked to grant an aid requested by the King, they replied that they could not do so 
without consulting the commons of the country and that a new Parliament had to be 
summoned for that purpose.350  Up until the eighteenth century it was also common 
for members to receive instructions from their constituencies, but after the Reform 
Act of 1832 it was no longer practicable.351  The Redistribution Act of 1885, which 
endeavoured to divide Britain into equal electoral districts, strengthened the view 
that a member represents the country as a whole.  This development is described as 
follows by Birgh:352 
“In earlier periods it had not been inappropriate to think of members as delegated representatives, 
charged with presenting the grievances of their counties or boroughs to the King’s Ministers and of 
giving consent to taxation on behalf of the propertied classes.  If some Members of Parliament 
exercised more individual judgment than this model allowed for, in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries the theory of Parliamentary representation nevertheless hinged on the idea of the 
representative as a delegate.  But in the latter years of the seventeenth century, Algernon Sydney had 
declared that Members should put the interests of the nation as a whole before the interests of their 
particular areas and the argument was developed by other politicians of Whig sympathies before it 
was given its famous and eloquent expression by Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of 
Bristol in 1774.  It was a necessary development of ideas by a group who claimed that Parliament, 
rather than the King, was or should be the supreme authority in the government of the country.” 
 
From this it followed that if Parliament was to be the centre of power; Members of 
Parliament had to be free to act according to their conscience in the best interests of 
the nation.353  Birgh354  points out that while Members of Parliament derive their 
authority from their election by their fellow citizens, they not only represent those 
who elect them but that they have a duty to also consider the interests of generations 
to come. 
It is clear from the above that the position in positive English public law is: 
“That a representative is not bound by mandates issued to him, but, on the 
contrary, may act according to his own judgement and conscience.”355 
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3.3 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
In general the freedoms and rights of British subjects accompanied the colonists who 
went to the British Territories overseas as a part of the English common law.356  The 
long established principle that the King could not levy taxes without his subjects’ 
consent therefore also applied to the colonists.357  When George III levied taxes on the 
colonists to pay for the war against France, the slogan no taxation without 
representation became the battle cry for the revolution that led to the independence of 
the United States of America.358  According to Storey, the colonists were not 
demanding new rights but they were pleading for the preservation of their own rights 
under the Crown.359  Their complaints culminated in specific charges included in the 
Declaration of Independence, namely that they fought “to preserve the freedom and 
rights as citizens of England.”360  It is interesting that the American colonists did not 
demand representation in the British Parliament but resented being taxed without their 
consent. The argument was that the King of England should tax only Englishmen and 
if money was to be raised from the colonists only a colonial legislature might 
authorise its raising.361  Burke362 supported the American colonists because they “had 
taken up arms for one motive only; that is, our attempting to tax them without their 
consent”.363  It therefore appears that Burke did not consider the American colonists 
to be virtually represented in the British Parliament, “because they were too far away 
to be considered part of the national community of Great Britain.”364 
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3.4 VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that although Parliament was seen as representing the 
whole nation, universal suffrage was only introduced both in Britain and in South 
Africa during the Twentieth Century.  In Britain it was essentially the unpropertied 
masses while in South Africa it was the black population that did not have the right to 
vote, even though in terms of public law, these groups were considered part of 
Parliament, as it was “that great body that comprehends the whole nation” and 
“Parliament’s consent is every man’s consent.”365  To overcome this anomaly, Burke 
coined the term virtual representation.  In a letter to Sir Hercules Longrishe dated 3 
January 1792, he explained the concept as follows: 
“There is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in 
the name of any description of people, and the people in whose interest they act, though the trustees are 
not actually chosen by them.  This is virtual representation. Such a representation I think to be, in many 
cases, even better than the actual.”366 
 
To understand Burke one has to appreciate that he did not base political rights on 
philosophical theories as did Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others. He considered 
politics as “a matter of prudence, expediency, circumstance, utility, experience, 
history, loyalty and reverence and not of abstract speculation.”367 
 
Burke did not see society in terms of equal individuals, but in terms of unequal groups 
and historically recognised interests.368  Property, aristocracy and monarchy were 
such historical interests based on prescription rather than on natural law or abstract 
reasoning.369  He consequently saw political rights not as universal human rights but 
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as patrimonial rights.  It is against this background that his distinction between the 
rights of Englishmen and the rights of men (i.e. human rights) should be seen.  
According to him the rights of Englishmen were not based on theories but were 
inherited “as a patrimony derived from their forefathers.”370  He also quoted the 
Petition of Rights where it was stated that “your subjects have inherited this freedom.” 
 
He furthermore argued that in the Declaration of Rights the primary object 
was to secure existing rights from being subverted again.371  He postulated that: 
 
“….from (the) Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our 
constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our 
forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity.”372 
 
Burke was indifferent to the fact that most Englishmen could not vote as he considered 
the smallest farmer as being virtually represented by the great landlords.  Virtual 
representation was in many cases even better than actual representation because 
“people may err in their choice; but common interest and common sentiment are 
rarely mistaken”.373  This explains Burke’s statement that “twenty-four millions ought 
to prevail over two-hundred thousands… if the constitution of a kingdom be a 
problem of arithmetic”.374 
 
Basson375 explains Burke’s theory as follows: 
“…one should, however, always remember that Burke believed first and foremost in a government 
by an elite and that he did not want to give too great an influence to the populace or voters in the 
sphere of governmental power.” 
 
                                                 
370 Ebenstein op cit 474. 
371 Ebenstein op cit  475. 
372 Ebebstein op cit  475. 
373 Canavan FP op cit 160. 
374 Ebenstien op cit 481. 
375 Basson DA The Independence of the Principles Underlining the Theory of Modern Conservatism in 
Positive Constitutional Law unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria (1984)  35. 
  75
In retrospect, Burke’s patrimonial approach may seem flawed but it is interesting that a 
liberal such as Voltaire stated in his Letters to the English  in 1734, after spending three 
years in England, that England was a “land of freedom and common sense, secular in 
outlook, tolerant in religion, and respectful of the rule of law.”376Montesquieu, who also 
visited England shortly after Voltaire stated in one of his publications that: 
“…the government of England is wiser, because there is a body (Parliament?) which examines it 
continuously and continuously examines itself; its errors never last long, and are often useful because of 
the spirit of attention they give to people.  In a word, a free government, that is, one that is always 
agitated, cannot be maintained if it is not capable of correction through its own laws.”377 
 
The question arises whether those citizens who did not possess the right to vote in 
South Africa pre-1994, were not virtually represented.  Burke justified his support for 
the extension of the franchise to the Roman Catholics in Ireland on the principle that 
where a group is being oppressed by a government, such a group cannot be seen as 
being virtually represented.378  It is trite that the black community in South Africa was 
oppressed prior to 1994 and for that reason it must be concluded that they were not 
virtually represented.  However, notwithstanding the political rights contained in the 
present Constitution379 there are persons who do not have the right to vote in South 
Africa and are therefore not directly represented.  These persons are: 
• Alien visitors 
• Citizens under 18 at the time of the last election 
• Citizens over 18 at the time of the last election but who were not registered on 
the Voters Rolls 
• Certain prisoners 
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• The mentally ill380 
 
In addition, a large number of registered voters do not cast their votes and are 
therefore not directly represented.381  As Parliament also has to act in the interest of 
these persons, it is submitted that although the concept of virtual representation may 
sound archaic and paternalistic in present day constitutional law, these persons are for 
all practical purposes virtually represented by the elected members. It can also be 
argued that the registered voters who abstained from voting are also virtually 
represented by the elected representatives. 
 
3.5   SOUTH AFRICA PRE-1994 
 
As far as South Africa is concerned, Basson382 adopts a positive law approach and 
argues convincingly that because the British Parliamentary system was accepted as 
the system of Government in South Africa, the representative theory of a free mandate 
is part of South African Public Law.383  This is confirmed by Southern African case 
law. 
 
The first case was in Zimbabwe384 where members of a political party who became 
Members of Parliament through nomination on the Party list in accordance with the 
proportional electoral system, had entered into an agreement with the Party in terms 
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whereof they were obliged to vacate their seats if they no longer supported the Party’s 
principles, policies or leadership or ceased to be members of the Party.  Eight 
members subsequently resigned from the Party. The Speaker refused to recognise 
their seats as being vacant, whereupon the court was approached.  The court found 
that neither a member of the public nor a political party had the right to apply for a 
declaratory order that a member had become disqualified.385 Consequently the court 
found that it had no jurisdiction. Nevertheless important aspects of representation in 
public law386 were discussed namely: 
 
• Parliament must act in the best interests of the State.387 
• Parliament is not concerned with contractual rights as between a particular 
party and Members of Parliament and Parliament cannot be influenced by any 
such contract.388 
• Once Members of Parliament have been duly elected and sworn in as 
Members, Parliament alone has the power to decide whether they remain 
Members or not.389 
• There may be good reasons for a Member to resign from a Party and a contract 
so widely worded as to bring about the obligation of a Member to vacate his 
seat in Parliament if his conscience compelled him to resign from the Party is 
contrary to public policy and unenforceable.390 
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The next case was in South West Africa / Namibia391 where the Court approved the 
last point mentioned above392 and went on to state: 
“A Party who nominates a representative at all times runs the risk that it may lose its confidence in the 
nominee.”393 
 
It also stated that since the National Assembly could pass laws in the national interest, 
freedom of speech and the freedom to vote when deliberating such matters are 
necessarily presupposed.394  The judgment was upheld on appeal395and the Chief 
Justice made the following important statement: 
“The Members of the Legislative Assembly can, in my opinion, therefore not be seen as representatives 
of the nominating parties or societies, but only as representatives of the people of the Territory.”396 
 
With reference to these cases, Wiechers397 confirms that the common law rule that an 
individual Member of Parliament is not bound by a Party mandate, applied in South 
Africa and that should a Member enter into an agreement with a political party in 
terms whereof the Member undertakes to vacate his/her seat, should he/she break 
his/her party affiliation, the court will not enforce the agreement.398  He points out, 
however, that an unruly member may soon find himself in the political wilderness if 
he cuts himself loose from party ties.399 
 
Although Basson400 confirms that the free mandate theory of representation was the 
de jure legal position in South Africa, he points out that a system of party government 
operated de facto whereby the political parties, through the reality of strong party 
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discipline, had a substantial influence in the sphere of government power and 
representatives usually toed the party line.  This may have led Currie and de Waal401 
to state that in most modern democracies the type of mandate in force has little 
significance, as it is the political party concerned and not the representative or those 
who elected him, which dictates how the electorate is represented. 
 
3.6   SOUTH AFRICA 1994 TO THE PRESENT 
 
The preamble to the interim Constitution, after acknowledging humble submission to 
Almighty God, continues in the first person plural: “We, the people of South 
Africa...”  It is common cause that the interim Constitution was adopted by the last 
parliament under the 1983 Constitution which was not representative of all the people 
of South Africa402.  However, since the interim Constitution endeavoured to create a 
new order in which there would be “equality between men and women and people of 
all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights 
and freedoms,” it clearly intended the general good and consequently, those who were 
not at its passing directly represented in Parliament can be regarded as having been 
virtually represented. 
 
The preamble to the 1996 Constitution is similarly couched in the first person plural 
and also commences with “We the people of South Africa”.  It further states that the 
Constitution is adopted by the people through their freely elected representatives.  
Section 42(3) makes specific provision for the National Assembly to represent the 
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people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution.  It is therefore 
clear that the Members of the National Assembly are considered the representatives of 
the people.  It is put as follows by Currie and deWaal:403 
“…the basic idea of representative democracy is that the people should participate in politics through 
their duly elected representatives.” 
 
 
 
 
3.7   CONCLUSION 
 
The legal value underlying the principle of representation in public law was 
instrumental in the historic development of representative government, as it is known 
today.404   The absolute monarchies of medieval times were gradually transformed 
into representative governmental systems in which authority ceased to be exercised 
arbitrarily but came to be exercised on behalf of the subjects of the state.405 
 
The development of the principle that a large number of people may be represented in 
the process of government by an elected representative is probably the most 
significant contribution that English Public Law made to the practical implementation 
of democracy.  It is difficult to imagine how any community larger than a tribe or clan 
can function in any democratic way without a smaller group of people being given the 
right to decide on behalf of the whole group. 
 
An interesting phenomenon in the development of representation is that it was 
originally not considered an inherent right to elect representatives and that it is by the 
purest chance that those men who were the first representatives acted in such a 
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manner that even those who did not participate in their election or appointment saw 
them as their representatives.  This led to the concept of virtual representation in 
terms whereof the representative was deemed to act also on behalf of those who did 
not participate in his election as long as his actions were intended for the common 
good of the realm. 
 
However, the underlying principle that taxes could not be levied without consent runs 
like a golden thread through the development of the public law concept of 
representation. This principle was voiced by the American colonists when they coined 
the slogan ‘no taxation without representation.’  This resulted in representation 
playing such an important role in the American Constitution and through it in many 
other modern Constitutions. 
 
It is important to note that representation did not develop from a theoretical concept 
but from practical considerations.  Much criticism may be levelled at the limitations 
of representation, but it should be borne in mind that the development of the concept 
is still in process and that it can never be more than a balance between the theoretical 
ideal and what can be achieved in practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ADVENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
FROM INFORMAL GROUPINGS TO GOVERNMENT406 
 
“Although party is often ‘extra constitutional’ it is an essential organ of every large-
scale democracy ---- The organisation of opinion by parties inevitability followed the 
rise of democracy.  The principle of representation had to be vitalised by the conflict 
of parties.  When parties flourish we have in effect passed from a pre-democratic 
mode of representative government to a genuinely democratic one.” 
R M MacIver The Webb of Government (1947) 209-210. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to imagine a Parliament in a democratic society without political parties, but 
the interesting fact is that Parliament pre-dates political parties by more than three hundred 
years.407  “Party” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary408 as “a division of a whole: 
a part, portion or share; a company or body of persons; a number of persons united 
maintaining a cause, policy, opinion etc in opposition to others who maintain a different 
one”.  In the New Encyclopaedia Britannica409 a political party is defined as a group 
organised to achieve and exercise power within a political system.  It is therefore implicit 
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that a party will be exclusive in that it only involves a part of society, as the word implies.  
Exclusiveness again implies tension and rivalry, which as will be seen, formed the 
cornerstone of the two-party system as it evolved in Britain from the seventeenth 
century.410 
 
Political parties as we know them today developed in Britain during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as a result of ideological differences among members of Parliament.411  
Today political parties are the core institutions in a democratic society, because they are the 
key: 
 
• vehicles for political representation; 
• mechanism for the organisation of government; 
• to maintaining democratic accountability.412 
 
Although the primary aim of political parties is to gain power, party politics is not 
only about competition but is also expected to integrate and accommodate interests 
and to reconcile different opinions so as to offer a choice to the electorate.413  It will 
now be endeavoured to trace the origin of political parties as manifested in Britain and 
their development in South Africa. 
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4.2 BRITAIN 
 
It was shown in Chapter 2 above that although Parliament dates back to the thirteenth 
century, the Crown continued to exercise de facto control over Parliament through 
Royal patronage for a long time.  The constitutional lesson learnt from the events of 
the latter half of the seventeenth century (the revolution and execution of Charles I) 
was that there had to be harmony between the Crown, the Ministers and the majority 
in Parliament.414  During the reign of William III (1689-1702), Parliament took a 
critical attitude and the regular adherents of the Court were in a minority.415  The King 
then reached agreement with politicians who had some debating talent and family 
connections and gave posts to a group of young Whig leaders.416 417 
 
Political parties in Britain thus first developed from informal groupings of Members 
of Parliament that congealed into mainly two groups.418  As Cabinet Government 
developed it became important for the Government to secure the support of the 
majority of Members. This led to the groupings becoming more formalised and 
committed to common policies.  These were internal developments in Parliament. 
 
The liberalisation of the franchise during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to 
a fuller democracy which required well organised structures for the mustering of 
support by a Party to gain political power.  This heralded the extra-parliamentary 
                                                 
414 Mackintosh JP The British Cabinet Third edition (1977) 40. 
415 Mackintosh op cit 45. 
416 Ibid 
417 This is generally seen as the beginning of majority rule in the Commons.  Macauly TB History of 
England Vol 3 (1861) 248 – 250. 
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period of political parties where the de facto power moved from Members of 
Parliament to political parties and more specifically to the political party in power.  
From this time forward Parliament can be seen “…as an organ of power put at the 
disposal of a political group to whom an electoral majority has for a term of years 
accorded its confidence in the expectation that election promises will be adequately 
redeemed.”419 
 
The first political party in Parliament, the Tory Party,420 was formed by the majority 
of the members of the 1661 Parliament, called the Cavalier Parliament.421  The Party 
was “more Anglican and Squirearchical than Royalist; it kept the Crown on a short 
allowance of taxes, scouted the advice of Charles and Clarendon and remodelled the 
Corporations in the interests of their own Church and Party rather than in those of the 
Court. By Parliamentary Statute they set afoot a prosecution of Puritan non-
conformists more cruel than any desired by the King and even by that stout Anglican, 
the Lord Chancellor.”422   The founder of the Tory Party was Thomas Osborne, Earl 
of Danby “the first Royal Minister who owed his position by the throne to the 
goodwill of the House of Commons.”423  The Cavalier Parliament sat for fifteen years 
and Danby “further secured his majority in the House by systematising the bribery of 
individual Members…..”424 
 
                                                 
419 Sir D Lindsay-Keir The Constitutional History of Modern Britain 1485 – 1947 (1947) 460. 
420 The name Tory was originally a hostile nickname meaning an ‘Irish Catholic Bandit’ Trevelyan GM 
History of England (1926) 464 footnote 1. 
421 Trevelyan op cit  449. 
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423 Trevelyan op cit  460. 
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The Whig Party425 was founded by Shaftsbury in opposition to the Tories.426  The 
Whig Party was the party of the “unprivileged dissenters and of the mercantile and 
middle classes arrayed under a section of the higher aristocracy.”427  It was the Whig 
Party that organised the earliest Parliamentary opposition,428  but according to Lees 
and Kimber429 Edmund Burke was the first to acknowledge political parties in 1769. 
However, Ostrogorski and Weber430 put it much later. They state that the origins of 
political parties are to be found in the effects of the 1832 and 1867 Reform Acts and 
the consequential rise of extra-parliamentary activity by political parties from that 
time.  Prior to that time parties had not yet evolved into well-organised institutions 
and only existed in the sense that many members could be described as Whigs, Tories 
or Radicals by ideological association, although they did not like to be called “Party 
Men”.  Mackintosh described parties at this stage as follows: 
“The Leaders of a Party were those who entered the Cabinet and its adherents were such 
Members of Parliament as attended the meeting held at the start of the session and voted with 
the Government on most431 occasions.  Parties were thus loose entities that grew up around 
Cabinets rather than well-defined organisations which could produce them.  Yet political 
feelings were clearly marked and it was usually evident that a given House of Commons was 
more likely to support Ministers of a certain political colour.”432 
 
Towards the second half of the nineteenth century Members of Parliament, 
although supporting a party in general terms, still acted individually and the 
majority refused to carry a party banner.433  Party membership did not yet exist 
and the parties still had no organisation to appoint candidates.434  At the 
beginning of a Parliamentary session a meeting of those Members who 
                                                 
425 ‘Whig’ originally meant a Scottish covenanting zealot. Trevelyan op cit 464 footnote 1. 
426 Trevelyan op cit 465. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Fifth Sir Charles A Commentary on Macaulay’s History of England (1938) 259. 
429  Lees John D and Kimber Richard Political Parties in Modern Britain (1972) 1. 
430 Hanham HJ The First Constituency Party Political Studies (1961) 188 – 189. 
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432 Op cit 76 – 77. 
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supported the Government would be held to discuss Government policy broadly 
and to gain the support of backbenchers.435  More or less at this point in time the 
idea took root that the Government should represent the majority Party in 
Parliament.436  The freedom of Members of Parliament to vote in accordance to 
their own convictions and not necessarily according to Party policy made it 
difficult for Ministers to implement Government policy, as they could never be 
sure of gaining the necessary support.437 
 
Parliament at this stage was still in the hands of the landed gentry and both the 
Tory Government and Whig opposition were convinced that it should remain in 
their hands.438 
 
Ostrogoski439 describes the development of political parties in England as 
follows: 
“The parties, however, had laid hands on the very weapon which was being used against them, 
extra-parliamentary organisation.  The movement had begun somewhat late.  For a long time 
parties had no distinct life of their own save in Parliament; in the country they barely existed as 
moral entities independently of the personages or families which were the embodiment of them.  
The language of the day only testified to the facts in using, instead of “Tory” and “Whig,” such 
expressions as “the Rutland interest,” “the Bedford interest,” etc.  The voters simply represented 
the personal following of the rivals who fought the electoral duel; they were their retainers or 
sold themselves to them on the polling-day for money.  The operations of sale and purchase 
were often conducted through the agency of organised bodies, sometimes public bodies, such as 
municipalities, which made money out of their boroughs, sometimes voluntary organisations, 
which acted in the guise of non-political societies without any legal existence.  Side by side with 
these juntas there sprang up occasionally, in a sporadic fashion and with an ephemeral existence, 
bona fide political organisations, in the form of clubs or committees, for supporting a particular 
candidate. 
But whatever the organs of electoral action, secret or avowed, municipal corporations, clubs or 
private agents, they represented local divisions and rivalries more than anything else.  The only 
party organisation on a basis approaching a national basis was in Parliament.  Its efforts were 
felt essentially within the walls of Parliament itself.” 
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436 Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit  108. 
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438 Howat op cit 73. 
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However, the Industrial Revolution changed Britain from a basically agricultural 
nation to an industrial one,440 which resulted in the rise of a rich and influential 
middle class as well as the formation of Trade Unions, which became pressure 
groups for reform.  The voters started to demand a more consistent and 
unanimous attitude from the Members of Parliament of the Parties they voted 
for, with the result that Party organisation and discipline became essential for 
effective government or opposition.441 
 
As the power of the Crown declined due to the emergence of more political 
issues, greater political awareness and the process of administrative reform, all 
of which reduced the Crown’s influence on politics, the Cabinet emerged as the 
real power.442  The introduction of a Reform Bill in 1831 changed the 
relationship between Members of Parliament and their constituencies as 
Members were then, for the first time seen to be accountable to the electorate 
and fewer resources were available for patronage.443  The Crown also came to 
realise that it was restricted in its appointment of a Prime Minister to a Member 
who was most likely to demand the largest measure of support in the House of 
Commons.444 
 
However, it was under Gladstone and Disraeli that party solidarity was achieved 
and it was realised that a party leader and party followers were obliged to be 
loyal to the group.445  The election of Members of Parliament became more 
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444 Mackintosh op cit 76. 
445 Carpenter op cit 49 – 50. 
  89
democratic as the twentieth century approached; it became increasingly 
important for politicians to gain the support of the electorate and formal political 
parties developed from the informal groupings that existed. 
 
Kleynhans446 writes that the most acceptable explanation for the rise of 
disciplined political parties was given by Ostrogorski who said that it was to be 
found in the extension of the franchise and redistribution of constituencies. 
These developments brought an end to the friendly and personal relationship 
between the member and his constituency as the caucus demanded total 
obedience from its members.  From this point members ceased to be 
representatives and became delegates or subordinates of the party they belonged 
to. 
 
It is interesting to note that the first political parties began within Parliament 
itself and over time deliberately developed into extra-parliamentary 
organisations “to recruit support and maintain a mass electoral base in the face 
of political and social change.”447 
 
In conclusion it can be stated that the development of political parties in Britain 
went through three phases: 
 
• The first phase came about when Members of Parliament started to assert 
themselves and became more independent as the Crown’s control of 
                                                 
446 Staatsleer (Honneurs) SAPOLI-A (1984) 313, referring to Ostrogoski op cit. 
447 Lees John D and Kimber Richard Political Parties in Modern Britain: An organizational and 
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appointments diminished. This resulted in Members grouping together 
into two main groups. 
 
• The second phase was brought about by the need of Cabinets to be able 
to rely on the support of the majority of Members to pass new laws to 
implement policy. 
 
• The third phase was introduced by the reforms that resulted in more 
democratic elections and the resultant need to muster support for a Party 
in order to gain political power.  This heralded the extra-parliamentary 
period of political parties as parliament from that time became 
representative of the people and at the same time responsible to the 
people. 
 
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA PRE-UNION 
When the parliamentary system of government was first introduced in South Africa in 
1853,448 political parties had not yet fully developed.  In the Cape Colony the Cape 
Parliament remained a largely homogeneous body for the first quarter of a century 
and it appears that the prevailing sentiment was hostile to political parties.449  
McCracken points out that when the Governor opened the second Cape Parliament in 
1859 he attributed the success of the first Parliament to: 
“The absence of factions or party passions and complimented the new members on having been 
returned when the electorate was unusually free from party influence.”450 
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He further states that Namaqualand congratulated themselves on returning a 
member who was “untrammelled by any pledge to any political party”.451  He 
quoted Scermbrucker as follows: 
“I can honestly assure you that there are no political parties – at least there is no political 
organisation such as we have frequently been told there was….everyone is for himself and seems to 
act as the spirit may move him”.452 
 
At this stage of political development, allegiance tended to be given on a personal 
basis and “instead of the majority creating a government, the government created a 
majority.”453This was confirmed by Neame who stated that politics during this time 
ran upon personal rather than upon party lines.454 
 
It is therefore clear that political parties were slow to develop in the Cape 
Colony and it was only as a result of the Jameson Raid that the Cape split into 
clear party lines.455 
 
The first political party established in the Cape Colony456 was the Afrikaner 
Bond formed in 1880 by SJ du Toit.457  Apart from the Bond there initially 
existed no other formal political party in the Cape Colony.  The Bond never 
formed a Government but rather supported Governments led by outsiders such 
as Scalen, Upington, Sprigg, Rhodes, Schreiner and Merriman.458  Bond 
members did however from time to time serve in the Cabinet and the withdrawal 
of Bond support usually caused Ministries to fall.459  In the absence of formal 
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political party alignment, Members who did not have the support of the Bond 
were called “Progressives,” but the Progressive Party was only established in 
1895.460 
 
After the Anglo Boer War 10 500 so-called Cape rebels were disenfranchised, 
which led to the Progressive Party winning the 1903 elections by a narrow 
majority.461  In the thirty-eight years of responsible government before Union, 
the Cape Colony had 12 Ministries.462  Eight Members served as Prime 
Ministers during this period and in four cases a change of Government was 
caused by a defeat in the House, or because a motion of no confidence was 
passed.463 Notwithstanding the frequent changes of Government,464 there seems 
to have been quite a stable membership in both Parliament and the Cabinet.465  
Stable government without strong party discipline therefore seems to have 
prevailed during this period. 
 
In the Orange Free State the first political party was the Orangia Unie formed in 
December 1905.466  When responsible Government was granted in 1907 the 
Orangia Unie won 30 out of the 38 seats in the Legislative Assembly.467 
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In the Transvaal there existed no formal political parties prior to 1904, although 
there were two political groupings, the supporters of Kruger and Joubert 
respectively.468  The first political party formed in the Transvaal was Het Volk 
which adopted its Constitution on 6 July 1905.  In the first elections held under 
British rule in 1907, Het Volk gained 37 seats out of a total of 69 seats.469 
 
Until 1899 there were no party political activities in Natal and when Union was 
formed in 1910 there was still no political party activity worth mentioning.470 
 
4.4 SOUTH AFRICA 1910 – 1994 
 
Although a large number of political parties were established since the 
formation of Union,471 only three Parties governed South Africa from 1910 – 
1994 namely: 
 
• The South African Party (SAP) 1910 - 1924472 
• The National Party (NP) 1924 – 1933 
• The United Party (UP) 1934 – 1948 
• The National Party 1948 - 1994473 
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All these parties were established by an intra-parliamentary process: 
 
• The South African Party was formed on 21 November 1911 when the 
Governing Party was transformed into the South African Party and 
joined by independent Members.474 
• The National Party was formed on 9 January 1914 by General JBM 
Hertzog and other Members of the South African Party.475 
• The United Party was established on 5 December 1934 through the 
amalgamation of the South African Party and National Party.476 
• Nineteen members of the National Party did not join the new party and 
when there came a split in the United Party because of differences over 
the war with Germany,477  Malan and Hertzog formed the Herenigde 
Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party-HNP) but in 1951 the HNP 
and Afrikaner Party amalgamated and reverted to the name National 
Party. 
 
A large number of other political parties were also established through an intra-
parliamentary process, i.e.  : 
• The Afrikaner Party was formed by ten United Party Members   of 
Parliament in January 1941.478 
• The New Order was formed by seventeen Members of Parliament in 
August/September 1941.479 
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• In November 1954 six members of the United Party formed the 
National Conservative Party.480 
• On 13 November 1959 eleven members of the United Party 
formed the Progressive Party.481 
• In April 1960 a former member of the National Party formed the 
National Union.482 
• On 19 June 1962 the National Union amalgamated with the 
United Party.483 
• On 25 October 1969 four members of the National Party formed 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party.484 
• On 4 February 1975 four members of the United Party formed 
the Reformist Party.485 
• On 25 July 1975 the Reformist and the Progressive Parties 
amalgamated as the Progressive Reform Party.486 
• On 26 March 1977 six members of the United Party established 
the Independent United Party.487 
• On 28 June 1977 the United Party was dissolved and a new party, 
the New Republic Party was established and all but six of the ex 
United Party Members joined the new party.488 
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• The six members who did not join the New Republic Party 
formed the Progressive Federal Party together with members of 
the Progressive Reform Party.489 
• On 20 March 1982 seventeen members of the National Party 
formed the Conservative Party.490 
• On 7 October 1987 one Independent member and two members 
of the Progressive Federal Party formed the National Democratic 
Movement.491 
• In April 1989 the Progressive Federal Party was dissolved and a 
new party, the Democratic Party was formed and joined by 
sixteen Progressive Federal Party members and the three 
National Democratic Movement members.492 
• On 13 August 1992 the Afrikaner Volks Unie was formed by five 
members of the Conservative Party.493 
• On 16 March 1994 eight members of the Conservative Party 
formed the Freedom Front.494 
 
From this it can therefore be concluded that from Union in 1910 to full 
democratisation in 1994 all political parties that played a significant role in Parliament 
were established through an intra-Parliamentary process and none of these 
developments would have been possible if an anti-defection clause had applied. 
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There were of course political parties that did not participate in the Parliamentary 
process due to discriminatory and suppressive legislation. Of these the South African 
Communist Party, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress are 
the most significant examples. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, non-whites were excluded from the negotiations that preceded 
the formation of the Union of South Africa and they were also subject to serious 
discriminatory laws and practices.495  In reaction to the exclusion of blacks from the 
political process, a conference was held at Bloemfontein, on 4 January 1912 at which 
the African National Congress was established.496 
 
It is interesting that the African National Congress was structured as a Congress with 
two Houses, an upper and lower house.  The upper house consisted of seven 
paramount Chiefs appointed as honorary presidents, and the lower house had a 
National Executive Committee, which, amongst others, included the position of 
Speaker.497  One gets the impression that as the founders of the African National 
Congress were excluded from the National Parliament, they created their own 
Parliament, but called it Congress.  In March 1959 the Africanists group which 
supported a Pan Africanist ideology, broke away from the African National Congress 
to form the Pan African Congress (PAC).498  Both Parties were declared illegal 
organisations on 8 April 1960.499    After its banning, the African National Congress 
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went underground and committed itself to an armed struggle.500  The African National 
Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Congress were 
all unbanned on 2 February 1990501 and they participated in the first fully democratic 
elections on 27 April 1994.502 
 
The South African Communist Party was established in 1915 when leftist members of 
the Union-based Labour Party broke away from the Labour Party because they saw 
the First World War as a conflict between Capitalists and Imperialists and believed 
that workers should not become involved in the War.503  The Party never attained any 
significant political support, but was nevertheless banned in 1950 by the Suppression 
of Communism Act.504 The Party, however, disbanded before the Act was officially 
put into practice, went underground and started working closely with the African 
National Congress.505 
 
The South African Communist Party was unbanned in February 1990. The symbiotic 
relationship that had developed between the South African Communist Party and the 
African National Congress was evident from the fact that it was estimated that 25 out 
of the 50 National Executive Council Members elected in July 1991 held dual 
membership.506  However, in the General Elections that followed its unbanning (1994, 
1999 and 2004) the South African Communist Party did not participate under its own 
banner, but took part in the elections under the African National Congress banner as 
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part of a tripartite alliance between the African National Congress, Congress of South 
African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party.507  Apparently 34 of 
the 200 names on the African National Congress’ national list for the 1994 elections 
for the National Assembly were members of the South African Communist 
Party508and a number of South African Communist Party members were appointed to 
the Cabinet when the ANC came to power after the 1994 General Elections. 
 
With the first fully democratic elections of 1994, South Africa entered a critical 
period of change and adaptation.  Although the role of political parties was entrenched 
in the constitutions of 1993 and 1996, no law governs political parties except that 
registration is required.509  However, it is submitted that since political parties are now 
entrenched by the Constitution as the cornerstone of democracy, political parties have 
developed from informal intra-Parliamentary groupings to sui generis institutions that 
are subject to the principles of democracy and the rules of natural justice. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The proverb “birds of a feather flock together” implies that people of a kind will 
tend to group together.  This is a natural human phenomenon that must have 
manifested itself amongst the Members of Parliament from its earliest days.  
However, it was the government’s need to be able to count on Members’ support 
for its policies which led to the formation of groupings into political parties 
towards the end of the seventeenth century.  Originally political parties had very 
little extra-parliamentary activity and it was only after the electoral reforms in the 
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nineteenth century that political parties developed into extra-parliamentary 
organisations to recruit support and maintain a sound electoral base with a view to 
forming the government. 
 
In South Africa, political parties only began to emerge at the start of the twentieth 
century and more particularly after Union was formed in 1910.  The results of the 
first Union elections showed a fairly balanced outcome with the governing party 
obtaining a comfortable majority but with a strong opposition.  During the first 
fifty years of Union there was a healthy balance between the political parties in 
South Africa and a change of government occurred three times.  Two major re-
alignments between the big parties also occurred during this period510 and up to 
1958 a change of government was quite possible in any election.511 
 
However, after 1960 the political scene was totally dominated by one political 
party to such an extent that a change in government no longer seemed probable.512  
This was due to the fact that, for all practical purposes, the white electorate were 
the sole role players in South Africa.  Party politics after 1960 and up to 1994 
resulted in: 
 
• A stagnation of political party development as a very large section of the 
population was excluded from mainstream politics and 
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• A reluctance in accommodating the Black population in mainstream 
politics as developments in the rest of Africa since  the independence of 
Ghana in 1957, scared whites from sharing political power with blacks.513 
 
This also explains why the opposition could not succeed in reinventing itself. 
This leads to the conclusion that when a society is politically not free, political 
parties cannot achieve the political balance required by a two-party dominated 
parliamentary system. 
 
Political parties are extremely powerful under the post-1994 Constitutional 
regime and the fact that there are virtually no legal prescriptions concerning the 
internal functioning of political parties514 is considered a serious lacuna that 
needs to be addressed.  Although it has been submitted that political parties are 
at least subject to basic democratic principles, the courts seem to be reluctant to 
interfere with the internal functioning of political parties.515 
 
As the ANC and other banned political organisations were precluded from 
participating in parliamentary elections before 1994, these parties could not play 
the role of a true political party until the first free elections in 1994 and their role 
up to then had been that of extra-parliamentary pressure groups.516 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A MEMBER’S MANDATE517 
“Between elections, however, voters have no control over the conduct of their 
representatives.  They cannot dictate to them how they must vote in Parliament, nor 
do they have any legal right to insist that they conduct themselves or refrain from 
conducting themselves in a particular manner.” 
Chaskalson CJ in UDM  v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others op cit par 49. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In public law a free mandate means that the representatives who are elected to the 
legislature exercise a free mandate in national interest, while an imperative mandate means 
that the elected representatives are obliged to act in terms of the mandates given by the 
voters who elected them as their representatives.518 
 
According to Sir Henry Sumner Maine519 the word mandate, as used in constitutional law, 
does not have the ordinary meaning ascribed to it in English, French or Latin but “it is a 
fragment of a French phrase, mandat impératif which means an express direction from a 
constituency which its representative is not permitted to disobey.”  Maine520 poses the 
question whether a candidate, who in an election address declared himself in favour of a 
specific matter, if elected, has a mandate to vote for its implementation and if so, how many 
election addresses containing such references constitute a mandate?  Assuming a mandate 
has been obtained, a further question arises namely “how long is it in force?”  In the same 
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vein it may be asked what the position of a party that fails to obtain a majority is, i.e. what 
is the mandate of an opposition representative? There are no clear answers to these 
questions. 
 
Pitkin521 identifies the relationship between representative and constituents as a vexing and 
seemingly endless controversy.  He points out that although some theorists maintain that 
the representative’s duty is to reflect accurately the wishes and opinions of those he 
represents, the majority have the view that “the representative must do best what is best for 
those in his charge, but that he must do what he thinks best, using his own judgement and 
wisdom, since he is chosen to make decisions for his constituents.” 
 
Kleynhans522 says that representation is based on the presumption that the decisions of the 
representatives will be the same as those of the citizens, should the citizens be able to be 
present in person, discuss the matter personally and come to a vote. 
 
According to Ilbert,523 a Member of Parliament is “responsible” for all his constituents, 
whether they have voted for him or not.  Again, this strengthens the notion that a Member, 
once elected, has a free mandate.  In a proportional list system this would mean that every 
citizen could be viewed as part of a Member’s constituency.  Except for prominent party 
supporters there is no way by which a Member of Parliament would be able to tell with any 
certainty whether a particular voter who solicits his or her assistance indeed voted for the 
party concerned.  In practice all enquiries are dealt with as if it came from party 
supporters.524 
                                                 
521 Op cit 4. 
522 SAPOLI-A (1984) 53. 
523 Op cit 147. 
524 As informed by Mr JH van der Merwe MP Chief Whip of the IFP. 
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Guizot525 takes the matter back to the old principle that no one is bound to obey laws to 
which he has not given his consent.  He states that the natural reply to why the electorate 
vote for a specific person is because in the consideration of public affairs such a person is 
believed to be more capable than any other of sustaining the cause to which personal 
opinions, feelings and interests are alive.526 
 
Irrespective of the specific theory of mandate that may prevail in a political system, there 
are a number of factors that have an influence on the way in which a representative 
exercises or interprets his mandate.  The most important factor in this regard is that a 
representative is only elected for a limited period.527  Pitkin528 states that it is a political fact 
that politicians want to be re-elected and that they therefore often pattern their actions on 
what they perceive as their constituents’ wishes and not on what their constituents purport 
to want.  The voters, who pass the final judgment, also make their decisions on perceptions.  
Re-election is therefore not absolute proof that a representative was a good 
representative,529 just as a representative may lose his seat despite having been an excellent 
representative.530  Notwithstanding, the standard by which a representative should be 
judged is whether he has promoted the objective interests of those he represented.  Seen 
against this background there is a wide range of possibilities within the framework of the 
representative’s basic obligations.  The golden rule appears to be that the representative 
                                                 
525 Op cit 338. 
526 Op cit page 335. 
527 Presently for five years.  See Section 49 (1) of the Constitution 1996. 
528 Op cit 164. 
529 Especially in a proportional representative list system. 
530 Ibid. 
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must avoid a conflict of interests between himself and his constituents.  Pitkin531 puts it as 
follows: 
“The representative must act in such a way that, although he is independent, and his constituents are 
capable of action and judgment, no conflict arises between them.  He must act in their interest, and this 
means that he must not normally come into conflict with their wishes.” 
 
However, in practice, the political party to which a member belongs, selection criteria, 
extra-parliamentary pressure groups, funding, the influence of the elite and the way in 
which a member sees his allegiance, will to a great extent determine how the representative 
exercises his / her mandate. 
 
5.2 POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
The political party under whose banner a member was elected will for obvious reasons have 
a big influence on how a member exercises his / her political rights, and the following are 
the most important aspects in this regard: 
 
• The party’s election manifesto 
• Party discipline 
• Caucus 
• Party funding 
• The selection of candidates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
531 Op cit 166. 
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5.2.1 ELECTION MANIFESTOS 
 
As the electoral system became more democratised, party leaders started to appeal to the 
electorate as a whole as if one big constituency.532  In their desire to win elections, parties 
state their policies and electoral promises in what has become known as the party’s election 
manifesto.  If a party is elected it undertakes to implement the election promises contained in 
the manifesto.533  It is generally accepted that if elected, the manifesto confirms a mandate to 
the governing party to implement the policies contained in the manifesto.534  There is a 
presumption that those who voted for a party in an election expressly or tacitly accepted its 
programmes and therefore are giving a mandate for the implementation thereof.  Kavanagh535 
however, points out that the findings of election studies have thrown doubt on this 
presumption as voters’ decision is influenced by factors such as a party’s service record, 
competence, leadership, tradition and way of handling specific issues. 
 
Under the constituency-based electoral system536 candidates usually also issue their own 
manifestos, which apart from personal details, normally contain a commitment to serve the 
constituency and to endorse the policies of the political party concerned.537  If elected such a 
personal manifesto constitutes a specific mandate.  Under the proportional list electoral 
system no such personal manifestos are issued with the result that there is no direct mandate 
between the electorate and a particular candidate.  Electoral promises made during campaign 
speeches can perhaps be seen as a direct mandate, but proof of their contents would be 
problematic. 
                                                 
532 Keir op cit 460. 
533 Kavanagh Dennis “The Political Manifesto” (1981) Parliamentary Affairs XXXIV   7. 
534 Kavanagh op cit 8 and Kleynhans WA South African General Election Manifestos 1910-1981 
(1987) 14. 
535 Op cit 7. 
536 Such as applied in South Africa before 1994. 
537 Kleynhans WA Staatsleer Honours Study Guide No 1 (1985) 355. 
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Manifestos have developed from relatively short specific documents to “Statements long on 
rhetoric and short on specific proposals” that contain something for everybody.538  This, 
together with the notion of leaving options open, the use of ambiguous and vague language as 
well as conditional and even contradictory proposals, weakens the mandate value of 
manifestos.539  However, elected members consider themselves bound by the programmes 
stated in the election manifesto and if not implemented will be open to attack at the next 
election.540  It is interesting to note that it was official policy of the Progressive Party and its 
successor the Progressive Federal Party, not to publish traditional manifestos during general 
elections and that the Labour Party in 1933, the Afrikaner Party in 1948 and the National 
Party in 1961 did not publish manifestos of their own.541  Manifestos nevertheless remain 
important policy statement documents. 
 
5.2.2 PARTY DISCIPLINE 
 
It was indicated earlier in this study that although Members de jure had a free mandate, the de 
facto position was that Members of Parliament normally toed the party line on peril of being 
expelled to a political desert.542  Although a political party could not remove a member from 
his seat prior to 1994, expulsion from the party normally heralded the end of the Member’s 
political career in Parliament.543  How difficult it is to survive in Parliament without the 
support of a political party is borne out by the fact that only one member, WC Malan in 1987, 
                                                 
538 Kavanagh op cit 8 & 9. 
539 Kavanagh op cit 9. 
540 Kleynhans op cit 12. 
541 Kleynhans op 17. 
542 Wiechers op cit 192. 
543 The Parliamentary Register shows a substantial number of expulsions. 
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succeeded in being re-elected as an independent member during the period 1948 – 1994.544  
The anti-defection clause introduced by the 1993 Constitution together with the party list 
proportional electoral system put political parties in a very strong position to control 
members and there have been a number of cases where members have lost their seats due to 
loss of party membership.  It may be apt to conclude this sub-chapter with the following 
quotation: 
 
“Party loyalty has become the prime political virtue required of a Member of Parliament and the 
test of that loyalty is his willingness to support the official leadership when he knows it 
to be wrong.”545 
 
Mangu put it as follows: “…to survive and secure a successful political career, the loyalty of 
politicians is to their parties first and not to the people.”546 
 
 
 
5.2.3 THE CAUCUS 
 
The word caucus is derived from the American Indian word kaw-kaw-was meaning to talk.547 
The word was first used in the United States of America to describe the “intrigues and 
devices of unscrupulous electoral wire-pullers and political corruptions” but in England the 
word was coined by Lord Beaconsfield548 in 1874 as a sarcastic attack on the Liberal Party’s 
organisational structure.549  As political parties became better organised, the word caucus 
came to mean the collective body of a party’s members in Parliament.  Although caucus is 
not recognised in formal public law it has become a Parliamentary institution through 
                                                 
544 Parliamentary Register 118. 
545 Berrington Hugh Partisanship and Dissidents in the 19th Century House of Commons reprinted from 
Parliamentary Affairs 1968 by Lees and Kimber op cit 113. 
546 Mangu Andre Mbata B Who really governs in South Africa’s constitutional democracy: parties or 
“we, the people”? Codicillus XLIV No 2 22. 
547 Kleynhans op cit 317. 
548 Benjamin Disraeli who was Prime Minister in Britain during the 19th century - Hibbert Christopher 
Disraeli A Personal History (2004). 
549 Ostrogowski op cit 89. 
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convention.550  In South Africa the Parliamentary programme specifically makes provision 
for Party Caucus meetings on Thursday mornings and each party is allocated a caucus room.  
The rules applicable to caucus meetings differ from party to party but they all have three 
principles in common: 
 
• Absolute confidentially of discussions 
• Freedom of expression 
• Consensus of opinion 
 
This entails that a member is free to voice his or her opinion on a matter but once the caucus 
has reached a decision, all members have to abide by that decision irrespective of their own 
views.551  Although Members of Parliament had a free mandate before 1994 and since 1994 
enjoy specific political rights in terms of the Bill of Rights,552 responsible party government 
requires discipline, loyalty, solidarity and unity from the elected members.553  This led to the 
development of the convention that parties discuss their business at caucus meetings which are 
closed and confidential.  Members have the right to express their views freely and without fear 
in a caucus meeting but once the caucus has taken a decision all members are collectively 
bound to support the decision taken by caucus even if they hold a different opinion privately.  
This rule is very strictly applied by all parties and non-compliance normally leads to the 
expulsion of a member from the party.554 
 
                                                 
550 Kleynhans op cit 317. 
551 For a description of the practical working of the National Party caucus in the 1960s and 1970s see 
MC Botha Politiek en Parlement (1982) 61 to 68. 
552 Section 19 of the 1996 Constitution. 
553 Kleynhans op cit 317. 
554 Before 1994 an expelled member normally joined another party or formed a new party but since 
1994 expulsion would result in a member automatically losing his seat. 
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Although the caucus system promotes orderly government it no doubt limits the mandate of a 
political representative.  The British politician Aneurin Bevon put it as follows: 
“We make speeches, and if they do not accord with what has just been decided in private upstairs, we 
are threatened with expulsion.  Is that democracy?  It is conspiracy.  The caucus is getting more 
powerful than the electorate itself.”555 
 
The political correspondent of The Argus also criticised the strong grip that the caucus system 
has over Members of Parliament and he put it as follows: 
“The caucus system….has become an accepted principle of political life.  Few, if any, of 
those actively engaged in politics argue that the business of parliament could now be 
conducted without it….Accepting that it would be futile for practical reasons to argue for the 
removal of the caucus system there is still a strong case to be made out for its radical reform 
especially in South Africa, where it is even more rigid than in Britain.”556 
 
 
Sir James Rose-Innes557 was also critical of the caucus system and had the following to say in 
this regard: 
“Parties fulfil their purpose through the caucus system but at what great cost?  The more 
effectively it operates the greater menace to free constitutional government does it 
become.”558 
 
In conclusion it can therefore be stated that irrespective of whether a free mandate or 
imperative mandate theory of representation applies, the caucus system, even more so after 
1994, forces Members of Parliament to toe the party line. 
 
5.2.4 FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Funding of political parties has become the lifeline of political parties throughout the 
democratic world.559  In South Africa substantial public funding is provided to political 
                                                 
555 As quoted by Kleynhans op cit 318 to 319. 
556 The Argus (20 May 1963) as quoted by Kleynhans op cit 318. 
557 Member of the Cape Parliament from 1884-1890, Chief Justice of the Transvaal Colony from 1902-
1910 and Chief Justice of the Union of South Africa from 1914-1927. 
558 As quoted by Kleynhans op cit 319. 
559 Tshitereke Clarence Securing Democracy: Party Finance and Party Donations  
The South African Challenge 2 Institute of Security Studies (2002). 
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parties represented in Parliament.560  Private funding with no limits and no requirement as to 
disclosure is, however, also allowed.561  Although many donations are made to political 
parties with no strings attached, it is generally acknowledged that there is an element of 
reciprocity in the private funding of political parties.562  Tshitereke563 puts it as follows: 
“The problem is that donors, whether corporate or individual, often make contributions not out 
of goodness of their hearts or for reasons of political idealism, but in expectation of a return.” 
 
This, it is submitted, is especially true in the case of large donations which are not disclosed.  
Because of the confidential nature of undisclosed donations it is of course difficult to 
determine their effect on a representative’s mandate, but the absence of rules and the lack of 
transparency leave political parties exposed to potential influence peddling.564,565 The saying 
that there is no free lunch is very apt in this regard and it is submitted that the reluctance to 
pass strict laws to regulate funding is detrimental to transparent democracy and unbiased 
decision making.566 
 
5.2.5 THE SELECTION AND NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 
 
How candidates are elected has a direct bearing on their accountability and mandate.  Before 
1994 South Africa had a constituency-based electoral system and for the sake of 
completeness a brief overview of how candidates were selected in a constituency-based 
                                                 
560 Sec 236 of the Constitution provides for national legislation for the funding of political parties 
participating in national or provincial legislatures and the funding of such parties is regulated by the 
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 103 of 1997. See IEC Annual Report on 
Represented Political Parties’ Fund for the actual amounts paid to political parties.   
561 Please see IDASA & Others v ANC and Others 2005(5) SA 39 CPD.  
562 Tshitereke op cit 1. 
563 Op cit  2. 
564 Tshitereke op cit 5. 
565 Writer was informed by a Member of Parliament, who preferred not to be named, that he was 
removed from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of Finance because he was seen as being critical 
of institutions that funded his party. 
566 A Private Member’s Bill to regulate the funding of political parties was tabled by Mr Douglas 
Gibson MP Chief Whip of the Opposition during the Second Session of the Second Parliament but it 
remained under the line of the Parliamentary Order Paper and lapsed with the dissolution of Parliament 
for the 2004 election. 
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electoral system will be given before the compilation of party lists in the post-1994 
proportional list system is discussed. 
 
5.2.5.1 CONSTITUENCY BASED ELECTORAL SYSTEM:  PRE- 1994567 
 
South Africa was divided into 165 electoral divisions (constituencies).568  The 
delimitation of constituencies was made by a delimitation commission consisting of 
three judges at intervals of at least five years.569  Each constituency was entitled to 
elect a Member of Parliament for that constituency in general elections or a by-
election.  Candidates had to be nominated as representatives of a political party or as 
independent candidates.  Independent candidates or candidates of a political party not 
represented in Parliament had to be nominated by 300 registered voters in the 
constituency.570  Originally only the candidate’s name, address and occupation was 
printed on the ballot paper but later the candidate’s political affiliation was also 
printed on the ballot paper. 
 
In discussing the party organisation in Great Britain between the World Wars, Seldom 
and Ball describe the process of selecting a candidate as follows:  “Important matters 
such as the selection of…..the parliamentary candidate were often settled amongst a 
small group of leaders of a higher social status, many of whom served long periods on 
Executive Committees.”571  Lees and Kimber572 give a detailed account of the 
selection process of a candidate for a safe Tory seat in a by-election in 1969, which 
                                                 
567 For the sake of brevity the changes introduced by the 1983 Constitution are not dealt with here. 
568 With the formation of the Union in 1910 it was 121 but this number was gradually increased to 165 
in 1973.  See Wiechers op cit 269. 
569 See Wiechers op cit  301. 
570 Section 41(4) of the Electoral Act 45 of1979. 
571 Seldom and Ball (Editors) Conservative  Century (1994) 264. 
572 Op cit 99 to 105. 
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gives insight into the way parties in constituency based electoral election systems 
nominate candidates.  In that particular case there were 124 candidates (excluding six 
candidates who applied too late) from which the selection committee eventually had 
to select one candidate.  Although it is clear from their report that due process was 
followed, it is equally clear that the eventual outcome was biased in favour of the 
candidate who was eventually nominated.  This case study confirms the notion that 
political parties go through the motions of democracy to justify decisions that have 
been taken before the process even began. 
 
The situation in South Africa was very similar and a study of the nomination 
procedures followed by the two political parties that dominated politics in South 
Africa from 1914 to 1977573 revealed the following principles: 
 
• The election of a candidate to Parliament is in reality a ratification of the 
choice of the political party concerned. 
• With few exceptions candidates were nominated by the registered party 
members in a particular constituency.574 
• Where more than one nomination was made a nomination election was held 
amongst registered party members in the constituency concerned to appoint 
the candidate by majority vote. 
                                                 
573 The United Party and the National Party. 
574 Where it happened that party leadership overruled the constituency’s choice, as in the case of the 
National Party candidate for Ermelo in 1977, the Party ran the risk of losing support.  In the case of 
Ermelo which was a safe NP seat as from 1948, the NP lost the seat at the subsequent election in 1981.  
See Beeld (5 November 1977) and Parliamentary Register 257.  Another example is the case of the 
constituency of Florida in 1966 where the Prime Minister insisted on an outside candidate for the 
National Party and then lost the seat to the United Party in the next election in 1970, as told by HJ 
Bekker MP and confirmed by JJM Stephens MP. 
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• The party leadership had the right to veto a candidate who was not acceptable 
to the party leadership. 
• Candidates had to give a written undertaking to honour party principles. 
• Once the nomination of a candidate was endorsed by the party such a 
candidate was the only candidate for that party in the constituency.575 
 
Kleynhans576 sees this procedure as confirming a double mandate on the candidate 
elected; one by the party and one by the electorate. 
 
A road map for aspirant politicians under the constituency based electoral system is 
given by MC Botha.577  According to Botha the proven road to the country’s 
chambers of power was through diligent and loyal party work.  He called it an open 
road but a long and weary one.  Candidates were nominated by party structures but 
the head office had to approve the candidate.  If more than one candidate was 
nominated, the enrolled party members in the constituency concerned appointed the 
candidate by ballot.  A member therefore had a closer relationship with his 
constituents and he was approached on a regular basis to assist constituents on a wide 
range of topics.578  An important point made by Botha579 is that since a Member of 
Parliament also represents those who are not members of his party, he or she should 
also be available to supporters of opposition parties.  Kleynhans580 states that if 
participation in an election is a quest for power, then the nomination process is the 
                                                 
575 See Kleynhans WA SAPOLI A (1984) 119 to 191 for a full exposition of the nomination and 
selection procedure by political parties in South Africa. 
576 Op cit  120. 
577 Op cit 1 to 23. 
578 Op cit 26. 
579 Op cit 29. 
580 SAPOLI A 119. 
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most important party activity.  He explained the power of political parties in this 
regard as follows: 
“The hold that South African political parties have on the officially elected Members in 
Parliament, stems from the important role that party organisation play outside Parliament to fully 
control the nomination and election processes of candidates from the moment that party members 
begin to be interested to participate as party candidates up to the election itself and the 
announcement of the results”.581 
 
He calls it “the control of the party outside Parliament over the party inside 
Parliament”.582 
 
5.2.5.2 THE PROPORTIONAL LIST ELECTORAL SYSTEM POST 1994 
 
One of the constitutional principles adopted at Codesa was that there shall be 
representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, 
universal adult suffrage, a common voters roll and proportional representation.583   
The Constitution of 1993 consequently introduced a proportional list electoral system 
into South Africa which required political parties to be registered in terms of the 
Electoral Act.584 
 
Parties wishing to contest an election of the National Assembly had to nominate 
candidates for such election on lists of candidates in accordance with Schedule 2 and 
the Electoral Act.  However, there is no constitutional requirement of intra-party 
democratic decision-making and the Constitution is also silent on how candidates are 
to be selected to appear on party lists.  The fact that this matter is not addressed in the 
Constitution strengthens the party leadership’s control over representatives and 
                                                 
581 Op cit 85. 
582 Ibit. 
583 Chapter VIII Schedule 4 to the Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993-my underlining. 
584 Act 201 of 1993. 
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according to Chaskalson585 the system may result in a shift of loyalty of candidates 
and representatives from the voting public to the party leadership.  It has been stated 
that the proportional list system increases the scope for political parties to act in an 
oligarchic manner in regard to nominations and that the control shifts from the 
constituency level as in the Westminster system, to the upper reaches of a party.586 
 
In terms of the South African electoral system the electorate has no choice between 
candidates, only between parties.  In view of the democratic principles embedded in 
the Constitution and specifically the political rights to: 
 
• Participate in the activities of a political party587 and 
• Stand for public office,588 
 
it can be argued that the selection of candidates by parties should by implication be 
through a democratic and transparent process. It would be ironic to have a democratic 
constitution while the candidates selected for election to public office in terms of that 
Constitution were selected arbitrarily.  The danger that ordinary party supporters will 
have little power to affect the selection process of party candidates was foreseen by 
Fredericks in 1993.589  It was also foreseen that although the process would be subject 
to the administrative principles of regularity and fairness, it would, however, be scant 
comfort to the excluded potential candidate.  In Bushbuckridge Border Committee v 
                                                 
585 Op cit. 
586 Fredericks Izak The Legal Regulation of Political Parties and their Participation in Elections. Free 
and Fair Elections (1993) 73-96. 
587 Section 19 (1) (v). 
588 Section 19 (3) (b). 
589 Op cit 90. 
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Government of the Northern Province590 it was held that a political party is not an 
administrative body or organ of state and is not subject to the rules of administrative 
justice.  Accordingly, political promises can not form the basis of a legitimate 
expectation.591  In Marais v Democratic Alliance,592 the court also held that the 
decisions of the national management council of a political party did not constitute 
“administrative action” as such decisions could not be regarded as the exercise of a 
“public power” or the performance of a “public function” in terms of the political 
party’s constitution. 
 
In a proportional list electoral system, a candidate’s position on the party’s candidate 
list is of utmost importance as that position, combined with the support the party 
receives at the polls, determines the candidate’s chances of becoming an elected 
representative.  With the exception of the ANC, the NP in 1994 and the DA in 2004, 
no other political party obtained 50 or more seats in the National Assembly during a 
general election since 1994.  It is therefore clear that apart from these exceptions, only 
the cream of a party’s members had a chance of being elected and in the case of the 
smaller parties, only the top hierarchy had any prospects of being elected. 
 
The methodology whereby the parties compile their candidate lists is therefore of 
paramount importance and if not done in a transparent and democratic manner, the 
system could become nothing better than an oligarchy.  The system will also have 
relevance to an elected member’s allegiance and mandate.  As indicated above, the 
Constitution does not dictate how candidates are to be selected to appear on the party 
list and it appears that parties are indeed using very different methods to compile their 
                                                 
590 1999 (2) BCLR 193 (T). 
591 At 200 C-E of the Report. 
592 2002 (2) BCLR 171 (C) at 193E.  
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party lists.593  The compilation of party lists has not yet been challenged in court, but 
the changing of a candidate’s position on a list was challenged in Finbar Dunne v The 
Inkatha Freedom Party and Others.594  In rejecting the Plaintiff’s case the court made 
the following statements relevant to this study: 
 
• The essence of the system of proportional representation is that voters vote for 
parties and not for particular candidates.595 
• The vacancy that occurs vests in the party concerned.596 
• Parties may change the order of names on their list at their own discretion.597 
• The emphasis falls on the party and its rights and interests and not on the 
names appearing on the party lists or the alleged right of any person whose 
name happens to appear on such a list.598 
• The very essence of the closed list system of proportional representation lies in 
the fact that the voters vote for the list as a whole; that the list is drawn up by 
the political party and that a voter cannot make changes to the order of 
candidates on the list. A voter thus has no voice in the selection of the person 
who is to represent him or her. 
• The compilation of party lists is an internal matter relating to each party and 
does not constitute an exercise in public power nor does it constitute 
administrative conduct, which is susceptible to judicial review. 
• The doctrine of legitimate expectation accordingly finds no application in the 
compilation of lists. 
                                                 
593 Pierre de Vos South Africa’s Experience with Proportional Representation in J de Ville and N 
Steytler Voting in 1999: Choosing an Electoral System (1996) 55-78. 
594 Unreported case no 02/2121 WLD. 
595 Paragraph 18.1. 
596 Paragraph 18.2. 
597 Paragraph 18.3. 
598 Paragraph 19. 
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It is therefore important to consider the methodology applied by the major political 
parties in compiling their candidate lists. 
 
5.2.5.2.1 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) 
 
The constitution of the ANC599 makes provision for the appointment of a national list 
committee by the National Executive Committee for the selection and adoption of 
candidates for the National Parliament.600  A national list committee is defined in the 
glossary of the ANC’s constitution as a committee appointed annually by the National 
Executive Committee and which is responsible for drawing up regulations and 
procedures to be used in the selection of candidates for national parliament.  It shall 
consist of at least five and not more than nine members.  A provincial list and 
candidate’s committee is appointed in each province responsible for the compilation 
of election lists and ward candidates.  It is submitted that the following principles and 
rules embodied in the ANC’s constitution are relevant to the compilation of party 
lists: 
 
• In the preamble, the fundamental goal of the party is stated as the construction 
of a non-discriminatory democratic society. 
• All forms of discrimination should be eradicated.601 
• The government should be freely chosen by the people according to the 
principles of universal suffrage on a common voters roll.602 
                                                 
599 As amended by and adopted at the 51st National Conference in December 2002, available on the 
internet at www.anc.gov.za.  It is also filed at the IEC. 
600 Rule 12.2(k). 
601 Rule 2.1. 
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• The party’s policies are determined by the membership and its leaders are 
accountable to the members.603 
• The party shall be non-racial, anti-racist and non-sexist and against any form 
of tribalistic exclusivism or ethnic chauvinism in its composition and 
functioning.604 
• Women are to be properly represented at all levels.605 
• Membership of all bodies of the party will be open to men and women in the 
organisation without regard to race, colour or creed.606 
• On being accepted as a member of the ANC, a new member shall make the 
following solemn declaration: 
“I, AB, solemnly declare that I will abide by the aims and objectives of the African National 
Congress as set out in the Constitution, the Freedom Charter and other duly adopted policy 
positions, that I am joining the organisation voluntarily and without motives of material 
advantage or personal gain, that I agree to respect the Constitution and the structures and to 
work as a loyal member of the organisation, that I will place my energies and skills at the 
disposal of the organisation and carry out tasks given to me, that I will work towards making 
the ANC an even more effective instrument of liberation in the hands of the people, and that I 
will defend the unity and integrity of the organisation and its principles and combat any 
tendency towards disruption and factionalism”.607 
 
• A member has the specific right to take part in elections and to be elected or 
appointed to any committee, structure, commission or delegation.608 
• A member shall observe discipline, behave honestly and carry out loyally 
decisions of the majority and decisions of higher bodies.609 
• At least one-third of the members in all structures have to be women.610 
• The national general council has the right to alter or rescind any decision taken 
by any of the constituent bodies, units or officials of the ANC.611 
                                                                                                                                            
602 Rule 2.3. 
603 Rule 3.2. 
604 Rule 3.4. 
605 Rule 3.6. 
606 Rule 3.8. 
607 Rule 4.15. 
608 Rule 5.1(d). 
609 Rule 5.2(g). 
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• The national conference also has the power to review, ratify, alter or rescind 
any decision taken by any of the constituent bodies, units or officials of the 
party. 
• All candidates representing the party at any level during an election of 
government must undertake in writing, prior to the elections, to abide by the 
constitution of the party and the relevant code of conduct for elected 
representatives and to submit to and abide by any disciplinary proceedings 
instituted against her or him in terms of the constitution or code of conduct.612 
 
In preparation for the 1994 elections, the ANC held a candidate’s election conference 
in Johannesburg to compile its National Candidate List.613  The conference consisted 
of delegates from the branches in each region along with delegates from special 
interest groups such as COSATU, the Women’s League and the Youth League.  Any 
member was eligible for nomination and the nomination had to be supported by at 
least two branches of the ANC.  The provinces each first compiled a regional list 
through elections and thereafter a national list of 200 names was compiled.  There 
were more than 1,000 nominees and every delegate could vote for 200 names.  The 
200 nominees with the highest number of votes were selected.  Adjustments were 
made to the lists pertaining to gender equality where after the list had to be cleared by 
the National Executive Committee of the ANC who apparently did make certain 
changes to the list.614 
                                                                                                                                            
611 Rule 10.7(c). 
612 Rule 25.1(b). 
613 Pierre de Vos South Africa’s experience with proportional representation de Ville Jacque and 
Steytler Nico (ed) Voting in 1999 Choosing an Electoral System (1996) 39. 
614 Op cit 40. 
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According to Fébè Potgieter, coordinator of the National Working Committee and the 
National Executive Council of the ANC,615 much the same procedure was followed in 
compiling the 1999 lists. 
However, for the 2004 elections, the National Executive Council of the ANC 
adopted616 guidelines for the compilation of its lists based on the following 
considerations: 
• The process must combine democracy and transparency as well as allow for 
strategic political intervention. 
• The process and final list has to have legitimacy and broad acceptance. 
• The process must be clear and simple. 
The guidelines were published in an information sheet of the National Working 
Committee on 6 June 2003 containing 56 numbered paragraphs of which the 
following are the most important: 
• All powers and final discussions about lists, quotas and ordering lies with the 
National Executive Committee.617 
• Specific criteria are set for candidates.618 
• Procedure for the nomination of candidates is set out.619 
• Provision is made for the screening of initial lists.620 
                                                 
615 E-mail dated 25 September 2003. 
616 22 to 24 May 2003. 
617 Paragraph 20. 
618 Paragraph 29. 
619 Paragraphs 30 to 35. 
620 Paragraphs 36 to 40. 
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• Provision is made for provincial list conferences621 and a national list 
conference.622 
• Provision is also made for appeals or objections.623 
• The National Executive Committee may approve final alterations.624 
• The person designated by the President as premier candidate will be number 
one on the relevant province’s list. 
It is therefore clear that in theory, the ANC methodology allows for a free and 
democratic procedure while the National Executive Committee still maintains control.  
Criticism against the procedure is that it takes far too long to be finalised.  According 
to the timeframe set for the 2004 candidate list, the process started in June 2003 and 
was scheduled to be finalised in December 2003.  As the very nature of electing and 
listing people is a potentially explosive one, less tension will build up if the process is 
shortened. 
 
5.2.5.2.2 DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 
In 1994, The Democratic Party (DP) initially decided to use a single transferable vote 
system (STV System) for the election of candidate lists. But after finding that it was, 
in practice, a very complicated way of compiling lists, it was only used in the 
compilation of the national list.  An Electoral College was constituted on the basis of 
one representative for every 1,000 members of the party in each province.  The 
                                                 
621 Paragraphs 44 to 46. 
622 Paragraphs 47 to 51. 
623 Paragraph 52. 
624 Paragraph 53. 
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members of the Electoral College were elected at the annual provincial conferences 
where after the Electoral College voted in terms of the STV System by ranking 
candidates in batches of eight.  The first 24 positions on the national lists were 
selected in this way, but from number 25 onwards, candidates were ranked according 
to the number of votes obtained.  Two independent scrutinisers monitored voting and 
except for the reservation of the first position on the list for the party leader, no 
changes were made to the list.  Each region independently compiled regional lists.  
Each region could choose its own method for the compilation of its list provided that 
it adhered to the basic principles of democracy.  No changes were made to the list. 
Although the DP list was criticised for not being fully representative of the Party’s 
constituents, the methodology followed complies with the principles of free and fair 
elections.625 
The constitution of the Democratic Alliance (DA)626 makes provision for the adoption 
of suitable regulations for the selection of candidates.627  Certain minimum 
requirements are set for such regulations628 amongst others: 
• All candidates are to be selected by democratically elected electoral colleges, 
the members of which are to be selected through a proportional voting 
system.629 
• All potential candidates are to be vetted by an Electoral College or committee 
of the Electoral College.630 
                                                 
625 De Vos op cit 32. 
626 The constitution is available on the internet at www.da.gov.za and it is also filed at the IEC. 
627 Paragraph 2.2.1. Regulations were adopted by the Federal Council on 2 August 2003.  The DA has 
since adopted new regulations at its Federal Council meeting of 29- 30 July 2006 which regulations 
differ substantially from the regulations discussed here and appear to be an effort to strike a fairer 
balance between the rights of the candidate, the party and members. 
628 Paragraph 2.2.2. 
629 Paragraph 2.2.2.1. 
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• Candidates must have an equal opportunity to address the Electoral College or 
committee of the Electoral College.631 
• Voting will be by secret ballot.632 
• Once finalised the lists are to be submitted to the leader of the party before 
ranking.633 
• The leader of the party is entitled to address an electoral college and express 
his views on any candidate.634 
• The Electoral College, thereafter, proceeds with the ranking process leaving 
positions 3, 7, 14, 21 and every seventh position thereafter unfilled.635 
• The leader of the party may fill any or all of the unfilled positions by 
promoting any person in a lower position.636 
• In exceptional and justifiable circumstances, the leader of the party may 
nominate persons not previously considered by an Electoral College after 
consultation with the Electoral College.637 
• Such a decision by the leader of the party may be vetoed by a two-third 
majority of the Electoral College.638 
                                                                                                                                            
630 Paragraph 2.2.2.2. 
631 Paragraph 2.2.2.4. 
632 Paragraph 2.2.2.5. 
633 Paragraph 2.2.5.2. 
634 Paragraph 2.2.5.3. 
635 Paragraph 2.2.5.4. 
636 Paragraph 2.2.5.5. 
637 Ibid. 
638 Paragraph 2.2.5.6. 
  126
• The leader of the party may not demote a person from his or her position or 
remove a person from the list.639 
• Should the leader of the party not fill the unfilled positions on the list, the 
persons in lower positions will move up accordingly.640 
The federal council of the Democratic Alliance approved pro forma candidate 
selection regulations on 2 August 2003 and according to these regulations, the 
Provincial Executive, in consultation with the Federal Executive, has to determine 
dates for the nomination of potential candidates.641  Once the dates have been 
determined, the Provincial Executive of each province must advise all its party 
formations, including branch committees, of the dates and invite nominations for 
potential candidates.642 
A potential candidate must be: 
• A member of the Party; and 
• Nominated by a minimum of two party members who are members in the 
electoral area for which the potential candidate is nominated.643 
Each province must elect an Electoral College but the bigger provinces may elect more than 
one Electoral College, termed “regional electoral colleges.”644  The size of an electoral 
college is prescribed and it may not consist of fewer than 20 members in the case of smaller 
provinces or more than 100 members in the case of the bigger provinces.  Public 
                                                 
639 Paragraph 2.2.5.7. 
640 Paragraph 2.2.5.8. 
641 Regulation 7.2. 
642 Regulation 2.1. 
643 Regulation 2.2. 
644 Regulation 3.1. 
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representatives may not exceed 50% of the Electoral College membership.645  Members are to 
be elected from each region in proportion to the number of votes received by the party in that 
region in the most recent elections of a national nature.646  A provincial Electoral College 
elects a Provincial Electoral Executive Committee, which must consist of not less than 10 and 
not more than 80 members with the same proviso that not more than 50% may be public 
representatives.647  The following persons are not eligible as members of an electoral college: 
• Party staff members. 
• A parent, parent-in-law, son or daughter, sibling or partner of a potential 
candidate or aspirant candidate. 
• Persons who were not members of the party on or before 15 August 2003 
or have not been members for at least two years, whichever is the shorter 
period, and 
• Potential candidates and aspirant candidates.648 
All nominations of potential candidates must be submitted to the relevant Electoral 
College Executive Committee649 who may reject nominations that are defective or 
irregular for any material reason, or that do not comply with the requirements set out 
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the law or the Constitution of the 
party.650  Thereafter, the nominations are considered by the relevant Electoral College 
                                                 
645 Regulation 3.2. 
646 Regulation 3.4. 
647 Regulation 3.8. 
648 Regulation 3.14. 
649 Regulation 4.1. 
650 Regulation 4.3. 
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Executive Committee in terms of certain criteria651 and three times the seat target 
number is invited for interviews.652 
After the interviews have been concluded, the Electoral College Executive Committee 
has to select aspirant candidates equal to twice the seat target.653  The chairperson of 
an Electoral College Executive Committee then presents a list of names of aspirant 
candidates in alphabetical order, unranked and where necessary, with a summary of 
comment. 
According to the Constitution of the Democratic Alliance, the leader of the party is a 
member of any Electoral College.654 Prior to the ranking process, the full list is 
submitted to the leader who is entitled to address the Electoral College and express a 
view about any candidate under consideration.655  Once the list of candidates has been 
submitted to the Independent Electoral Commission, it is considered official and 
complete.656 
The regulations for the selection and placement of candidates have been drawn up 
with the overall objective to recruit and select suitable candidates who: 
• meet the key requirements of merit, representivity and diversity; and 
• have a commitment to and are able to effectively promote the vision, 
principles, policy and programme of action of the party. 
                                                 
651 Regulation 4.4.1. 
652 Regulation 4.4.2. 
653 Regulation 4.7.1. 
654 Section 2.2.5.1. 
655 Section 2.2.5.2 – 3. 
656 Regulation 5.11. 
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It is acknowledged that there is no “perfect” system and that one has to settle for 
compromises based on logic, experience and arithmetic, but the following key 
objectives have been spelled out: 
• The majority must have a say. 
• Significant minorities must not be excluded. 
• The “tail must not wag the dog”. 
• Insignificant minorities / lunatic fringes must not be encouraged to attempt to 
disproportionate the representation. 
• Wasted votes to be minimised. 
• The chances of tactical voting must be minimised. 
• Enable the Electoral College to monitor representivity; and 
• Aim for as much simplicity, speed and clarity as far as possible. 
Although the qualification for nomination is very low (any member of the party 
nominated by at least two members) the Electoral College executive committees have 
virtually unrestrained power in deciding who will become candidates and what their 
positions would be on the lists. Nevertheless, the election of the Electoral College 
complies with general democratic principles and the exclusion of officials and any 
person with a possible conflict of interest meet with accepted standards as far as 
indirect election is concerned. 
By having the right to fill positions 3, 7, 14, 21 etc on the list, the leader of the party is 
in a strong position to ensure the election of at least a number of members of his 
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choice.  The number of members eventually appointed by the leader will, of course, 
depend on the number of seats gained, but the percentage will diminish with an 
increase in seats won.  For example, if only seven seats are won, the leader determines 
three of the members (42.86% of the seats), being the first position filled by him, the 
third position and the seventh position.  If 14 seats are won, the leader-appointed 
members decrease to four or 28.57%.  If 21 seats are won, the leader-appointed 
members decrease to 23.8%.  If the results of the 1999 election are taken as a norm, 
the leader would have controlled the appointment of seven of the 38 members 
(18.42%).  The DA system of nominating and listing candidates can therefore be 
summed up as an indirect, but democratically transparent system that allows for a 
limited leader’s prerogative. 
 
5.2.5.2.3 THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP) 
As the IFP initially decided not to participate in the 1994 elections, no provision was 
made for the compilation of party lists.  When it eventually decided to participate in 
the election, it was too late to go through any nomination process and Arthur 
Koningkramer, who ran the IFP election office, is quoted as follows: 
“It was chaotic.  People were randomly put on the list and no democratic procedure was 
used at all.  We simply didn’t have the time.”657 
 
The IFP, since then, adopted in principle the idea that future candidates would be 
democratically elected through provincial electoral colleges but these were not yet in 
place by the 1999 elections and the lists were again compiled by the National 
                                                 
657 Pierre de Vos op cit 35. 
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Executive Council and deployed leaders in the provinces other than KwaZulu-
Natal.658 
However, at the Annual General Conference held in July 2003, a candidate selection 
policy was adopted.  As far as personal circumstances are concerned, the following 
requirements were laid down: 659Every candidate must- 
• be legally permitted to stand as a candidate 
• comply with any required candidate nominations procedure 
• be a current paid-up member of the IFP 
• be a registered voter 
• have experience and expertise that will enable the candidate to hold his or her 
own constructively in the relevant legislature 
• have no history of involvement in fostering divisions and conflicts in the party 
• be of appropriate social standing in the community 
• have no history of ill discipline or corruption. 
Further issues that were to be taken into account are geographical representivity, 
gender, age and disability, racial / ethnic representivity, skills and the position of 
traditional leaders.  It is specifically stated that a track record of membership and 
loyalty to the party are necessary preconditions to be honoured with representing the 
party in a legislature.  As far as the nomination of candidates is concerned, a 30/70 
                                                 
658 As informed by the Party’s Chief Whip Mr JH van der Merwe MP. 
659 Information supplied by Mr Albert Mncwango MP, National Organiser of the IFP by letter dated 14 
November 2003. 
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formula was adopted in terms whereof 70% of the candidates come through a party 
structure route while 30% is nominated by the National Council. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, the 11 districts of the province are each entitled to one initial 
candidate and based on the support during the previous elections, districts are entitled 
to additional candidates up to a maximum of eight per district. 
In the other provinces, the province is taken as a whole and districts are not taken into 
account.  As far as candidates for the National Assembly are concerned, the formula is 
premised on the regional quota of seats and weighted based on past election results.  
A ratio between the National Council and district / provincial candidates, is 
determined. 
Each district or province convenes a candidate committee chaired by a National 
Council appointee to elect the required number of candidates.  The lists are prioritised 
and submitted to the National Executive Council for processing.  The National 
Council, at the same time, nominates its lists, which are also prioritised and submitted 
to the National Executive Council.  The National Executive Council merges the 
various lists to create: 
• the provincial lists 
• the regional lists; and 
• the national lists 
In theory the methodology devised by the IFP appears to be transparent and 
democratic.  However, in practise the final lists are compiled by the Secretary General 
of the Party and approved by the President of the Party before submission to the 
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National Council660 for consent.661  It can therefore not be said that the IFP candidate 
lists are compiled either democratically or transparently. 
5.2.5.2.4   COMMENT 
Irrespective of the methodology applied by the parties studied, it is clear that those 
who eventually make it to the candidate lists must at least have some degree of 
support at branch level in their parties or be held in very high esteem by the party 
hierarchy.  To achieve such a position would, in most cases, entail dedication, 
sacrifice and hard work over many years with no guarantee of success.  It is not 
possible to quantify the efforts put in by individual members, but there are examples 
of huge monetary contributions662, thousands of kilometres travelled, many weekends 
and leisure time spent in attending meetings and canvassing with the only carrot being 
a spes of eventually being placed high enough on the list for election. 
Such extra-ordinary contributions do not stop once a member has been elected.   
Because of the nature of Parliamentary work, members with professional interests 
outside Cape Town and environment find it difficult to continue with their professions 
or businesses in more than an advisory or consulting capacity with resultant pecuniary 
loss.  Those who were in employment before appointment inevitably have to resign 
their positions with very little or any hope of returning should they lose their seat.663  
Demands on financial contributions continue at an increased level and, depending on 
a member’s home base, his or her non-refundable travelling and out of pocket 
                                                 
660 Which is a non-democratic body appointed by the President of the Party. 
661 Personal observation confirmed by Mr JH van der Merwe MP Chief Whip of the IFP. 
662 According to an article by Eugene Gunning in Rapport  (16 May 2004),  Members of Parliament 
have to contribute between R600 and R3400 per month from their parliamentary salaries to their 
respective parties. In the case of one party elected members had to pay R20 000 to the party after their 
election. This could be seen as monetary qualifications, which is unconstitutional.   
663 The contributions made by a Member in his election and thereafter, can therefore not be left out of 
the equation. 
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expenses could be much more than the annual representation allowance paid by 
Parliament.664  Time spent on travelling between a Member’s home base and Cape 
Town as well as to and from meetings can also be very taxing.665 
 
5.3 PRESSURE GROUPS 
In positive public law the authority of the state is legitimised by the process through 
which the subjects of the state influence the composition of the government as well as 
government policy so that the power of the state is not exercised arbitrarily but on 
behalf of the subjects of the state.666  Elections form the most important part of the 
process by which a representative system of government is created, but pressure 
groups such as labour unions also play an important role.  However, the difference 
between political parties and pressure groups is that pressure groups intend to 
influence government policy whereas political parties aim at gaining control of the 
government through elections. 
In a non-democratic society citizens manifest their displeasure with government 
policy by visible means such as violence, strikes, demonstrations etc.  However, in a 
democratic society it is axiomatic that the people express their wishes through the 
ballot box and that the minority tolerate the rule of the majority until the next round. 
Basson667 identified the following pressure groups in South Africa: 
                                                 
664 Presently R40 000-00. 
665 According to the writer’s records he spent 376 hours in travelling during his first year as a Member 
of Parliament. 
666 Basson DA “Vakbonde in Politieke Verteenwoordiging” (1983) De Jure 147. 
667 Op cit 150. 
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• Commercial pressure groups such as the Chambers of Commerce, Chambers 
of Mines etc; 
• Agricultural pressure groups such as Agri SA, National Wool Growers 
Association, Transvaal Agricultural Union etc; 
• Professional pressure groups such as Association of Civil Servants, Law 
Societies, Teacher Associations etc; 
• Ethnic and Cultural pressure groups such as the Broederbond, Black Sash, 
Women’s Federations etc; 
• Organised Labour such as trade unions; 
• Reformist Organisations such as the SPCA, Aksie Morele Standaarde, 
Treatment Action Campaign, Religious organisations etc. 
The importance of extra-parliamentary politics is illustrated by the fact that the Leader 
of the Opposition in 1986, Dr van Zyl Slabbert, resigned because he believed after 
seven years as Leader of the Opposition that he could achieve more through extra-
Parliamentary politics.  After resigning he formed the Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa (IDASA), which indeed did much to prepare South 
Africa for a political settlement in 1993.668  However, it should be pointed out that 
Slabbert conceded that his frustration was with Parliament under the 1983 
Constitution and not with the abstract concept of Parliamentary Government, to which 
he was unreservedly committed.669 
                                                 
668  Suzman Helen In No Uncertain Terms (1993) 254. 
669 Slabbert F van Zyl The System and the Struggle, Reform, Revolt and Action in South African (1989) 
92. 
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It therefore seems that one has to distinguish between the position of a properly 
constituted, fully represented Parliament such as the South African Parliaments under 
the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions and a Parliament that is not fully representative such 
as those before 1994.  If a Parliament is not fully representative, those not represented 
will demand power and since they are not represented in Parliament, they will have to 
make use of extra-Parliamentary means.  There will also be extra-Parliamentary 
groups who on moral grounds will take it upon themselves to promote the cause of 
those not represented, such as religious organisations (i.e. the Christian Institute) and 
moral organisations (i.e.the Black Sash).670 
There is less justification for extra-Parliamentary pressure groups in the case of a 
democratically elected representative Parliament, but since such groups form part of a 
political party’s larger constituency, it is to be expected that such groups will have an 
influence on the behaviour of political parties and thus on their mandate. 
The most influential pressure group in South African history was no doubt the 
Broederbond.  It was described as follows in 1978:671 
“Although it has only 12,000 scrupulously elected members, it plots and influences the destiny of all 25                                    
million South Africans, black and white….the South African Government today is the Broederbond 
and the Broederbond is the Government.  No government can rule without the support of the 
Broederbond and no Afrikaner can become Prime Minister unless he comes from the Organisation’s 
select ranks.” 
At the fiftieth anniversary of the Broederbond in 1968 the first Chairman of the 
organisation, HJ Klopper672 said the following in a celebratory speech:673 
“Since the Afrikaner Broederbond got into its stride it has given the country its governments. It has 
given the country every Nationalist Prime Minister since 1948. Its efforts gave our Republic to our 
                                                 
670 Please see Naude Beyers My Land van Hoop (1995) 73 to 140 for the motivations of the Christian 
Institute in participating in extra-Parliamentary activity. 
671Wilkens Ivor and Strydom Hans The Super Afrikaners (1978) 1. 
672 Who also was the Speaker of the National Assembly from 20 January 1961 to 1 August 1974 
Parliamentary Register 130. 
673 Wilkens and Strydom op cit 345 
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Nation.  It has given the country two State Presidents.674  Do you realise what a powerful force is 
gathered here tonight between these four walls?  Show me a greater power on the whole Continent of 
Africa!  Show me a greater power anywhere even in your so-called civilised countries!  We are part of 
the State, we are part of the Church, we are part of every big momentum that has been born of the 
nation.  And we make our contributions unseen:675  We carried them through to the point that our 
nation has reached today.” 
What distinguishes the Broederbond from other pressure groups is that it was a secret 
society676 and that its members were recruited through a long and complicated secret 
process.677  The fact that such a society dominated the government to the extent that it 
did, shows how dangerous it is for extra-parliamentary groups to gain too much 
control over a political party. 
 
5.4 THE ALLEGIANCE OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that an Oath of Allegiance formed a cornerstone of the 
constitutional process that eventually developed into the parliamentary system.  
Members of Parliament in Britain were required to swear allegiance to the monarch 
and this principle was also introduced in South Africa. 
 
The Oath of Allegiance in South Africa was first introduced by proclamation on 7 
October 1795 at the first surrender of the Cape to the British.678  According to the 
Oath of Allegiance required of residents, all persons residing in the Cape were 
considered to have taken the Oath unless notice of the contrary was given, in which 
                                                 
674 At that time CR Swart and JJ Fouche.  The subsequent State Presidents until 1994, N Diederichs, M 
Viljoen, BJ Vorster, PW Botha and FW de Klerk were also members according to the list published by 
Wilkins and Strydom op cit A21 to A139. 
675 My underlining. 
676 Wilkins and Strydom op cit 383. 
677 Wilkins and Strydom op cit 372 to 382. 
678 Eybers op cit page 4. 
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case a reasonable time to settle one’s affairs to withdraw from the Colony was 
granted.679 
 
The principle of an Oath of Allegiance was also introduced in the Voortrekker 
Republics and from August 1840, all residents of 15 years or above were compelled 
to take an Oath of Allegiance “Voor land en volk”.680  Those who refused to take the 
Oath remained without any civil rights681 and it was later decided to banish them from 
Natal.682  The Members of the Council of Representatives683 also had to take the 
following Oath: 
“We the undersigned representatives of the people, promise and solemnly swear, that we in our 
relationship in all matters give our votes in all fairness, without favour, fear or regard of persons and 
to our best knowledge and ability.  That we will not, from nobody accept or give gifts or favours if it 
is suspected that it is done with the purpose to gain our votes for advantage; not to have any other 
purpose than to advance the common good and welfare according to the instructions adopted in this 
regard.”684 
 
The Oath of Allegiance for Members of Parliament was constitutionalised in the 
Constitution of the Cape Colony, which read as follows: 
“I do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to Her Majesty, 
Queen Victoria, as lawful Sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of this 
Colony of this Cape of Good Hope; and that I will defend Her to the utmost of my Power against all 
traitorous-Conspiracies and attempts whatever, which shall be made against Her Person, Crown and 
Dignity; and that I will do my utmost endeavours to disclose and make known to Her Majesty, Her 
Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and traitorous Conspiracies and Attempts, which I shall know to be 
against Her Majesty, or any of them;-And all this I do swear without any Equivocation, and renouncing 
all Pardons and Dispensations from any Person or Persons whatever to the contrary.”685 
 
Subsequent Constitutions re-enacted the principle of an Oath of Allegiance to the 
Crown, State or Constitution.  According to the Oath Members took when sworn in as 
                                                 
679 Ibid. 
680 Preller Gustav S Voortrekker Wetgewing (1924)  vi. 
681 Ibid .  
682 Preller op cit vii 
683 Raad van representanten van het volk which was the equivalent of their Parliament. 
684 Preller op cit xiii. My translation from the Dutch of Article 16 Voortrekker legislation. 
685 Cape of Good Hope Standing Rules and Orders and Forms of Proceeding of the House of Assembly 
(1883) 112. 
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Members of the Union Parliament, their allegiance was not to the Party or the 
electorate, but to the Crown.686  The following Oath was administered: 
“I, AB, do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the King (or Queen as 
the case may be) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his or her heirs and successors, 
according to law, so help me God.” 
 
The words of “the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” were deleted by 
Section 7 of the Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934 and replaced by the name of the 
then King or Queen for the time being.  Provision was also made for an affirmation 
for those who had an objection to taking the Oath. 
 
When the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was adopted in 1961 the Oath 
was changed to one of faithfulness to the Republic.687  The Oath read as follows: 
“I, AB, do swear to be faithful to the Republic of South Africa and solemnly promise to 
perform my duties as a Member of the Senate / House of Assembly to the best of my ability.  
So help me God.”688 
 
The Oath prescribed by the 1983 Constitution was the same as that prescribed by the 
1961 Constitution except that it made provision for the House of Representatives and 
the House of Delegates, while omitting the Senate which had been abolished in 
1980.689  With the adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993, the Oath was slightly 
adapted and read as follows: 
“I, AB, do hereby swear / solemnly affirm to be faithful to the Republic of South Africa and 
solemnly promise to perform my functions as a Member of the National Assembly / Senate / 
Provincial Legislature to the best of my ability.”690 
 
 
                                                 
686 Section 51 of the South Africa Act. 
687 Section 52. 
688 No provision was made for an affirmation. 
689 Section 57. 
690 Section 123. 
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However, when the 1996 Constitution was adopted, the Oath was expanded to include 
obedience and respect to the Constitution and all other law.  The new Oath read as 
follows: 
“I, AB, do hereby swear / solemnly affirm that I will be faithful to the Republic of South 
Africa and will obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other law of the Republic; 
and I solemnly promise to perform my functions as a Member of the National Assembly / 
permanent delegate to the National Council of Provinces / Member of the Legislature of the 
Province of CD to the best of my ability.”691 
 
While the allegiance of Members of Parliament up to the end of Union (1961) was to 
the Head of State (the Crown), the Republican Constitution provided for: 
 
• Faithfulness to the State (the Republic); and 
• A promise to perform the duties of a Member to best ability. 
 
The Oath in terms of the interim Constitution of 1993 was for all practical purposes 
the same but the 1996 Constitution added the undertaking to “obey, respect and 
uphold the Constitution and / or other law”.  From a constitutional law point of view, 
the Crown was replaced by the State (and not by the President) when the Republican 
Government was introduced.  The changes up to the 1983 Constitution did not change 
the principle of the Oath in any material way. 
 
The Oath up to the 1996 Constitution was therefore for all practical purposes the same 
in content and implied that the Member was to act in the best interest of the people as 
a whole, irrespective of who elected him or her.  The question arises whether the 
addition of the undertaking to “obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other 
law” changed the purport of the Oath? 
                                                 
691Schedule 2 Section 4(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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One argument is that being faithful to the State automatically implies that one would 
obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other law and that the wider 
wording in the 1996 Oath does not materially change the situation.  However, as in 
the case of the change in constitutional regime from the Union Constitution to the 
Republican Constitution, the 1996 Constitution also introduced a fundamental change 
in the sense that Parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by Constitutional 
sovereignty.692 It is therefore submitted that the addition of the undertakings was done 
to emphasise the supremacy of the Constitution and not to broaden the purport of the 
Oath.  This conclusion is supported by the wording of the Oath of the President and 
the Deputy President. 
 
The Oath prescribed for the President and the Deputy President is in essence the same 
as that of Members, except that it contains the following additional promises:693 
 
• (to) promote all that will advance the Republic, and oppose all that may harm 
it; 
• protect and promote the rights of all South Africans; 
• discharge his duties with all his strength and talents to the best of his 
knowledge and ability and true to the dictates of his conscience; 
• do justice to all and 
• devote himself to the well-being of the Republic and all of its people. 
 
                                                 
692Please see Chapter 5.3.2. 
693 Schedule 2 sections 1 and 2. 
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It is submitted that as in the case of Members, the promises are examples of the 
commitment inherent to the Oath of being faithful to the Republic and to obey, 
observe, uphold and maintain all law.  It therefore seems that the promises are more 
ex consequentibus to the purport of the Oath rather than having been included ex 
abundanti cautela. It is submitted that the promises were added to the Oath to define 
the liability of the taker of the Oath.694   The central theme of these promises is to act 
in the general good of all, subject only to the dictates of conscience. As no other 
dictates are mentioned it can in terms of the inclusio unius rule695 be construed as 
authority for a free mandate subject only to the law.696 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the various changes effected to the wording of the 
Oath were primarily made to provide for the constitutional changes that occurred over 
time and that the underlying principle of allegiance has not changed.  Allegiance or 
faithfulness is therefore pledged to the State in the wide sense of the word and 
although a Member of Parliament may owe his position in Parliament to a specific 
group of people, his Oath is to act in the interests of the public at large.697 
 
                                                 
694 Steyn LC Die Uitleg van Wette Third ed (1963) 17. 
695 Steyn op cit 196. 
696 Such an interpretation would also comply with Section 39 (2) of the 1996 Constitution that requires 
a mode of statutory interpretation that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. In 
this context particularly sections 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.  It is also in line with the principles of the 
original Oath between the Sovereign and his subjects. 
697 An apparent lacuna is, however, that there is no sanction for Members who break the Oath if the 
transgression is not punished with at least twelve months imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
(Section 47(1) (e) of the 1996 Constitution).  In the so-called Travelgate scandal, for example, 
Members were given stiff sentences of up to four years for fraud, but as fines were imposed as an 
option, Parliament could not take any action against these Members, notwithstanding the seriousness of 
the transgressions. (The Cape Times of 18 March 2005 and Mail and Guardian of 20 June 2005).  That 
it is left to Political Parties to discipline their Members under these circumstances (please see statement 
issued by the Chief Whip of the Opposition dated 11 August 2004) is not satisfactory as the Oath is 
made in Parliament before the President of the Constitutional Court or a Judge designated by the 
President of the Constitutional Court (Schedule 2 section 4(1). Persons filling a vacancy are sworn in 
by the Presiding Officer of the Assembly in terms of Schedule 2 Section 4(2).  The possibility of   
Parliament itself taking action against Members in these circumstances on the grounds of breaking the 
terms of the Oath needs further attention. 
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5.5 THE INFLUENCE OF THE ELITE 
 
In all democratic societies there are people who by virtue of their special position in 
society exercise an influence over the development of events.  These people are 
known as the elite.698  The word elite is derived from the French word élire, which 
means to choose.699   The elite then refers to the chosen and is “a collective term for 
people with status, education, wealth and those compelling qualities which can 
influence the course of politics.”700  Kotze701 defines elites as follows: 
“Elites are those persons who, individually, regularly and seriously have the power to affect 
organisational outcomes.” 
 
Although politicians and Members of Parliament, in particular, are considered part of 
the elite702 van Niekerk identifies four other categories of the elite, namely the 
bureaucracy (senior civil servants), business leaders (captains of industry), leaders of 
organised labour and military leaders.703  To this can be added members of the 
academia, media, judiciary, religious leaders, diplomatic corps, agricultural leaders, 
leaders of national organisations and NGOs.  The total number of the national elite is 
not very high and Kotze puts the figure for a large country like the United States of 
America between 5,000 and 10,000 people and for a middle-range country like 
Australia between 1,000 and 5,000 people.704  South Africa would probably also fall 
in the 1,000 to 5,000 category. 
 
                                                 
698  van Niekerk CPJ Rol van die Elite in die Demokrasie in Suid-Afrika en die Demokrasie    Fourie, 
Kriek, Labuschagne, Louw and Venter ( Editors) (1988) 179. 
699  Kotze Hennie Elites and Democratisation (1991) 3. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Op cit 3. 
702 Kotze op cit  9. 
703 Op cit 195 to 196. 
704 Op cit 4. 
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It is of course not possible to ascertain with any accuracy what influence the elite 
have on the way a Member of Parliament sees his mandate, but it can be accepted that 
the influence is substantial.  Examples are briefings by senior civil servants and 
academics to Parliamentary Committees, Editorials and other publications, judgments 
(especially by the Constitutional Court), statements by Church leaders and personal 
interactions.705 
 
5.5 REFERENDA AND PLEBISCITES 
 
Basson706 defines referendum as that form of direct law making whereby the 
government is bound in law by the result of the referendum.  A plebiscite on the other 
hand is a mere test of voters’ feelings on a particular issue.  The result of a plebiscite 
is not considered binding de jure but the government will in most cases feel morally 
obliged to honour the result.  In practice therefore both systems have the same result 
in as far as they curtail the representatives’ free mandate, as the representative is 
bound by such a mandate issued by the voters.  Basson707 is of the opinion that a 
referendum cannot be held where a free mandate theory of representation applies. 
 
South Africa has had three referenda in its constitutional history.  The first was in 
1960 to decide whether the country should become a Republic.  The second was on 2 
November 1983 concerning the constitutional changes embodied in the 1983 
Constitution and the third was on 17 March 1992 concerning the constitutional 
changes that led to the “new” South Africa.  In all three cases the voters voted in 
                                                 
705 A very recent example is the discussion between President Mbeki and the so-called Afrikaans elite 
led by Prof Willie Esterhuysen of Stellenbosch.  See the Sunday Times editorial (20 November 2005). 
706 Second LLD thesis op cit 167. 
707 Op cit 168 and further. 
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favour of the proposed changes and they were implemented.  The question that arises 
is whether a convention was not created by these three referenda in terms whereof any 
substantial constitutional change should first be put to the test by a referendum? 
 
5.6 THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
In Chapter 2 reference was made to the fact that in terms of the new constitutional 
regime in South Africa the Constitution and not Parliament is sovereign.708  Section 
44(4) of the 1996 Constitution provides that “When exercising legislative authority, 
Parliament is bound only by the Constitution, and must act in accordance with, and 
within the limits of, the Constitution.”  The Constitutional Court is empowered to 
decide on the constitutionality of any Parliamentary Bill,709 amendment to the 
Constitution,710 whether Parliament has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation711 
and whether an Act of Parliament is constitutional.712  In positive public law this is 
referred to as the “Supremacy of the Constitution”.  The Constitutional Court has 
ruled713  that one of the constraints that this imposes on Parliament, apart from the 
dictates of the Constitution, is that there must be a rational relationship between the 
scheme which it adopts and the achievement of legitimate government purpose714.  
That rationality is a minimum requirement for the exercise of power was confirmed in 
a later judgement of the Constitutional Court.715  In as much as this limits the power 
                                                 
708 See Chapter 2.7. 
709 Section 167(4) (b). 
710 Section 167(4) (d). 
711 Section 167(4) (e). 
712 Section 167(5). 
713 New National Party of South Africa v Government of Republic of  South Africa and Another 1999 
(3) SA 191 (CC). 
714 Op cit 206 and further. 
715 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 
2000 (2) SA 674 at 708 D-F; 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at 84-85. 
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of Parliament to legislate freely it, of course, limits the scope of a representative’s 
mandate accordingly. 
 
However, as the Constitution is not cast in stone716  a mandate to change any matter 
regulated by the Constitution can still be legal but its implementation will, of course, 
be conditional to the necessary majority to amend the Constitution be obtained717. 
 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
There are both intra- and extra-parliamentary factors that have an influence on the 
actions of a Member of Parliament.  Of these, the political party to which a member 
belongs has the strongest influence.  The intra-parliamentary influence is exercised 
through the Caucus whose decisions are binding on individual members.  Extra-
parliamentarely, the party has control over a member through the party’s manifesto, 
policies, disciplinary action, funding and the selection of candidates.  The fact that a 
member loses his or her seat through the loss of party membership makes the party’s 
hold over a member absolute. In this sense the party outside parliament controls the 
party inside parliament. 
After political parties, extra-parliamentary pressure groups have the strongest 
influence.  The difference between political parties and pressure groups is that while 
pressure groups tend to influence government policy, political parties aim at gaining 
control of the government through elections.  However, political parties in opposition 
also act as pressure groups.  In a democratic society, the role of pressure groups is not 
                                                 
716 It may be amended in terms of Section 74. 
717 Section 1 and subsection 74(1) may only be amended by a supporting vote of at least 75 per cent in 
the National Assembly and six of the provinces in the NCOP.  
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as important as in non-democratic societies, as in a democracy the people express 
their wishes at the ballot box and it is axiomatic that the minority tolerate the rule of 
the majority until the next election. 
As far as the allegiance of members is concerned, it is submitted that although 
members swear / confirm their allegiance to the constitution, the concept of allegiance 
no longer plays an important role in practical politics and is only of theoretical 
interest.  However, the content of the oath implies a free mandate. 
 
That the elite have a definite influence on the activity of a member is without doubt, 
but since the influence is exercised on a more subtle level, it is difficult to determine 
its effect with any accuracy. 
Referenda and plebiscites are a form of direct democracy. In practice, a representative 
is therefore mandated to adhere to the outcome of a referendum or plebiscite and 
consequently has no discretion in this regard. 
The transfer of sovereignty from Parliament to the Constitution has the potential to 
create tension between the judiciary and Parliament as illustrated by the reaction by 
the judiciary to the Fourteenth Amendment Bill718proposed by the Minister of 
Justice719. The fact that the Bill was put on hold illustrates the influence of the 
judiciary on the legislative process and this may result in a blur between the basically 
political approach of a legislature and the judicial function of the courts. However, in 
a certain sense it is reminiscent of the time of the old witemagenot when laws could 
not be made at will but had to be “found” by the wise of the tribe720.  It there for 
seems that at least in this regard constitutional law has made a full circle. The danger 
                                                 
718 See press release by Sheila Camerer MP Spokesperson for the Opposition on Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs (22 April 2005).  
719 As a result of the reaction by the judiciary the Bill was put on ice and will most probably not be 
passed in its present form. 
720See chapter 2.1.  
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of course lies therein that just as the monarchs tried to manipulate the decisions of the 
wise, there may develop a temptation to influence the judiciary.721 This subject falls 
outside the scope of this study but it certainly needs to be studied further. 
                                                 
721 The Fourteenth Amendment Bill is seen by some as precisely that. See statement by Ms Sheila 
Camerer MP op cit. and the criticism of the International Bar Association as reported by Rickard 
Carmel in the Sunday Times (23 April 2006). 
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CHAPTER 6 
FLOOR-CROSSING 
“Some men change their party for the sake of their principles; others change their 
principles for the sake of their party.” 
Winston S Churchill 722 
 
“Floor-crossing has an impact on the original electoral balance, but it does not 
necessarily mean a shift in defectors ideologies and electoral support --- South 
African politics requires this type of manoeuvring because if Parliamentarians are 
disaffected with internal party anarchy, --- they can change to other parties to uphold 
the needs of voters, not just party interests.” 
Selby L Matlogu   Letter to Mail & Guardian 16-22 September 2005 
“It is unconscionable that we have a political system whereby politicians can, on 
personal whim or on the basis of political favour, cross the floor to join other parties 
without having to make themselves accountable to the voters or to a constituency.” 
Michael Cassidy Letter to Mail & Guardian 16-22 September 2005 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As indicated above a free mandate theory of representation existed in South Africa up 
to the implementation of the interim Constitution in 1994.  Floor-crossing occurred 
regularly during this period. For convenience, this period has been divided into three 
periods, namely 1910 – 1948; 1948 – 1983 and 1983 - 1994.  The period after 1994 is 
dealt with after a discussion of the relevant legislation and ensuing court cases, under 
the headings “Floor-crossing 2003” and “Floor-crossing 2005” respectively.723 The 
private members’ bills to re-introduce an imperative system of representation and 
subsequent developments are discussed and finally the advantages and disadvantages 
of floor-crossing are weighed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
722 As quoted by Dominique Enright The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill (2001) 23. 
723 Chapters 6.4 and 6.5. 
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6.1.1. FLOOR-CROSSING 1910 – 1948 
 
During the period 1910 – 1948 three major floor-crossing events can be identified: 
• The first was when General Hertzog broke away from the South African Party 
in 1913 to form the National Party in 1914 because of differences Hertzog had 
with the policy of the South African Party as stated in its political 
manifesto.724 
• The second was the coalition between the National Party and the South 
African Party which led to the formation of the United Party in 1934.725 
• The third was the split in the United Party with the outbreak of the Second 
World War in 1939.726  The Central Head Committee of the United Party 
endorsed the decision to declare war on Germany at a meeting held on 3 
November 1939 with an overwhelming majority whereafter Hertzog and his 
followers resigned from the Party.727 
 
6.1.2 FLOOR-CROSSING 1948 – 1983 
 
Less dramatic moves occurred during this period, but the following is noteworthy: 
                                                 
724 See open letter by General Louis Botha to members of the South African Party dated 5 February 
1913 and published in the Volkstem (7 February 1913).  It is interesting that Hertzog first tried to gain 
control of the South African Party at the annual general conference in Cape Town in November 1913 
and only went over to establish his own party when he was defeated in the challenge for control over 
the party by 131 to 90 votes.  (See Crafford FS Jan Smuts (1945) 99 to 100, Standard Encyclopaedia of 
Southern Africa volume 10 103, and Dictionary of South African Biography Volume 1 370). 
725 Please see Die Hertzog Toesprake Deel 6 edited by Spies, Kruger and Oberholzer (1977). 
726 See Hansard 4 September 1939. 
727 Smuts JC Groter Suid-Afrika (1941) 123. 
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• The coalition between the Herenigde Nasionale Party and Afrikaner Party that 
formed the government in 1948 led to the amalgamation of the two parties into 
the National Party in 1950.728 
• In November 1954, six members of the United Party broke away to form the 
National Conservative Party.729  The new party was dissolved in 1957 and 
three members returned to the United Party while three joined the National 
Party.730 
• In November 1959, eleven members of the United Party formed the 
Progressive Party.731 
 
The period from 1961 to 1983 can be considered the golden period of the National 
Party.  It increased its representation from 103 to 142 members in the National 
Assembly.  However, it only gained 3 members from floor-crossing.732 
 
There were two outstanding occurrences during this period: 
• The first was the reshuffling of the opposition and the demise of the United 
Party.  Four members expelled from the United Party in 1975 formed the 
Reformist Party which amalgamated with the Progressive Party to form the 
Progressive Reform Party.733  Six further members expelled from the United 
Party in 1977 formed the Independent United Party. Shortly thereafter the 
United Party was dissolved and a new party, the New Republican Party was 
established. Twenty-five of the United Party members joined the new party.  
                                                 
728 Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa (SESA) Volume 1 192. 
729 Parliamentary Register 311. 
730 Parliamentary Register 312. 
731 Mostert op cit 121. 
732 HGO Odell United Party member for Pietermaritzburg City in 1962, HM Lewis United Party 
member for Umlazi in 1969 and SJM Steyn United Party member for Yeoville in 1973. 
733 Mostert op cit 126. 
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The six members who did not join the New Republican Party joined the 
Progressive Reform Party and formed the Progressive Federal Party. 
• The second was the break-away that occurred from the National Party’s right 
wing, of which there were two events.  The first was in 1969 when four 
National Party members formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and the 
second was in 1982 when eighteen members formed the Conservative Party 
(CP). 
 
6.1.3 FLOOR-CROSSING 1983 – 1994 
 
There were three significant movements during this period, namely: 
• The demise of the New Republican Party.  Five of its members defected to the 
National Party and only one member was returned after the 1987 elections.734 
• The establishment of the Democratic Party in 1989 by members of the 
Progressive Federal Party and the National Democratic Movement.735 
• The rush to new or extra-parliamentary parties towards the end of this period.  
Floor-crossing during this stage can be divided into two main groups, viz 
o Those who crossed to existing extra-parliamentary parties, such as the 
ANC736 and the IFP.737,738 
o Those who crossed to a new political party.739 
                                                 
734 See Parliamentary Register. 
735 Formed earlier by an Independent member and two members of the Progressive Federal Party-see 
Parliamentary Register. 
736 By this time it was obvious that the ANC would play a dominant role in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Seven members of the Democratic Party joined the ANC but sat as Independent Members, 
while five members joined the IFP. 
737 Five Members, one from the DP, two from the CP and two from the NP joined the IFP.   
738 At that point in time the NP and the IFP were locked in negotiations and it was expected by some 
that a NP/IFP combination would form the first democratic government in South Africa.  As informed 
by Mr JH van der Merwe MP, Chief Whip of the IFP. 
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6.2 SOUTH AFRICA POST- 1994 : THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION, ACT 
200 OF 1993 
 
The principle of the free mandate theory of representation was destroyed by Section 
43(b) of the interim Constitution which came into effect on 27 April 1994.740  Section 
43(b), the so-called anti-defection clause, stipulated that a member of the National 
Assembly had to vacate his or her seat if he or she ceased to be a member of the party 
that nominated him or her as a member of the National Assembly.  This introduced 
the so-called imperative mandate theory of representation in terms whereof a 
representative is bound by mandates issued by the political party which nominated 
him or her.741  Basson742 criticised the introduction of the anti-defection clause and 
pointed out that the free mandate was the universally accepted principle of 
representation in constitutional law.  He also queried the bolstering of the already 
significant influence of political parties and suggested that an imperative mandate 
may contravene the protected fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of the interim 
Constitution, such as the right of freedom of expression,743  freedom of association744 
and the right to freely make political choices.745  He submits that the limitation of 
these rights is not justifiable in an open and democratic society.746 
 
                                                                                                                                            
739 Eleven members of the CP eventually formed the Freedom Front.  The reason was that the CP 
refused to participate in the 1994 General Election and had members stayed on in the CP it would have 
meant the end of their political careers. 
740 Basson DA South African’s Interim Constitution Text and Notes (1994) 79. 
741 Basson op cit. It is interesting to note that in the case of the Pan-African Parliament specific 
provision is made for a free mandate in Art. 6 of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Committee Relating to the Pan-African Parliament signed at Sirte Libya on 2 March 2001, 
which states that Members shall vote in their personal and independent capacity. The Rules of 
Procedure adopted on 21 September 2005 state that “in the exercise of their mandate, Members…shall 
be independent and not be bound by any instructions or orders from any authority.” Rule 7(4).  
742 Basson op cit 80. 
743 Section 15. 
744 Section 17. 
745 Section 21(c). 
746 Op cit 32. 
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Albert Venter747 is also of the opinion that a free mandate for each member of the 
National Assembly should be allowed and he points out that the free mandate is more 
democratic and compatible with the general tenor of a free and open society.  A free 
mandate also loosens the power grip that party leaders have over representatives and 
makes parliamentary representation of the voters a greater reality. He also points out 
that leading democracies such as France, Germany and The Netherlands are well 
known examples of States which prohibit an imperative mandate. 
 
According to Steytler,748 the anti-defection clause was one of the most contested and 
debated elements of the system of representative democracy under the interim 
Constitution. On the one hand, it was decried as being undemocratic as it allegedly 
stifles freedom of speech and association, but on the other hand it was staunchly 
supported as an integral component of the party list system.  The reason for the anti-
defection clause in the 1993 Constitution was to preserve political stability during the 
initial period of transition, but its retention in the 1996 Constitution was strongly 
criticised.749 
 
 
6.3 THE 1996 CONSTITUTION 
 
The provision in the interim Constitution that a member who loses membership of the 
party that nominated him/her, had to vacate his/her seat was initially not included in 
                                                 
747 “Proportional representation and ex post facto accreditation of members of Parliament”  De Ville 
and Steytler op cit 78. 
748 Steytler N “Parliamentary Democracy-The Anti-Defection Clause” (1997) Law Democracy and 
Development 221-231. 
749 Devenish GE A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 119. 
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the body of the 1996 Constitution.750  According to Rautenbach and Malherbe751 this 
repealed the imperative mandate that applied in terms of the interim Constitution and 
restored the concept of a free mandate.  However, the anti-defection clause was 
retained in Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution which made provision for transitional 
arrangements.752 At the same time, it made provision for an Act of Parliament to be 
passed within a reasonable period after the new Constitution took effect, to provide 
for the retention of membership of a member who ceases to be a member of the party 
which nominated him/her.753  The fact that the anti-defection clause was not included 
in the body of the 1996 Constitution, but put in the Annexure to the Constitution, is an 
indication that it was the intention to return to a free mandate.754  The retention of the 
anti-defection clause was made under transitional arrangements755 which inter alia 
stated that despite the repeal of the interim Constitution, Schedule 2 of that 
Constitution as Amended by Annexure A to the 1996 Constitution would still apply, 
amongst others to: 
• The loss of membership and 
• The filling of vacancies and review of party lists until the second election of 
the Assembly under the New Constitution.756 
The amended Schedule 2 stipulated that a person loses membership of a Legislature if 
that person ceases to be a member of the party which nominated him or her as a 
member of the Legislature.757  Although the 1996 Constitution itself was silent on the 
question of floor-crossing, it did in effect prohibit floor-crossing through Schedule 2 
                                                 
750 See Section 47. 
751 Op cit 113. 
752 Item 13 Annexure A. 
753 Item 13(3). 
754 Devenish op cit 226. 
755 Schedule 6. 
756 Schedule 6 Item 3(b) (c).  This would refer to the second elections under the New Constitution i.e. 
the 2004 election. 
757 Item 23 A (i). 
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of the interim Constitution which prohibition, if no new legislation was to be passed, 
would have ceased at the time of the second election after 1996, i.e. 2004. 
 
Glenda Fick758 discussed the anti-defection clause as it appeared in Item 23A of 
Annexure A2, Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution and came to the conclusion that 
the South African Constitution makes provision for representation in the form of 
delegation.759  She emphasises the concept of “government by the people” and the fact 
that Section 57(1) (b) of the Constitution “envisages participatory democracy and 
public involvement in the business of the National Assembly.”760    She also interprets 
Section 59 as granting the electorate “a forum to articulate its mandate, and the 
constitutional assurance that its political will will be taken into account, and that the 
mandate it gives to the National Assembly is given effect to.”761  She comes to the 
conclusion that the constitutional text, in making provision for the active involvement 
of the electorate, does not favour the representative as one who may be “guided by his 
own opinions, judgment and enlightened conscience” and that consequently the 
members of the National Assembly do not have a free mandate. 
 
It is submitted that Fick read more in the Constitution than what was intended.  The 
provisions made in the Constitution to ensure accountability are “universal adult 
suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government.”762 Section 57(1) is not imperative but gives the National 
Assembly the discretion to “give due regard to representative and participatory 
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement” when making rules 
                                                 
758 “The Anti-Defection Clause in the South African Constitution” (1999) 14 SA Public Law 46. 
759Op cit 54. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Op cit 55. 
762 Section 1(d). 
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and orders concerning its business. Section 59(1) is imperative but in practice it is 
applied to mean that public hearings have to be held when necessary and that written 
comments must be tabled in Parliament.  The presenters at the public hearings do not 
participate in any debate and their opinions are but part of the many matters that 
Members have to consider in their deliberations.  No input at a public hearing or 
written comment can therefore be seen as a mandate. 
 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal763 has held that Section 59 (1) imposes an 
obligation on Parliament to facilitate public involvement in its legislative processes 
and the Constitutional Court has subsequently ruled in two separate judgments764 that 
laws were unconstitutional because of insufficient public participation. In the Doctors 
for Life case the Court investigated the nature and scope of a legislature’s 
constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement in the law-making process 
and came to the conclusion that “The obligation to facilitate public involvement is a 
material part of the law-making process. It is a requirement of manner and form. 
Failure to comply with this obligation renders the resulting legislation invalid”.765 In 
his dissenting judgment Yacoob J766 pointed out that public involvement in the 
legislative process is not mentioned at all as an essential principle of the 
Constitution.767  He stated that the place of public involvement in South Africa’s 
democracy had to be ascertained by looking at the relationship between representative 
and participatory elements in the country’s constitutional democracy. Government by 
the people is not achieved by public involvement in law-making but by providing a 
                                                 
763King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 2006 (1) SA 474 
(SCA);BCLR 462 (SCA) at par 19.  
764Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others CCT 12/05 and 
Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others CCT 73/05. 
765 Op cit par 209. 
766 Op cit par 246-339. 
767 Op cit par 274. 
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national forum for the public consideration of issues.768 However, “this does not mean 
that the public must be allowed to participate in debates in the National Assembly and 
that the National Assembly must provide a forum for members of the public to 
consider issues.”769 Government by the people means government by the people’s 
elected representatives. This was explained as follows:770 
When matters are debated in the National Assembly, in public, amongst members of the Assembly they 
represent the people and ensure government by the people. The National Assembly is the forum for 
those debates. 
Of great importance is the fact that the National Assembly, by passing laws, also represents the people 
and ensures government by the people. In our constitutional scheme, laws passed by representatives of 
the people must be regarded as government by the people and as laws passed by the people. This is a 
vital contextual factor in determining what ‘public involvement’ in the Constitution means. 
 
After considering the meaning of the term public involvement the learned judge came 
to the following conclusion:771 
It is impermissible to conclude that the term ‘public involvement’ at the level of interpretation 
postulates as a minimum that the public must be given an opportunity to comment on draft legislation. 
The term is not capable of that construction. To interpret the phrase in that way would amount to re-
drafting the Constitution. 
 
Van der Westhuizen J772 concurred with the judgment of Yacoob and pointed out that 
if the constitutional purpose was to include a specific requirement of public  
involvement as part of the legislative process, it would have been built into the 
legislative process. He poses the question: “Why would all other steps in the 
legislative process be clearly set out in detailed provisions under the appropriate 
heading, but not this one?” He concludes that: 
If the will of the Parliamentary majority will in the end mostly prevail in any event, and all that is 
required is to ‘involve’ the public by for example mechanically holding public hearings for every piece 
of legislation - or to make sure that hearings are not promised as in this case-participatory democracy 
would appear to be quite cosmetic and empty, in spite of any idealistic and romantic motivation for 
promoting it. 
 
It is submitted that the minority judgment is not only based upon a more plausible 
interpretation of the Constitution, but is also preferable as far as the doctrine of the 
                                                 
768 Op cit par 283. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Op cit par 283 and 284. 
771 Op cit par 312. 
772 Op cit par 241-245. 
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separation of powers is concerned. However, the present position is that Parliament 
will in future have to invite public participation when new legislation is considered. 
This will impact on a public representative’s mandate but not necessarily more than 
any of the factors discussed in chapter 5. It should also be pointed out that even if the 
majority judgment is accepted as correct, it does not necessarily follows that an 
imperative mandate is the only system that is compatible with the Constitution’s 
emphasis on public participation in the legislative process. Greater consideration on 
the inputs of the public can enable members of parliament to make up their own 
minds of what is in the public interest, independently of the official party line. In this 
way public participation can serve as a counter weight to the hold of political parties 
over their members. 
 
6.3.1. CERTIFICATION OF THE 1996 CONSTITUTION773 
 
The interim Constitution made provision for a Constitutional Assembly, consisting of 
the National Assembly and the Senate, to draft and adopt a new constitutional text774 
that would comply with the Constitutional Principles laid down in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution.775  It further provided that the new Constitutional text passed by the 
Constitutional Assembly would be of no force and effect unless the Constitutional 
Court certified that the provisions of the new text complied with the Constitutional 
Principles contained in Schedule 4 of the interim Constitution. The Constitutional 
                                                 
773 Prof Andre Mbata B Mangu is of the opinion that what the Constitutional Court certified was not the 
will of the people but rather that of their undemocratically elected representatives and that it is a 
strange paradox that our democracy lies on undemocratic foundations.  “Who really governs in South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy: parties or ‘we the people’?” Codicilius XLIV  21. It is submitted 
that although the interim Constitution was enacted by an undemocratically elected parliament, the 
Constitutional Assembly was democratically elected.   
774 Section 68 (1) and (2). 
775 Section 71 (1). 
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Assembly adopted a new constitutional text in May 1996 and it was transmitted to the 
Constitutional Court for certification.  The Court emphasised that it had a judicial and 
not a political mandate776 and that its functions were clearly spelled out in Section 
71(2) of the interim Constitution, namely to certify that all the provisions of the 
Constitutional text comply with the Constitutional Principles, which was a judicial 
function, a legal exercise.  The Court went to pains to underline that it had no power, 
no mandate and no right to express any view on the political choices made by the 
Constitutional Assembly in drafting the Constitutional text apart from considering its 
compliance or non-compliance with the Constitutional Principles. 
 
Objections to the anti-defection clause were the following:777 
• It creates an imperative form of representation which subjects legislators to the 
authority of their parties in a manner that is not consistent with accountable, 
responsible, open, representative and democratic government. 
• Universally accepted rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, the freedom to make political choices and the right to 
stand for public office and if elected to hold office, are undermined. 
• It militates against the principles of “representative government, appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness, openness and 
democratic representation”. 
 
The Court considered the objections with reference to the relevant Constitutional 
Principles and came to the conclusion that the anti-defection clause was not 
                                                 
776 Ex parte Constitutional Assembly:  In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996(4) SA 744 (CC). 
777 See 829 to 831 of the Report. 
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inconsistent with the principles concerned.  It therefore approved the anti-defection 
clause, although other provisions were found to be inconsistent with the 
Constitutional Principles. In the subsequent certification judgment778 the 
constitutional text was duly certified.  The following are the salient aspects of the 
Court’s reasoning: 
• The anti-defection clause obliges members of a party who were elected by 
virtue of the inclusion of their names on the party’s list, to remain loyal to the 
party which meets the expectations of voters who supported the party. 
• Anti-defection clauses exist in the Constitutions of other democracies, such as 
India and Namibia and are therefore accepted in the democratic world. 
• Political representatives enjoy freedom of speech in the legislatures and 
committees subject to the applicable rules and orders and as citizens they 
enjoy freedom of association and participation in politics.  In as far as any of 
these rights are limited by the anti-defection clause “they are not aspects of 
rights which are universally accepted as fundamental.” 
• In a democracy the electoral system and the elections in accordance with that 
system provide the most important check on the legislature and its members. 
• Parties face the voters during the succeeding election and have to justify their 
acts during the previous legislative period.  Members who wish to be re-
elected have to follow party discipline. 
• Under a list system of proportional representation, it is parties that the 
electorate vote for and parties which must be accountable to the electorate. 
• An anti-defection clause can prevent defection and ensures that elected 
members continue to support the party under whose aegis they were elected. 
                                                 
778 In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997 
(2) SA 97 (CC). 
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• An anti-defection clause prevents the party in power from trying to get 
members of small parties to defect to the governing party enabling the 
governing party to obtain a special majority which is not a reflection of the 
views of the electorate. 
 
However, as far as the certification was concerned, the Court found that although the 
Constitutional text complied with the overwhelming majority of the requirements of 
the Constitutional Principles, some of the provisions of the text did not comply with 
the Constitutional Principles and certification was therefore withheld.  The 
Constitutional Assembly reconvened and a revised text of the new Constitution was 
passed on 11 October 1996.  The revised text was transmitted to the Constitutional 
Court for certification and in terms of Section 73A (1) (2) and (3) of the 1993 
Constitution, the Court had to examine afresh whether the amended text complied 
with the Constitutional Principles.  The court’s function was therefore not reduced to 
consider only those parts of the amended text that were affected by its earlier order, 
but it was open to an objector to raise an issue not considered before or to contend 
that the Court erred in approving some of the previous provisions.  In other words, the 
text as a whole had to be measured again against the Constitutional Principles.779  No 
new objections were raised as far as the anti-defection issue or related issues were 
concerned and no further reference to these issues was made in the judgment.  The 
revised text was consequently certified by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 
1996 and the New Constitution was enacted on 18 December 1996 as Act 108 of 
1996780 and it commenced on 4 February 1997. 
                                                 
779 At 109 of the report. 
780 In terms of the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act No 5 of 2005, the Constitution and amendments 
to the Constitution are treated differently from other Acts by not being allocated an Act number and 
from 27 June 2005 no act number is to be associated with the Constitution of South Africa. 
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The Constitutional Court therefore found in two separate judgments that a prohibition 
on floor-crossing was not inconsistent with the Constitutional Principles laid down by 
the interim Constitution.  Although this implied that political representatives under a 
proportional party list electoral system had no free mandate, the Court did recognise a 
political representative’s freedom of speech as contained in Section 58(1), Section 
71(1), Section 117(1) and Section 161 of the 1996 Constitution.781 
 
6.3.2 FLOOR-CROSSING LEGISLATION 
 
For reasons not relevant here, FW de Klerk led the National Party out of the 
Government of National Unity in 1996 and he and other prominent National Party 
members subsequently retired from active politics. The National Party changed its 
name to the New National Party (NNP) and when South Africa went to the polls in 
June 1999 in the first general elections under the 1996 Constitution, the NNP suffered 
badly, falling back from being the official opposition prior to the elections, to fourth 
place after the ANC, DP and IFP.  The results were as follows: 
 
ANC    266 
DP    38 
IFP    34 
NNP    28 
                                                 
781 The issue again came under the consideration of the Constitutional Court in the case of  United 
Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others  2003 (1) BCLR 25 
(CC), fully discussed later in this chapter.  In its judgment the Court found that floor-crossing per se 
was not inconsistent with the Founding Principles and the Bill of Rights, but it appears that the Court 
shied away from the reasons given in the first Certification judgment as no direct reference is made to 
the reasons given in that judgment for rejecting all the objections to the anti-defection provisions in the 
1996 Constitution. 
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UDM    13 
ACDP      6 
PAC      3 
UCDP      3 
FF      3 
FA      2 
AZAPO     1 
MF      1 
AEB      1 
 
 
With the Municipal Elections looming, the NNP formed an alliance with the DP and 
FA to fight the 2000 Municipal Elections under the banner of a new political party, 
the Democratic Alliance (DA).  The new political party did exceptionally well at the 
municipal elections of December 2000.782  At national and provincial level the three 
alliance partners had to retain their separate identities because of the anti-defection 
clause, although joint caucuses were held and there was even reference to the Alliance 
as the Democratic Alliance in the National Assembly.783  However, the relationship 
between the DP and the NNP did not flourish and came to a break when the NNP 
broke away from the DA towards the end of 2001 to form a new alliance with the 
ANC.  Because of the anti-defection clause the position of NNP Members of 
Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures were not affected by the alliance between 
the DP, NNP and FA but the NNP councillors who were elected under the DA banner, 
                                                 
782 The new party obtained 1306 councillors countrywide and 22.12% of the vote.  See IEC election 
results. 
783 As informed by Dr EA Conroy MP NNP. 
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were now caught up in the DA and had to toe the DA line on peril of being expelled 
and losing their seats in terms of anti-defection legislation.   
To release these “captured” councillors and to gain from the benefits of the new 
alliance between the ANC and the NNP, the government removed  Schedule 2 of the 
interim Constitution  from a dusty cupboard and four Acts of Parliament were signed 
into law on 19 June 2002, namely the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Second Amendment Act numbers 18 and 21 of 2002, The Loss of Retention of 
Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002 and the Local 
Government Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002.  The first Amendment 
Act784 and the Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Act785 both relate 
to floor-crossing in the Local Government sphere and are therefore not directly 
relevant to this study.  The Second Amendment Act786 and the Membership Act 
related to floor-crossing in the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures.  The 
Membership Act removed the prohibition on floor-crossing and provided for a limited 
system of floor-crossing that made provision for a 15 day window period in the 
second and fourth year after an election.  During these window periods, members 
could change their party allegiances without losing their seats subject to the 
requirement that at least 10% of the representatives of a party in a Legislature had to 
leave the party.  It also made provision for a once-off 15-day window period 
immediately following the commencement of the legislation where the 10% 
requirement would not apply. The Second Amendment Act made provision for the 
alteration of the composition of Provincial delegations to the National Council of 
Provinces in the event of a change in the composition of a provincial legislature as a 
                                                 
784 Act 18 of 2002. 
785 Act 20 of 2002. 
786 Act 21 of 2002. 
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result of  floor-crossing, party splits or party mergers provided for in the new 
Legislation. 
 
The four Acts mentioned above were published in the Government Gazette dated 20 
June 2002 and the United Democratic Movement brought an urgent application in the 
High Court praying for the suspension of the commencement of the so-called 
impugned legislation pending a decision of the full Court.   Interim relief was granted 
by the Court and on 24 June 2002 the full Court confirmed the order pending the 
outcome of a Constitutional Court application filed by the President of the Republic 
of South Africa, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and the 
Minister of Provincial and Local Government as appellants.787 The African Christian 
Democratic Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the 
Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and the South African Local Government 
Association joined the action as intervening parties whereas the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa and the Research Unit for Legal and Constitutional 
Interpretation submitted arguments as amici curiae.  Argument was heard from 6 to 8 
August 2002 and the Court delivered its judgment on 4 October 2002.  In its judgment 
the Court emphasised that the case was not about the merits or demerits of the 
provisions of the disputed legislation, which was a political question of no concern to 
the Court.788  The Court further pointed out that what had to be decided was not 
whether the disputed provisions were appropriate or inappropriate but whether they 
were constitutional or unconstitutional.789  The following considerations by the Court 
are relevant to this study: 
                                                 
787 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2002 (11) 
BCLR 1179 (CC). 
788 See paragraph 11 of the Report. 
789 Op cit. 
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• Whether the right to vote and proportional representation are part of the basic 
structure of the South African Constitution and as such not subject to 
amendment at all.790  The Court found that the electoral system adopted in the 
Constitution was one of many that are consistent with democracy.  Some such 
systems contained anti-defection clauses, while others did not.  Some were 
proportional and others not.  The Court therefore came to the conclusion that 
“it cannot be said that proportional representation, and the anti-defection 
provisions which support it, are so fundamental to our Constitutional order as 
to preclude any amendments of their provisions.”791 
• The Court next considered whether the disputed legislation was inconsistent 
with the founding values of the Constitution and specifically the contention 
that an anti-defection provision is an essential component of an electoral 
system based on proportional representation.792  The Court pointed out that 
there exists a tension between the expectation of voters and the conduct of 
Members elected to represent them.  However, “once elected, Members of the 
Legislature are free to take decisions and are not ordinarily liable to be 
recalled by voters if the decisions taken are contrary to commitments made 
during the election campaign.”793  The Court referred to its decision in the first 
Certification Judgment where it found that: 
“Under a list system of proportional representation, it is parties that the electorate vote 
for, and parties which must be accountable to the electorate.  A party which abandons its 
manifesto in a way not accepted by the electorate would probably lose at the next 
election.  In such a system an anti-defection clause is not inappropriate to ensure that the 
will of the electorate is honoured. An individual member remains free to follow the 
dictates of personal conscience.   This is not inconsistent with democracy…An anti-
defection clause enables a political party to prevent defections of its elected members, 
thus ensuring that they continue to support the party under whose aegis they were elected.  
It also prevents parties in power from enticing members of small parties to defect from 
                                                 
790 Paragraph 15. 
791 Paragraph 17. 
792 Paragraph 30. 
793 Paragraph 31. 
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the party upon whose list they were elected to join the governing party.  If this were 
permitted it could enable the governing party to obtain a special majority which it might 
not otherwise be able to muster and which is not a reflection of the views of the 
electorate.”794 
 
However, the Court cautioned that it did not follow from that judgment that a 
proportional representation system without an anti-defection clause would be 
inconsistent with democracy, although it was possible that in a proportional 
representation electoral system the link between voter and party was closer 
compared to a constituency-based electoral system.795  The Court concluded 
that although an anti-defection clause could possibly be desirable in a 
proportional electoral system, it was not an essential component of multi-party 
democracy “…and cannot be implied as a necessary adjunct to a proportional 
representation system.”  In the end the Court decided that it was a matter of 
what the law stated: “…where the law prohibits defection that is a lawful 
prohibition, which must be enforced by the Courts.  But where it does not do 
so, Courts cannot prohibit such conduct where the legislature has chosen not 
to do so.”796  The Court concluded that accordingly floor-crossing is a matter 
on which Parliament is free to legislate within the confines of the Constitution. 
• The Court also made the point that although the electorate may be influenced 
by the names of candidates and their positions on a party list, “….they voted 
for Parties and not for particular candidates.”797 
• The Court also pointed out that unlike the interim Constitution, which 
specifically made provision for an anti-defection clause in the body of the 
Constitutional Text,798 the main text of the final Constitution did not prescribe 
                                                 
794 Paragraph 33. 
795 Paragraph 34. 
796 Paragraph 35. 
797 Paragraph 37. 
798 Section 43(b). 
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that membership will be lost if a member ceases to belong to the party on 
whose list he or she gained membership. The anti-defection provision was 
contained in Schedule 6 to the Constitution which dealt with transitional 
arrangements.799  Consequently the Court came to the conclusion that the 
Constitution did not demand an anti-defection provision but only made 
provision for anti-defection for a limited transitional period and allowed for 
the amendment thereof during the transition period by an Act of Parliament. 
• The Court then considered the constitutionality of the ten percent threshold 
and conceded that it made it easier to defect from smaller parties than from 
larger parties.800  However, the Court came to the conclusion that the fact that 
a particular system operated to the disadvantage of particular parties did not 
necessarily mean that it was unconstitutional.801  It again concluded that if the 
defection was permissible, the details of the legislation had to be left to 
Parliament, subject to the constraints of the Constitution.  That a threshold was 
decided upon was considered not to be inconsistent with the Constitution.802 
• The Court also considered the objection that changing the anti-defection 
provisions during the term of a legislature resulted in an infringement of 
voters’ rights as it might have affected the way voters cast their votes had they 
known the provision could have been lifted.803  The Court rejected this 
objection and stated that the rights entrenched under Section 19 are directed to 
elections, to voting and participation in political activities.  The Court 
concluded that “between elections, however, voters have no control over the 
conduct of their representatives.  They cannot dictate to them how they must 
                                                 
799 Paragraphs 40 & 41. 
800 Paragraph 46. 
801 Paragraph 47. 
802 Ibid. 
803 Paragraph 48. 
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vote in Parliament, nor do they have any legal right to insist that they conduct 
themselves or refrain from conducting themselves in a particular manner.”804 
• The Court then made a very important statement as far as the free mandate 
theory of representation is concerned: “The fact that political representatives 
may act inconsistently with their mandates is a risk in all electoral systems.”805  
Should a party change its mind after an election and deviate from its election 
promises the voters who voted for that party may feel betrayed but their rights 
under Section 19 were not infringed.  “Their remedy comes at the time of the 
next election when they decide how to cast their votes.”806 
• The Court further stated that as the Constitution made provision for the 
amendment of the anti-defection provisions it could be presumed that voters 
knew this and that voting on the assumption that it would not happen was a 
political decision, the consequence of which has no reference to the 
Constitution.807 
• The Court also considered the contention that floor-crossing would be 
inconsistent with one of the founding provisions in the Constitution, namely “a 
multi-party system of democratic government.”808  The Court noticed that the 
legislation was supported by 280 of the 324 Members who voted and found 
that it was within the power of Parliament to deal with matters related to 
elections and membership of the legislature if the power is exercised subject to 
the provisions of the Constitution itself.809 
                                                 
804 Paragraph 49. 
805 Paragraph 50. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Paragraph 51. 
808 Paragraphs 54 to 57. 
809 Paragraphs 57 & 58. 
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• The Court next considered the legality of the limitation of floor-crossing to 
two window-periods in the life of a legislature.810  The Court pointed out that 
floor-crossing had been subject to debate within South Africa since the 
negotiations that preceded the adoption of the interim Constitution and 
referred to the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by Parliament within a week of 
the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution on 7 February 1997 “to 
consider the drafting of legislation which gives effect to Item 23A(3) of the 
amended Schedule 2 to the Constitution, 1993, as provided for in Item 13 of 
Annexure A of Schedule 6 to the Constitution, 1996”. 811  The Court dealt with 
the different views expressed in the Committee and came to the conclusion 
that “viewed objectively in the light of the debates and the expert opinions that 
had been obtained a decision to limit floor-crossing to two window-periods in 
our view is a rational decision.”812 
• The Court then considered the filling of the seat of a floor-crosser in the event 
that it became vacant813 and came to the conclusion that “bearing in mind that 
the purpose of the legislation was to accommodate mid-term shifts in political 
allegiances and the limited term for which a defecting member would remain a 
member of the legislature it seems to us to be neither irrational nor 
inconsistent with multi-party democracy to provide that the seat should be 
regarded as the seat of the new party for the remainder of that member’s 
term.”814 
                                                 
810 Paragraphs 60 to 70. 
811 Paragraph 61. 
812 Paragraph 69. 
813 Paragraphs 71 to 74. 
814 Paragraph 74. 
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• The Court then proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the contested 
legislation815 and came to the conclusion that although item 23A vested a 
special power in Parliament to amend the transitional provisions of the 
Constitution by an Act of Parliament rather than by a Constitutional 
Amendment, that power had to be exercised within a reasonable period after 
the Constitution came into force and that five years was not a reasonable 
period.  It consequently found the Membership Act to be unconstitutional.816 
 
As a result Parliament amended the Constitution817 by inserting a new Schedule 
6A that provided for the retention of Membership of the National Assembly or a 
Provincial Legislature after a change of party membership, mergers between 
parties, subdivisions of parties and subdivisions and mergers of parties.818  Section 
47(3) of the Constitution was also amended819 by reintroducing an anti-defection 
clause subject to the window periods mentioned in Schedule 6A.  The 
amendments provided for a window period of 15 days immediately following the 
amendments during which period members could cross the floor without a 
threshold820 as well as for two 15-day periods from the first to the fifteenth day of 
September in the second and fourth year following an election,821 provided that 
members who leave the party for which they held a seat, represent not less than 
ten percent of the total number of seats held by such a party in the legislature 
concerned.822 
                                                 
815 Paragraphs 85 to 114. 
816 Paragraph 114. For a concise discussion of the judgment see Budhu SR Codicillus  XLIV ( October 
2003) 134-139. 
817 Act No 2 of 2003. 
818 Section 6. 
819 Section 2 of Act No 2 of 2003. 
820 Section 6(1). 
821 Section 4(1). 
822 Section 2(1). 
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It is interesting to note that a Cabinet Committee was appointed in March 2002 to 
investigate alternative electoral systems under the chairmanship of Dr Frederik 
van Zyl Slabbert.823 A lack or perceived lack of accountability was identified as a 
problem of the existing system and this gave rise to more discussion and debate 
than any of the other matters discussed.824 The majority report of the Committee 
proposed a multi-member constituency electoral system but the recommendations 
of the Committee were not accepted by the cabinet and the status quo 
continued.825 
 
 
6.4 FLOOR-CROSSING 2003 
 
The legislation referred to above in terms whereof members could cross the floor 
without loss of seat commenced on 21 March 2003 and terminated on 4 April 2003.  
In what was described as the worst kind of political malfeasance, a total of 23 
members of the National Assembly changed their allegiance.826  Expressed as a 
percentage, the floor-crossers constituted 5.75%, which is quite a significant change.  
Expressed in the number of votes negated by the defections, it would amount to more 
than one million votes.  The UDM and NNP suffered the heaviest losses while the 
ANC and the DA gained the most seats.  The UDM lost ten of its 14 Members of 
Parliament (i.e. 71.4%) while the NNP lost eight of its 28 Members (28.6%).  
                                                 
823 See report of the Electoral Task Team dated January 2003. 
824 Paragraph 4 3 5 of the report at 17. 
825 Please see Slabbert F van Zyl The Other Side of History (2006) 105-108. Subsequently the Minister 
of Home Affairs stated that the matter would be reviewed before the 2009 elections. Hansard 16 
August 2006. 
826 City Press (27 April 2003).  
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Proportionally, however, the DA with eight new members improved its representation 
with 21% to 46 members, the significance of which is clear if it is taken into account 
that it only had seven members prior to the 1999 elections.827  The stand of the parties 
in the National Assembly was as follows after the floor-crossing: 
 
Table: 5 
PARTY BEFORE AFTER DIFFERENCE 
ANC 266 275* +9 
DA 38 46 +8 
IFP 34 31 -3 
NNP 28 20 -8 
UDM 14 4 -10 
ACDP 6 7 +1 
PAC 3 2 -1 
MINORITY 
PARTIES 
11 10 -1 
NEW PARTIES 0 5 +5 
TOTALS 400 400  
 
 
The first general elections after the first floor-crossing period were held on 14 April 
2004.828  It is clear from the results that except for the UDM who regained half of the 
seats lost during the first floor-crossing period, the trend set by the floor-crossers was 
confirmed by the election results.  The ANC did not only retain the nine seats it 
                                                 
827 As the Democratic Party. 
* The ANC now had a two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
828 For the results please see Table 4 page 62. 
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gained during the previous window period, it added four more.  The DA also 
improved on the seats gained by floor-crossing while the ACDP retained the seat 
gained.  The slide away from the NNP increased dramatically as it lost a further 13 
seats.  The ID was the only party that had its origins in the 2003 floor-crossing that 
succeeded in being re-elected. The Party not only retained its seat but it gained six 
more seats.  It is also interesting to note that none of the parties that suffered losses 
during the 2003 floor-crossing period could repeat their performance of the 1999 
elections.  Notwithstanding the outcry in the press it therefore appears that the floor-
crossers had read the shift in the allegiance of the electorate correctly as confirmed by 
the results of the 2004 elections, 13 months later. 
 
 
6.5 FLOOR-CROSSING 2005 
 
The window period for the second opportunity for members of the legislatures to 
cross the floor commenced on 1 September 2005 and terminated on 15 September 
2005.  This time the ten percent threshold applied, which meant that there had to be a 
significant shift in the larger parties such as the ANC, DA and IFP.  In the case of the 
other political parties the requirement of at least ten percent did not have any effect as 
a single member already constituted more than ten percent and was therefore free to 
leave without loss of his or her seat.  The Act was silent on the date on which a 
party’s membership had to be taken to calculate the ten percent threshold and as the 
DA gained two members on 6 September 2005 its membership was 52 on 15 
September 2005 when five members defected.  The DA therefore argued that a 
minimum of ten percent of its membership was six and that the ten percent threshold 
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had therefore not been met. The Speaker argued that the membership at the start of the 
window period was the figure that had to be used to calculate the ten percent.  In the 
ensuing court case the High Court upheld the Speaker’s interpretation.829  However, it 
can be argued that the two members that the DA gained at the beginning of the 
window period set a trend and that the increased membership should therefore have 
been taken into account. This argument was not submitted and was not considered by 
the Court. 
 
A total of 25 members (6.25%) changed their allegiance in very much the same 
pattern as in 2003.  As in 2003 the ANC suffered no loss but gained a total of 14 
members.830  The only other existing party that received new members was the DA 
that got one member from the IFP and one member from the UDM.  Four new parties 
were formed while the National Democratic Conference (NADECO), formed earlier 
by the former chairperson of the IFP, gained four members that defected from the IFP.  
The United Independent Front (UIF) was formed by two members who defected from 
the UDM.  The United Party of South Africa (UPSA) is a one-member party formed 
by a former NNP member, while the Federation of Democrats (FD) and the 
Progressive Independent Movement (PIM) are one member parties formed 
respectively by former members of the ACDP and DA.831 
The state of the parties in Parliament after the close of the window period was as 
follows: 
 
 
                                                 
829 See  Julies and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 (4) SA 13 CPD . 
830 Six from the NNP, four from the DA, two from the ID and two from the ACDP. 
831 It is of historical interest to note that 15 September 2005 was the first day in more than 90 years that 
the National Party/New National Party had no representation in the National Assembly. 
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Table:  6 
PARTY NO OF SEATS CHANGE PERCENTAGE 
ANC 293 +14 +5.02 
DA 47 -3 -6.38 
IFP 23 -5 -17.86 
UDM 6 -3 -37.5 
NNP 0 -7 -100 
ID 5 -2 -28.57 
ACDP 4 -3 -42.86 
FF+ 4 0 0 
UCDP 3 0 0 
PAC 3 0 0 
MF 2 0 0 
AZAPO 1 0 0 
NADECO 4 +4 +100 
UIF 2 +2 +100 
UPSA 1 +1 +100 
PIM 1 +1 +100 
FD 1 +1 +100 
TOTAL 400   
 
Except for the new parties in Parliament of which NADECO is the only one that 
appears to have a constituency,832 the DA was the only opposition party that received 
new members.  It also appears that floor-crossing favours big parties, especially the 
ruling party who is in a position to lure opposition members with attractive offers of 
executive positions.833  A big party has the further advantage that the ten percent 
threshold makes it very difficult for a large number of members to arrange to 
                                                 
832 It is the only new party that gained seats during the March 2006 Municipal elections. 
833 See article in City Press (18 September 2005) in which the ANC Chairperson and Minister of 
Defence Mosiuoa Lekota was quoted saying job opportunities were “almost inexhaustible” for 
opposition Members of Parliament who crossed to the ANC. However, to date no Members who 
crossed to the ANC have been promoted. 
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defect.834  The ruling party is on record that the floor-crossing legislation is not going 
to be repealed835 and although it is conceded that a free mandate theory of 
representation is preferable to an imperative mandate, the hybrid system as applied at 
present needs to be revised, especially the ten percent threshold. 
 
 
6.6 PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BILLS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
In April 2006, two separate private members’ bills 836 aimed at amending the 
Constitution by reintroducing an anti-defection clause so as to prohibit floor crossing 
or the merger of political parties while members retain their seats, were tabled in 
Parliament. Although no private member bill has been adopted by Parliament since 
1994, these bills are dealt with here for the sake of completeness. 
 
The motivation for the bills can be summarized as follows:837 
●  The original intention of floor-crossing legislation was to allow elected public 
representatives to change party membership on the basis of individual conscience and 
principle but successive floor crossing “window periods” have demonstrated that this 
does not happen in practice. 
●  There is conflict between the principle of accountability to the electorate and the 
proportional list (PR) electoral system. Representatives who “cross the floor” in the 
                                                 
834 With the ANC’s new membership of 293 it will require 30 members to break away at the next 
window period which is highly unlikely.  Notwithstanding the division in the ANC during the 
September 2005 window period there were no defections. See the article by Mondle Makhanye A 
House Split Asunder in the Sunday Times (28 August 2005).   
835Minister Charles Nqakula Hansard 12 September 2005. 
836 Introduced by Dr JT Delport of the DA and Mr JH van der Merwe of the IFP respectively. As the 
bills have the same objective they were grouped together and appear on the Order Paper as the 
Constitution Fifteenth Amendment Bill. 
837 The first five bullets concern the motivation by Dr Delport while the rest is that of Mr van der 
Merwe. 
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current PR system are not answerable to their voters, and this undermines the 
democratic principle of accountability.838 
●  Defection periods have also revealed the prevalence of bribery and corruption to 
induce floor crossing, and this has elicited a negative reaction from members of the 
public. 
●  Given the so-called “ten percent clause”, by virtue of which ten percent of a party’s 
caucus must cross the floor for any one member to be able to cross, floor crossing has 
also had a disproportionately beneficial impact on the larger parties. 
●  The original intention of floor crossing legislation has been subverted and the 
legislation should therefore be revised. 
●  Floor crossing contradicts the provisions of the Constitution that- 
a) Provide for the right to vote for a political party and to be represented 
in the legislature in accordance with the votes so cast; 
b) Allow for the design of a representational system aimed at allowing 
entry into parliament of smaller and bigger political parties alike. 
●  The system of floor crossing has given rise to abuse and the protection of self-        
interest by individual politicians directly in conflict with the wishes expressed by the 
people and has effectively reduced the inclusive function of the South African 
electoral system. 
●  The system has led to a feeling amongst voters that they have been sold out when 
their properly elected public representatives, based on a self-serving unilateral 
decision, nullified their votes. 
                                                 
838 According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Electoral Task Team appointed by the 
Minister of Home Affairs in 2002, 68% of the respondents felt that the electoral system helped voters 
to hold political parties accountable while 60% were satisfied with the accountability of individual 
political representatives. Paragraph 4.3.5.2 of the report. 
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●  Through the conduct of certain individual politicians, voters’ constitutional rights 
are infringed upon and political stability is undermined and threatened. 
●  It is averred that since 2003 statistics have shown that not one of the politicians 
who crossed over and formed their own political parties received any support from the 
voters in the next election. 
●  Given South Africa’s list system of proportional representation, floor-crossing 
contradicts the will of the voters who vote for a political party and not a particular 
politician. 
●  Floor-crossing is based on political greed and merely concerned with short-term 
interests, rather than the long term interests of the voters. 
●  Public perception is that politicians defect from their parties as a result of 
disagreement with policies voters have originally voted for, or because they desire 
senior public office and they believe they are more likely to acquire it by joining 
another party. 
●  The prohibition of floor-crossing will give full effect to the principle and practice 
that the people shall govern and the inclusion of minorities. 
●  An anti-defection clause will prevent parties from having a disproportionately 
larger or smaller representation. 
●  The prohibition of floor-crossing will maintain a political system of as inclusive a 
character as possible that fully accords with the wishes of the electorate. 
 
Both presenters seem to have forgotten the guiding principle of representative 
government, namely that once elected, a public representative represents the public at 
large and the interests of the country as a whole; not only that of the political party 
  181
under whose banner the representative was elected. Seen from this perspective, 
specific party membership becomes less important after an election. 
 
However, as far as the specific motivation is concerned the following comments are 
offered: 
● None of the arguments advanced detracts from the importance of providing for 
elected representatives to change party membership on the basis of individual 
conscience and principle. That successive floor crossing periods have demonstrated 
that those who crossed the floor did not do so on grounds of individual conscience or 
principle is an unsupported and sweeping statement, especially since there have only 
been two window periods so far. 839 It may very well be that certain individual public 
representatives had less than noble intentions but laws are made for general instances 
and no law can dictate an individual’s conscience or principles. If all laws that are not 
strictly adhered to were to be reviewed, there would have been no need for law 
enforcement. 
 
● As far as accountability is concerned it should be borne in mind that it is a founding 
principle of the Constitution that there shall be regular elections and it is ultimately 
through regular elections that the electorate holds public representatives accountable. 
It is true that in a proportional list electoral system the individual public representative 
is not as exposed to the electorate as in a constituency based system, but in a 
proportional list electoral system political parties have a much stronger hold over 
individual public representatives than in a constituency based system where a member 
has a proven personal support base. However, in municipal elections where the 
                                                 
839 2003 and 2005. 
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electorate votes for both ward candidates and a political party on separate ballot 
papers in the same election, the difference between party votes and votes for the ward 
candidate of the same party is insignificant, indicating that the party and not the 
candidate is the decisive factor. This also applied to the constituency based electoral 
system where exceptional candidates have often lost against relatively unknown 
opponents. Examples are Alfred G Robertson, Administrator of the Transvaal, who 
lost against a relatively unknown farmer in 1924 in a by-election in his home 
constituency, Wakkerstroom and general JC Smuts who lost against Wennie du 
Plessis in Standerton in 1948 in a contest that was described as David v Goliath.840 It 
is therefore difficult to see how floor- crossing as such undermines the democratic 
principle of accountability. 
 
● Apart from accusations that were not elaborated on any further, there are no known 
cases of bribery and corruption as alleged. None of the members that defected to the 
ANC, for example, has been promoted to higher office at the time of writing.841 
However, if there is a prevalence of bribery and corruption as alleged, the remedy 
should be directed at the bribery and corruption itself. Inaction against perceived 
bribery and corruption may just as much be a cause for negative public reaction. It is 
writer’s submission that the negative public reaction is to a great extent also the result 
of political parties’ own propaganda, aided and abetted by the media. Instead of 
facing up to the real reasons for defections and their own shortcomings, political 
parties seem to find it more convenient to accuse, without evidence, opponents and 
erstwhile trusted colleagues for lack of moral fibre. They have fallen prey to the trap 
                                                 
840 The Star (19 May 1948) quoted by Piet Meiring in Jan Smuts the Afrikaner (1974) 188. 
841 In a speech delivered at the University of Pretoria on 9 May 2006, Tony Leon, Leader of the 
Opposition, mentioned the case of Dan Maluleke who had instantly been made a whip when he crossed 
to the ANC as an example. However, Maluleka was a whip in the DA at the time of his defection and 
was therefore strictly speaking not promoted.  
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of blaming others for their own misfortunes, rather than facing up to personal 
responsibility through introspection. 
 
● As far as the ten percent threshold is concerned, it is agreed that a threshold by 
definition will always protect the bigger parties but this is an aspect of the existing 
legislation that can be amended without affecting the aim of the floor- crossing 
legislation as such. As it is the ten percent clause does not accord with the intention of 
allowing elected representatives to change party membership on the basis of 
individual conscience and principles. By definition it cannot be an individual decision 
if its execution requires a number larger than one. 
 
● As far as the right to vote for a political party and the right to be represented in 
accordance with the votes so cast is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the 
Constitution also provides for free political choices, including the right to form a 
political party and to participate in the activities of a political party and to campaign 
for a political party or its cause.842 It further provides that every adult citizen has the 
right to stand for public office and if elected to hold office.843 The electorate only 
exercises its right to vote once in five years but people are free to change their 
political views between elections and they do, as is clear from the changes in election 
results from one election to the other. The election result therefore only reflects the 
electorate’s wishes at a particular point in time and where public representatives sense 
a change in the public mood, they should be permitted to act accordingly. Public 
representatives are not mere place holders on a party political score chart. They are 
leaders in their own communities and are not simply required to follow the perceived 
                                                 
842 Section 19 (1). 
843 Section 19 (3) (b). 
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wishes of the voters, but to give leadership as circumstances may dictate from time to 
time. 
 
● As far as the averment that floor-crossing contradicts the provisions in the 
Constitution that allow for the design of a representational system aimed at allowing 
entry into parliament of smaller and bigger parties alike is concerned,  it is not clear 
how floor-crossing negatively affects the entry into parliament of any party, small or 
big. 
 
● Concerning the allegation that floor-crossing gave rise to abuse and the protection 
of self-interest, it should be pointed out that floor- crossing is only permitted during 
the second and penultimate year of the life of a parliament. Those public 
representatives who abuse the system by pursuing self- interest will therefore not have 
long before they have to present themselves for re-election. Since all political parties 
have a system for screening party candidates for high office and the road to public 
office is a long one, it can be expected that only a small number of public 
representatives would fall into this category. The solution to this problem, if it indeed 
exists, is for each political party to better scrutinize those they put on their lists. 
Prohibiting floor-crossing will not cure the problem - public representatives such as 
those described, should never have been on party lists in the first place. 
 
● As far as the sell out allegation is concerned, it is conceded that where an 
opposition member defects to the ruling party it may lead to a feeling amongst voters 
that their votes have been nullified. However, movement from one opposition party to 
another should be seen differently since opposing the ruling party would still be 
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within the broad mandate of opposition. That floor-crossers are self-serving is a 
sweeping statement and the comments above equally apply here. It is also interesting 
to note that none of the members that defected from the IFP,844 crossed to the ruling 
party. With the 2004 crossing, the members that left the IFP were described in an 
editorial in Beeld as politicians of caliber.845 
 
● As far as the allegations concerning the conduct of certain individual politicians is 
concerned, it is suggested that if  only certain individual politicians are involved the 
remedy surely lies in introducing mechanisms to act against those involved and not to 
prohibit floor crossing totally. It is not clear how political stability can or has been 
affected by floor-crossing. 
 
● The statement that statistics have shown that politicians who have crossed the floor 
to form their own parties have no support is not factually correct. The ID which was 
formed in 2003 by a member who defected from the PAC returned to Parliament with 
seven seats after the 2004 general election. 
 
● Concerning the argument that the voters vote for a party and not for a politician, it 
should be pointed out that a party comprises individual politicians who play an 
important role in the party in general and in campaigning in particular. These 
individual politicians can therefore not be left out of the equation. A political party’s 
public representatives are normally known to the public and they play an important 
role in attracting and repelling votes. 
 
                                                 
844 From which party Mr van der Merwe received his mandate to submit the bill.  
845 Editorial (9 September 2005).  
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● As far as the allegation of greed is concerned it should be kept in mind that since 
a member’s term of office is not affected by floor-crossing, political greed, as alleged, 
can only be a motivation if the public representatives concerned gain an advantage 
that sounds in money or position in return. As already indicated, there are no known 
cases of floor-crossers being compensated in one way or the other. 
As far as the alleged public perception concerning disagreement with policy is 
concerned it should be borne in mind that since floor-crossing, in the sense it is 
discussed here, has only occurred from opposition parties, it is doubted whether this 
statement is correct since the policies of opposition parties are not really at issue after 
elections. The period in between elections is rather used to reflect on and adjust 
policies to meet new challenges and changed circumstances etc. so as to improve 
support at the next election. It is normally the ruling party’s prerogative to make 
senior political appointments and if public representatives believe they are more likely 
to acquire promotion by joining another party, it reflects on the confidence that such 
members have in the parties concerned. 
 
● Concerning the principle that the people shall govern it is not clear how an anti-
defection clause would give more effect to the principle. The people can only govern 
through their freely elected representatives and this criterion is met as long as 
representatives are freely elected. Crossing the floor does not alter a public 
representative’s function as a representative of the people. 
● The argument that an anti-defection clause would prevent parties from having a 
disproportionately larger or smaller representation does not appear to be sound. The 
trend set by the 2003 floor-crossing was confirmed by the following general elections 
in 2004 and it can therefore not be said that those parties which gained or lost 
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members during the 2003 floor crossing period, enjoyed disproportionately larger or 
smaller representation during the remainder of the term. 
 
● The argument that an anti-defection clause would maintain a political system that 
fully accords with the wishes of the electorate, endeavors to perpetuate the result of an 
election for five years while it is generally accepted that the electorate’s views are not 
static and change over time. Allowing floor-crossing permits public representatives to 
anticipate changes in the electorate’s political sentiments and adjust for the changes so 
as to comply with the wishes of the electorate. 
 
● The argument that a prohibition on floor-crossing would maintain a political system 
of as inclusive a character as possible is not convincing since floor-crossing does not 
change the composition of parliament, it only affects the number of seats parties hold. 
As stated above, any distortion that floor crossing may bring about will be corrected 
at the next election. 
 
In conclusion it is therefore submitted that the arguments presented by the proposers 
are not convincing. However, as indicated elsewhere in this study,846 there is indeed a 
need to improve on the present situation, especially as far as the power of political 
parties over public representatives is concerned as well as the lack of constitutional 
guidelines for political parties and the ten percent threshold. 
 
This matter was also raised in Parliament during questions to the President847when the 
Leader of the Opposition asked the President whether the government considered 
                                                 
846 Please see Chapter 7. 
847 Hansard 18 May 2006. 
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abolishing or amending floor-crossing legislation. In his reply the President repeated 
the basic argument that  “…during the term of a legislature there can be significant 
shifts in public opinion which do not warrant fresh elections but which have to be 
represented in the legislature.”  He also referred to the overwhelming majority with 
which Parliament approved the floor-crossing legislation848 and the fact that no 
submissions were made to the Constitutional Review Committee in this regard,849 but 
concluded that should there be “sufficient passion” about the matter, Parliament and 
not the executive should review it. 
 
 
6.7 STATISTICAL COMPARISONS 
 
Excluding the floor-crossing that occurred with the amalgamation of the National 
Party and the South African Party into the South African United National Party (UP) 
in 1934, when 56 National Party members and 61 South African Party members 
joined forces to form the new party and the changes that occurred with the outbreak of 
the second world war in 1939, a total of 142 members crossed the floor between 1910 
and 1994, some more than once.  Of these, only 12 crossed from opposition parties to 
the governing party while 23 crossed from governing parties to opposition parties.  
The largest shuffle occurred amongst the opposition parties where 107 members 
changed from one opposition party to another.  There were eleven Parliaments 
between 1948 and 1994 and 109 members crossed the floor during this period.  The 
                                                 
848 84%. 
849 IDASA subsequently made a submission to the Joint Constitutional Review Committee in June 
2006 in which it requested a review of floor-crossing legislation and/or the electoral system “to realise 
an optimal institutional arrangement that mitigates the systemic contradictions and problems 
perpetuated by the current structural and legislative regime.” Please see Joint Constitutional Review 
Committee Submissions (2006) C 24. 
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lowest number was zero during the life of the 1948 Parliament.850  The highest 
number was 24, which occurred three times in a row during the life of the last three 
Parliaments.  There were 16 floor-crossings during the life of the 1974 Parliament and 
15 during the life of the 1958 Parliament.  There were six in the 1953 Parliament and 
five in the 1966 Parliament while the 1970 and 1977 Parliaments only had one each.  
As a percentage the higher cases constituted between 13.6% and 9.2% of the 
members.  Related to the number of seats in the present National Assembly (400) and 
divided equally between two window periods it would amount to between 27 and 18 
members per window period which compares favourably with the 23 and 25 members 
that actually crossed in 2003 and 2005 respectively.  It is also interesting that the 
threshold of ten percent that operated for the first time in 2005 did not make any 
material difference compared to 2003 when there was no threshold.  However, two 
marked differences between the pre-1994 and post-1994 floor-crossing statistics are: 
 
• In the 1948 to 1994 era, even though the governing party steadily increased its 
seats election after election,851 it lost much more seats through floor-crossing 
than it gained from floor-crossing.852 
• In the post-1994 era the governing party had no losses and gained 9 and 14 
seats respectively in 2003 and 2005. 
 
In the pre-1994 era the majority of floor-crossings were between opposition parties 
while in the post-1994 era, movement between opposition parties seem to favour new 
parties. As there have been only two window periods post-1994, it may be too early to 
                                                 
850The amalgamation of the HNP and AP as the NP is not counted as floor- crossing as the parties 
contested the election as a coalition. 
851 With the exception of the 1970 election. 
852 23 losses against 12 gains. 
  190
make a meaningful comparison between the two eras but the following tendencies 
seem to prevail: 
• Pre-1994 the governing parties did not appear to woo members of the 
opposition while the post-1994 government seems to have gone out of its way 
to entice members to cross.853 
• Principles appear to have played a more important role in pre-1994 floor-
crossing with the exception of the crossings since 1992 which appear to have 
been expedient.854 
 
 
6.8 AN EVALUATION OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
FLOOR-CROSSING 
 
Floor-crossing and a free mandate of representation go hand in hand although there 
are constitutions that appear to contain a free mandate but at the same time have an 
anti-defection clause.855  However, in this discussion a free mandate implies inter alia 
the right to cross the floor.  Ever since the first floor-crossing legislation was 
introduced in 2002 and the subsequent Constitutional Court cases, the matter received 
wide press coverage.  Since the window periods for the legislatures and municipal 
                                                 
853  According to a Notice of Motion by Mr Douglas Gibson MP, Chief Whip of the Opposition, the 
Deputy Speaker while acting as Speaker was actively involved in canvassing members of the 
opposition to cross over to the ANC. Hansard 13 September 2005. 
854 Morally there is a very big difference between a member crossing from one opposition party to 
another and an opposition member crossing to the governing party according to Mr Tony Leon MP, 
leader of the opposition. Personal observation to writer in September 2005. 
855 The Namibian Constitution is an example.  Article 45 of the Namibian Constitution stipulates that 
“Members of the National Assembly shall be representative of all the people and shall in the 
performance of their duties be guided by the objectives of this Constitution, by the public interest and 
by their conscience”.  This creates the impression of a free mandate but article 48(b) contains an anti-
defection measure. Similarly, the Constitution of Mozambique states in article 168 (1) that the National 
Assembly represents all citizens and in article 168 (2) that representatives represent the whole country 
and not only those who elected them but in article 178 (2) (b) it is stated that a member vacates his seat 
if he accepts a position in a political party other than the one under whose banner he was elected.  
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councils do not coincide the matter comes up every year and is greeted with a barrage 
of media accusation.  The question therefore arises whether floor-crossing is such an 
evil thing as pictured by the media?  In one of the rare articles defending floor-
crossing, Anthony Butler856 stated the following: 
“These critics confuse floor-crossing, a symptom, with its underlying causes.  Many of the pathologies 
attributed to floor-crossing – MP’s lack of moral backbone, their cynical opportunism and their 
deference to Party Whips - are facets of our electoral system and not products of floor-crossing.  The 
closed list system protects MPs from constituency pressure and entrenches the power of party bosses.  
This pragmatic compromise is unlikely to be discarded because it is broadly inclusive and allows 
parties to reign in careerists and ethnic entrepreneurs.  It is pointless to blame floor-crossing for its 
incidental ills.” 
 
The disadvantages and advantages of floor-crossing are therefore compared with a 
view to come to a conclusion as to which is the preferable theory in South African 
public law. 
 
6.8.1 THE CASE FOR AN ANTI-DEFECTION CLAUSE 
 
This matter was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in the Certification case and 
what follows is a summary of the Court’s judgment on the issue.857 
• An anti-defection clause strengthens party discipline and secures a more stable 
government. 
• An anti-defection provision obliges members elected on a party list to remain 
loyal to that party as the party can easily replace dissident members.858 
• An anti-defection clause prevents the ruling party from enticing opposition 
members to cross to the government and thereby obtaining a special majority 
not granted by the electorate. 
                                                 
856 Business Day (11 October 2005). 
857 Please see pages 829 to 831 of the Report op cit. 
858 However, Mangu op cit 23 points out that “… ‘ (e)nslaving’ a member of a legislature to the party 
that nominated such member does not necessarily serve or promote a free and democratic society.” 
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• An anti-defection clause honours the outcome of an election and meets the 
expectations of the voters. 
• An anti-defection clause bars opportunistic members from crossing for self-
serving reasons. 
• In a proportional list electoral system the voters vote for a party and not for 
individual members.  An individual member should therefore not have the 
right to retain his or her seat if he or she leaves the party under whose banner 
he or she was elected. 
 
6.8.2 THE CASE FOR FLOOR-CROSSING 
 
The occurrence and the role of floor-crossing in South African constitutional history 
are recurring themes in previous chapters and what follows here is a summary of what 
is considered to be the advantages of floor-crossing. 
• A free mandate theory of representation was the positive constitutional legal 
position in South Africa up to 1994. The fact that Members of Parliament were 
free to cross the floor at any time had a positive influence on the political 
development of the country as demonstrated by the fact that all political 
parties that played a role in Parliament during this period had their origins in 
floor-crossing.  Had discontented members such as General Hertzog in 1913 
not been able to voice their discontent from within the system, there would 
have been much more political tension and the evolutionary development of 
the Constitutional process would have been very different. 
• The free mandate theory of representation allowed for the flexibility needed to 
address crucial matters which were unforeseen at the time of an election such 
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as the Great Depression in the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World 
War in 1939. 
• Freedom to cross the floor lessens the rigid control political parties have over 
their members which is advantageous for democracy.859 
• Freedom to cross the floor provides an escape for members who are caught up 
in a party which does not live up to expectations.  It is much better for a 
politician to cross the floor and live to fight another day than to jump ship or 
wait for the next election.860 
• A free mandate theory of representation complies with the generally accepted 
theory of representation in positive public law as applied in great democracies 
such as the UK, USA, Germany, The Netherlands and France. 
 
6.8.3 WEIGHING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FLOOR-
CROSSING 
 
As indicated above a free mandate theory of representation was the positive 
constitutional legal position in South Africa up to 1994 and Members of Parliament 
were therefore free to cross the floor at any time.  Although floor crossing did occur 
on a regular basis861 it did not have the effect of destabilising the government.  During 
the eighty four years preceding the 1993 Constitution a change of government 
occurred once because of the free mandate members enjoyed.862 It therefore appears 
that the absence of an anti-defection clause does not necessarily result in unstable 
                                                 
859 Mangu op cit put it as follows: “As far as floor-crossing is concerned it frees the members of 
legislatures from the imperative party mandate and dictatorship and is likely to promote democracy and 
foster loyalty to the people.”  
860 Butler op cit. 
861 See paragraph 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3. 
862 That was with the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 when the Prime Minister’s motion 
was defeated. 
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government.  The limited free mandate introduced in 2003 also did not result in any 
destabilisation of government.  It did, however, destabilise the opposition.  The 
opposition was further fragmented with a number of new political parties joining its 
ranks and members defecting to the ruling party.863  After the 2005 window period the 
Democratic Alliance was the only opposition party left with enough seats to function 
as an effective opposition party.  None of the other fourteen opposition parties, 
sharing sixty seats, remained with enough members to attend all the Portfolio 
Committees.864 
• Floor-crossing in its present form therefore seems to have a negative effect on 
the opposition. 
• It is true that an anti-defection clause prevents members from defecting but 
whether it promotes loyalty is debatable.  The fact that members are forced to 
vacate their seats if party membership is changed has not deterred members 
from resigning their seats.865 
• Loyalty is a personal quality based on reciprocity and cannot be forced.866  
Tim Hughes867 is of the opinion that the present electoral system results in 
party loyalty at the cost of the interest of the constituents.  It is therefore 
questionable whether it is a good thing to strengthen the already strong hold 
parties have over their members. 
• The argument that an anti-defection clause prevents the ruling party from 
enticing members of smaller parties is more valid.  Although this did not 
                                                 
863 Five new political parties were formed in 2003 and five again in 2005 while nine opposition members defected 
to the ruling party in 2003 and fourteen in 2005. 
864 There are 27 portfolio committees in Parliament and since the committees mostly sit at the same time it follows 
that a party with less than 27 members cannot adequately attend committee meetings. 
865 Examples are Dr Manie Schoeman, former leader of the NP in the Eastern Cape, who resigned his seat as a NP 
member and later returned as a member for the ANC, Mr Bantu Holomisa who left the ANC and later returned as 
leader of a  new party, the UDM and Mr Roelf Meyer, former leader of the NP in the Transvaal and Director 
General of the party, who also resigned from the NP and later returned as co-leader of the UDM. 
866 Butler op cit. 
867 Die Burger 21 March 2005. 
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present a problem in the pre-1994 era, there are accusations that it was the 
case in both 2003 and 2005.  However, this problem can easily be addressed 
by a sunset clause that prohibits a member who crossed the floor from being 
appointed to a more senior position for the remainder of his or her term or for 
a specified period.868 
• Although it is theoretically true that an anti-defection clause prevents a 
member from “stealing” the electorate’s votes, the argument that it honours 
the outcome of an election does not take into account that the electorate also 
changes its position over time as evidenced by the differences in election 
results from election to election.  It also appears that both before 1994 and 
since 2003, the floor-crossers anticipated the changing mood of the electorate 
since subsequent elections followed the same trend. 
• As far as the argument that an anti-defection clause bars opportunistic 
members from crossing for self-serving interests is concerned, the problem is 
that it also bars those who may have truly noble motives. It is like prohibiting 
everybody from driving on a public road because some drivers cause 
accidents.  It is a fact that some members do cross for self-serving purposes, 
especially those who cross from smaller opposition parties to the ruling party.  
However, it is submitted that such members are only acting true to their 
character and most probably became politicians for the wrong reasons.  There 
is no reason to protect such members against themselves and the public is 
quick to identify and reject those politicians who have self-serving agendas.869 
                                                 
868 See speech by Mrs Sheila Camerer MP Hansard 23 August 2005. 
869 It is submitted that the demise of the NNP is directly related to its leader’s personal ambition for 
high public office. 
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• As far as the argument that the seat belongs to the party and not to individual 
members is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the names of members 
who were elected appeared on party lists and that they also canvassed as 
candidates.  Although difficult to quantify it is presumed that all candidates 
attract votes.870  The argument raised above about the changing mood of the 
electorate is also valid here. 
 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
 
Before the anti-defection clause introduced by the 1993 Constitution came into effect, 
floor-crossing was a regular feature of the South African political scene and it played 
an important part in the formation of new political parties through an intra-
parliamentary process.  It also played a major role in forging the Country’s future, as 
South Africa would not have been able to participate in the Second World War if an 
imperative mandate theory of representation had existed at the time.  Notwithstanding 
the free mandate of representatives, floor-crossing did not occur on a great scale 
except when there were exceptional circumstances, such as the Great Depression in 
the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War.  It also appears that where 
floor-crossing occurred in any large numbers, it started a trend that was confirmed by 
subsequent elections.  An interesting fact is that throughout the pre-1994 era, with the 
exception of the amalgamation of the South African Party and the National Party in 
1934, the governing party lost more seats than it gained through floor-crossing. 
 
                                                 
870   Elected MP’s whose names were on Party lists presumably also attracted voters. 
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It is accepted that the introduction of an anti-defection clause in the interim 
Constitution was justified in the light of the necessity of a stable government during 
the initial stages of the Government of National Unity.  That the anti-defection clause 
was not included in the body of the 1996 Constitution is a clear indication that it was 
the intention to re-introduce the free mandate theory of representation within a 
reasonable time.  The fact that it was only re-introduced at the time that the governing 
party stood to gain from the change, seems to have been expedient.  The 
Constitutional Court judgments in the Certification case and the UDM case are also 
not totally reconcilable and leave room for criticism. 
 
The hybrid form of the reintroduced quasi free mandate of 2002/2003 has the 
advantage of regulating floor-crossing by minimising the disruptive effect it may 
have871 to only two periods during the life of a parliament but the introduction of the 
ten percent threshold favours the larger parties unfairly.  By definition the governing 
party will always be the largest party.  Historically larger parties have always lost 
more members through floor-crossing  but the threshold of ten percent effectively 
protects the governing party against defections since the size of the change of 
allegiance necessary to meet the ten percent threshold puts it in the category of a 
major shift.872  It is writer’s submission that if a threshold is necessary at all, an equal 
threshold of three to five members, irrespective of the size of the party, would have 
been preferable. 
 
                                                 
871 The financing of political parties is done quarterly in advance and changes in membership affect a 
party’s allocation but not its expenses. 
872 A group that meets the requirement to break away from the ANC at the next window period will be 
the second largest opposition party with at least 30 members. However, they need not all join the same 
party.   
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It is also interesting that while during the pre-1994 period the governing party lost 
more seats than it gained, the opposite is true for the post-1994 period.  Although the 
threshold has an inhibiting effect as indicated above, it seems that the fear expressed 
by the Constitutional Court in the certification judgment, namely that a free mandate 
may result in the governing party enticing members of smaller parties to cross, has  
proved to be real. 
 
As far as the private members’ bills aimed at abolishing floor-crossing is concerned, it 
is submitted that although opposition parties in general were adversely affected by 
floor-crossing in 2003 and 2005, in the long term a free mandate would be to their 
advantage. The present situation where the ruling party has nearly 75% of the 
Members in Parliament is abnormal in a proportional list electoral system and cannot 
last indefinitely. It is a fact that the bigger a party’s caucus, the better the chances for 
the development of factions that can lead to the formation of new alliances.873 
Without floor-crossing such developments will not be possible. 
 
As far as the advantages and disadvantages of a free mandate of representation is 
concerned, i.e. should floor-crossing be allowed or not, it is submitted that the 
arguments in favour of a free mandate are more convincing and more in line with 
positive constitutional law.  Nevertheless, the hybrid system presently applicable in 
South Africa needs refinement, especially as far as the threshold is concerned.  The 
origin of new one-member political parties through floor-crossing also gives rise for 
concern.  To eliminate such fragmentation of the opposition it is proposed that the 
registration of new political parties be made more difficult.  At present the 
                                                 
873 See front page article in the Cape Times of 15 June 2006 “Cosatu may quit alliance” by Moshoeshoe 
Monare. 
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requirement is only the support of fifty registered voters874 while a seat in Parliament 
represents between 40 and 50 000 votes.  It is suggested that the minimum 
requirement for the registration of new political party be increased to at least 500 
registered voters. 
 
Seen from an historical perspective floor-crossing has had more positive than negative 
results and in its present form it has a tempering effect on the stronghold political 
parties have over their members. 
                                                 
874 Section 15(2)(b) Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.     
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CHAPTER 7 
 
FINAL CONCLUSION 
“Democracy is the most just and benevolent form of government devised by man, but 
it is by no means the most efficient.  Its nature makes it difficult for leaders to face 
problems until they have become a crisis.  Because of the process required for 
election in a democracy, those who are best qualified to either lead or manage seldom 
get involved.  Historically we have been blessed with enough leadership that was just 
in time to save us from oblivion when crisis exploded upon us.” 
Rick Joyner 
 
 
7.1 GENERAL 
 
Crick875 stated that “If one is to reform the world, one had better understand it first.”  
It is trusted that this study contributed to the understanding of how parliamentary 
representation and the emotional issue of floor-crossing developed into the system 
prevailing in South Africa at present.  This study has shown that although there were 
times when development was slow, the process never came to a stop and both in 
Britain and South Africa the devastation of revolution was prevented by making the 
necessary adjustments, sometimes in the nick of time.    The advantage of 
evolutionary progress is that the golden thread of history is never severed and the past 
remains linked to the present which enriches the constitutional heritage.  The 
difference between a constitutional system that developed over time876 and that of a 
system introduced by a revolutionary process877 is that in the first mentioned case the 
experience of the past is a living part of the constitutional heritage of such a country.  
                                                 
875 Crick B The Reform of Parliament (1970) xi. 
876 Which writer contends is the case in South Africa. 
877 Such as Mozambique, for example. 
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Burke put it aptly that the political rights of Englishmen were not based on theories 
but were inherited as a patrimony derived from their forefathers.878 
 
Parliament was from the earliest times seen as representative of the population as a 
whole, although universal adult suffrage was only introduced in Britain in 1928 and in 
South Africa in 1994.  There was no representative government in South Africa 
before 1853 when the first Parliament was introduced in the Cape.  The Cape 
Parliament was cast in the Westminster parliamentary mould but was even more 
democratic than the British Parliament.  What was remarkable about the Cape 
Parliament was that it was colour blind.  However, race and colour did play an 
important role in the former Boer Republics and the representation of people of colour 
became a vexing problem in South African politics from the formation of the Union in 
1910.  Various systems to accommodate the political rights of non-whites were 
introduced from 1910 to 1984, which varied from indirect representation, homeland 
rule to the Tricameral Parliament, none of which met the principles of representation 
in contemporary public law. It could be argued that those who were not directly 
represented were represented virtually, but if it is accepted that boni mores is a 
precondition for virtual representation it must be concluded that those citizens who 
did not enjoy the franchise were also not virtually represented because racial 
discrimination is per se contra bono mores. 
 
The concept of representation in public law developed in Britain and to a great extent 
contributed to the preservation of its Parliamentary institutions and saving them from 
the destruction which overtook such institutions everywhere else.  The body of voters 
                                                 
878 Please see Chapter 3.4 of this study. 
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who chose the representatives was in the beginning not extraordinarily large and also 
not representative of the population as a whole in the modern sense of the word.  
However, through the doctrine of consent the whole community was considered to be 
represented in Parliament and it was only in the Twentieth Century that universal 
suffrage became the underlying principle of representation.  These developments 
occurred gradually and were not so much the result of political ideology but were seen 
as acquired patrimonial rights.  Although representatives originally received express 
instructions they were later left unfettered by direct instructions and were expected to 
strive to promote the general welfare of the realm.  This led to the development of the 
free mandate theory of representation which became the accepted theory of 
representation in positive public law and the prevailing theory of representation in 
South Africa up to 1994. 
 
Political parties originated in Parliament as informal groupings of members that 
congealed into mainly two groupings, government and opposition.  The advent of 
Cabinet Government created a need to secure the support of the majority of members 
which led to the groupings becoming more formalised.   As the election of members 
of Parliament became more democratic it became increasingly important for 
politicians to gain the support of the electorate and formal political parties developed 
from the informal intra-parliamentary groupings.  From this point in time political 
parties developed from intra-parliamentary groupings to extra-parliamentary 
organisations designed to achieve and exercise power.  In South Africa the first 
political party was established in 1880 but it was only after Union was formed in 1910 
that political parties started to play a significant role.  Only three parties governed 
South Africa between 1910 and 1994 and all three parties were established by intra-
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parliamentary processes which would not have been possible had a free mandate 
theory of representation not applied.  In addition 17 other political parties were 
formed by an intra-parliamentary process during the above mentioned period of which 
none remains in Parliament in its pre-1994 form.879  Since 1990 parties previously 
banned from participating in national politics returned to the political arena and in 
1994, a previously extra-parliamentary party won the first fully democratic elections.  
Since the part repeal of the anti-defection legislation in 2003, ten new political parties 
were established through intra-parliamentary processes. 
 
In Britain sovereignty gradually moved from the Monarchy to Parliament and thus to 
the people.  This development was taken further in South Africa in 1994 when the 
Constitution became sovereign.  This resulted in some power being removed from 
political representatives and placed in the hands of the Courts, particularly the 
Constitutional Court, which introduced a new dimension to the function of judges and 
led to the question who really governs the country.880  The limited scope of this study 
did not permit to go into this topic in any detail but it is submitted that the supremacy 
of the Constitution results in the judiciary becoming involved in what used to be 
exclusively the domain of Parliament.  The Courts are getting more and more 
involved with policy matters and there is a real danger of politics becoming settled in 
the Courts.881  This will inevitably lead to tension between Parliament and the 
Judiciary over the application of the Constitution and the independence of the  
bench.882 
 
                                                 
879 The only parties presently represented in Parliament that can be directly traced to parties represented 
in Parliament before 1994 are the DA and the FF+. 
880 See Chapter 5.7 
881 See interview of Wiechers by Eugene Gunning in Die Wêreld 22 May 2005. 
882 See Jeffery Anthea “A Threat all Round” Fast Facts no 6/2005. 
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The transfer of sovereignty from Parliament to the Constitution has a direct bearing 
on the mandate of political representatives since it places the Constitutional Court in 
the position of “supervisor” over certain functions of Parliament.  The problem of the 
supremacy of the Constitution is that its implementation blurs the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.  The new role of the Judiciary does not only call for the 
absolute independence of the Judiciary but at the same time necessitates a system in 
terms whereof the Judiciary can be held accountable.  The appointment of judges will 
also have to be reviewed to ensure that the rule of law does not become a remote 
control lever of the executive.883 
 
It was shown in Chapter 6 that floor-crossing has both advantages and disadvantages 
but the conclusion was reached that the free mandate theory of representation is the 
preferable theory of representation in public law.  Not only because it was the 
historically accepted theory in positive South African public law but also because it is 
better suited to stimulate further developments in democracy.  It was also shown that 
while the free mandate theory applied in South Africa it did not have any disruptive 
effects on South African politics.  It is accepted that an anti-defection clause was 
justified to preserve stability during the initial period of transition but the protection 
can no longer be justified and is a restraint on democratic development.  The part 
return to a free mandate in 2002/3 is welcomed but the current hybrid system favours 
big parties and need to be reviewed.884 
 
 
 
                                                 
883 It is significant that the first president of the Constitutional Court and later Chief Justice was the law 
adviser to the ANC at Codesa and personally drafted large portions of the interim Constitution.  
884 See paragraph 7.2.4.  
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7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the course of this study a number of aspects that need to be addressed were 
identified and the following recommendations are made: 
1. The nomination of candidates by political parties and their recourse to the 
courts. 
It was shown in Chapter 5.2.5 that although the larger political parties do have 
a democratic system of selecting candidates there are no legal requirements in 
this regard.  The Dunne judgment also indicates that a bereaved candidate has 
no recourse to the courts.  To protect the rights of candidates and in the 
interest of democracy it is recommended that political parties be obliged to 
have and implement democratic and transparent procedures for the nomination 
of candidates and that candidates have recourse to the courts in this regard. 
2. Membership requirement for the registration of political parties. 
In Chapters 6.4 and 6.5 it was pointed out that the intra-parliamentary 
formation of new one member parties through floor-crossing became a 
peculiarity of the new system. It is submitted that it is too easy to form a 
political party and it is suggested that the membership requirement be 
increased to at least 500 registered voters, which is not too high a standard if 
it is considered that a seat in Parliament represents more than 40,000 votes. 
3. The appointment of and control over the Judiciary. 
Although the appointment of judges and the control over the judiciary were 
not the subject of this study the matter is related in view of the supervisor role 
that the courts have under the 1996 Constitution.  However, as indicated in 
Chapter 5.7 and also pointed out in the final conclusion, the transfer of 
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sovereignty from Parliament to the Constitution has the potential to create 
tension between Parliament and the Judiciary and it is recommended that pre-
emptive measures be taken to completely de-politicise the appointment of 
judges and to create a purely judicial body to control the judiciary. 
4. Repeal of anti-defection measures. 
The final conclusion of this study was that a free mandate of representation is 
the preferable theory of representation in public law and it follows from such a 
finding that it be recommended that the remaining anti-defection measures 
also be repealed. It is submitted that South Africa has reached a stage of 
political maturity in which the protection of the anti-defection measures is no 
longer needed and its repeal will undoubtedly stimulate democratic 
development and freedom of expression. 
 
FG 
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